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ABSTRACT 
Different agencies and different nations are not able to securely communicate and 
share structured information due to differences in security policies and data formats.  The 
current evolution of security and data policies is not solving this fundamental problem.  
Document-based message-centric XML security can provide satisfactory security within 
a diversified communications framework between traditional and nontraditional partners 
by utilizing existing Web standards for XML canonicalization, XML digital signature, 
XML compression and XML encryption.  Vulnerabilities related to the exchange of 
cryptographic technologies are minimized by strictly adhering to open-standards 
technology.  This approach thus resolves multi-partner trust challenges in regards to 
using another entity's equipment, software, or policy requirements through the proper 
adoption of standards-based structured data and alternative cryptographic algorithms.  
Exemplar results demonstrated in this thesis show that XML Security is a feasible 
approach for operations that include multiple agencies and coalition partners.  
Alternative solutions are also available using proprietary technologies, but such 
approaches lock participants into commercial contracts, prohibit distribution and provide 
suspect capabilities. Therefore, they cannot attain interagency or international acceptance.  
Such methods involve the use of unique or proprietary message formats with customized 
encryption and compression algorithms that are not available for broad scrutiny by open 
source communities.  Closed approaches cannot gain group trust. 
This thesis specifically investigates XML standardization methods for various 
categories of unclassified data to provide secure information exchange among a wide 
audience, e.g. multi-agency task force or multinational coalition partners.  Using an XML 
document-centric approach is a helpful organizing principle for this problem that 
provides levels of security consistent with common business practices achieved, within 
the constraints of the respective organizational security policies of each participant.   The 
resulting design patterns for XML document development enhance confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication commensurate with the nature of the unclassified document 
generated, while maintaining information objects at an appropriate level of security and 
acceptable level of risk. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the global migration from the industrial age to the information age continues, 
the world is becoming a more network-centric environment with an increased 
requirement for the exchange of information.  However, the leaps in technology are not 
limited to those entities that collect and use it ethically.  Unethical users, industrial spies, 
and criminal organizations plunder and siege the opportunity to steal and/or alter 
information in transit for their own nefarious purposes.  Executive Order (EO) 13356 and 
13388 called for improved sharing of information (Bush 2004, 2005A).  However, 
current and future requirements extend the mandate beyond national security.  The 
requirement is to be able to establish an interoperable framework that facilitates secure 
exchange of data communications between traditional and non-traditional partners over 
possibly insecure networks.  Therefore, security policies that have existed for physical 
documents must be updated to include sufficient protocols and methods to protect 
electronic documents.  The security policy and associated implementation at a minimum 
need to address in transit document support for non-repudiation, authentication, 
document integrity, and a level of confidentiality commensurate with the classification of 
the data being transmitted.  These are issues that are faced in government, industry, and 
in consumer markets.   
To combat these problems industry has developed several complex solutions, 
which may negatively impact the users computing experience to the point that policy may 
be ignored or warnings go unnoticed.  Behavioral change is the most common quoted 
solution; however, the behavioral change manifests itself to both the operating system 
and the user.  To enhance a safe and secure computing experience Dr. Phillip Hallam-
Baker suggests that a human-systems integration approach to software design be 
undertaken by software developers in cooperation with the developers of security 
products such that the operating system innately takes a secure stance against infection 
and network infiltration (Hallam-Baker 2008A).  Dr. Hallam-Baker addressed 
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vulnerabilities facing users of the World Wide Web within “The DotCrime Manifesto: 
How to Stop Internet Crime” in which the following vulnerabilities were mentioned: 
 Identity theft 
 Masquerading (Spoofing) Attacks  
 Hijacking  
 Domain Name System (DNS) Security 
In regards to identity theft he stated that the “…the real root cause is the 
inadequate authentication mechanisms used …” (Hallam-Baker 2008A) By embedding 
security within the document, personal identifiable information contributing to identity 
theft can be avoided because document fragments possessing such data can be encrypted.  
It is illegible to anyone who intercepted the document in transit or employed some other 
nefarious method without having access to the appropriate key to decrypt the data.   
The motivation of this thesis is to show that existing web standards for document 
security can be commonly applied across a broad range of important scenarios by 
implementing XML Canonicalization (C14N), XML Authentication via digital signature, 
XML Compression and XML Encryption.  This thesis also demonstrates a meaningful 
exemplar that can work for multiple agencies and nations.   
The World Wide Web is not exempt from being vulnerable to attack.  Originally 
it was not designed with security in mind, but much has been accomplished. Websites 
that reside on the web require protection from nefarious entities that would deface the site 
and/or redirect authorized users to alternate Web sites for the purpose of stealing personal 
data, services, financial information, or deny service to authorized individuals.  When 
such problems occur, who is to be held accountable?  Who should be held accountable: 
the attacked individual for lack of attention to detail, the corporation that owns the Web 
site for not implementing a more pronounced security symbology to emphasize protected 
content, the operating system and/or browser vendor, or a combination of all 
aforementioned?  This is an argument for lawyers to hash out, but the average user does 
not care until they (or someone that they know) falls victim.  Therefore, the issue 
becomes how to manage identity and clearly identify, document, and prevent users from 
falling prey without infringing upon the users browsing experience.  Microsoft Windows 
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CardSpace, Verisign Labs Personal Identity Provider, and Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) were developed to support identity management and mutual 
authentication (Hallam-Baker 2008A).     
Information is a critical element of national power.  This is stressed in “Securing 
Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency: A Report of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity 
for the 44th Presidency.”   The elements of national power consist of diplomacy, 
intelligence, military, and economics (DIME).  These elements are dependent upon each 
other to maintain an operational stable and effective nation.   Since there is a global 
evolution to an information based society, U.S. interests include both civilian and 
national security systems.  “The historic distinction between civilian agency systems and 
national security systems no longer serves the U.S. interest.  Civilian agencies have not 
received the technical assistance they need to protect their systems in the current threat 
environment (CSIS 2008).”  Hence, there is a closely coupled shared security need that is 
governed by policy as illustrated in Figure 1.    
 
Figure 1.   This is a matrix depicting shared Information Assurance/ Security Policy 
needs across Department of Defense, Civilian Agencies, Coalition Partners and 
Civilian Infrastructure. (CSIS 2008) 
A society that is connected globally can neither operate effectively in a vacuum 
cutting international ties, nor can it effectively protect itself by segmenting or dividing 
areas of responsibility and accountability.  For certain cross-cutting problems, there must 
be common ground across all information domains to facilitate secure unclassified 
communications to flow between agencies.  The degree of coupling of the shared policy 
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between agencies differs by their trust relationships as illustrated in Figure 1.  As nation 
efforts move to participate in international organizations where varying levels trust that 
exist amongst members, there is still a requirement to have a common ground in regards 
to sharing data to meet a common objective.  Therefore, by implementing an international 
standard for security at the document level in which coalition partners supply their own 
tools and negotiate the base cryptography algorithm on scene, secure dynamic 
communications are possible.  Additionally, an open standards-based technology solution 
is expected to be far more palatable to entities in attaining diplomatic concurrence from 
multi-agency/multination groups when entering a multilateral policy agreement on the 
technical aspects of communications.  No one group would be seen as having an 
advantage over any other.   
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a metalanguage that allows the 
creation of markup languages for arbitrary specialized domains and purposes 
(Geroimenko et al 2005).  Therefore, based upon each participant’s independent 
communication messaging structure, an extensible stylesheet transformation (XSLT) or 
other conversion tool can be used to adapt to their respective readable format to a 
common document structure, which thereby makes XML an extremely important tool.  
Additionally, with the proliferation and widespread use of mobile wireless devices within 
the business environment, XML is employed for greater flexibility.  For example, 
examine a common object like a cell phone that not only sends and receives text 
messages but also enables web browsing.  It is quite probabable that its using Wireless 
Markup Language (WML).  However, with this comes a security concern that relate to 
ensuring ones personal and/or private information is protected.  Who is to say that 
another entity is not standing by intercepting the transmission in a passive mode, using 
simple devices such as airsnort (Shmoo Group) or other with the combined use of a 
mobile phone sniffer (Elektor) and cellular phone interceptor?  Therefore, requirements 
exist to guard against unauthorized access to information passed via voice or data 
networks.  XML encryption and authentication can help to prevent data loss and 
disclosure to unauthorized parties, preserve document integrity during transmission, and 
provide of a means of non-repudiation through authentication. 
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With the popularity and integration of XML into major vendor’s products, such as 
Sun/Oracle Systems OpenOffice Suite, Microsoft Office Productivity Suite, and 
numerous other commercial and open source tools, XML Encryption is a viable 
technology to support confidential communication exchange between parties that may 
transmit data over untrusted networks, such as the World Wide Web.  Within the 
constraints of an organization’s security policy, it may be necessary to establish point-to-
point links with coalition participants.  As such, there must be an avenue for the initiator 
to decide which parties are authorized to view the given data through a means called 
discretionary access control (DAC) as shown in Figure 2.  DAC approach means that the 
keys to encrypt/decrypt or sign/authenticate documents are distributed on a discretionary 
basis, i.e. only shared among trusted participants. 
 
Figure 2.   Discretionary Access Control (DAC) of key distribution for 
encryption/decryption and signature authentication allows XML security to be 
applied at the document level.  Restricting keys to trusted participants prevents 
unauthorized access to information 
With the application of discretionary access control (DAC), the originator may 
send the document to multiple parties using a trusted or untrusted network.  However, 
 6
with XML encryption applied, only those participants that have the appropriate 
credentials can open it.     
1. Thesis Goal and Scope Use tab key 
Providing a framework for secure uncomplicated communications using XML 
encryption and authentication techniques employing discretionary access control (DAC) 
applied at the document level is the primary goal of this thesis.  The thesis also explores 
the proper combination of Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) compression, XML digital 
signature, and XML encryption methods.  Algorithms implemented are using open source 
tools such as Apache libraries and X3D-Edit (Brutzman).   
The documents used and classification levels applied in this thesis are purely 
unclassified, which promotes collaboration with traditional and non-traditional partners 
with minimal exchange of hardware or cryptographic technology.  All technology used is 
open source and freely available to the general public. There is an element of information 
assurance (IA) that briefly discusses elements of encryption, authentication, 
confidentiality, and integrity.  Nevertheless it is assumed that any such documents 
originate in a secure enclave and is able to transit through a series of untrusted networks 
before reaching a trusted partner’s secure enclave.     
2.  Security—How is it Defined within the Scope of the Thesis? 
Security in the context used within this thesis refers to the four major tenents of 
information assurance which are defined  as follows (CNSS Glossary Working Group):  
 Authentication - Security measure designed to establish the validity of a 
transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an individual's 
authorization to receive specific categories of information. 
 Confidentiality - Assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, processes, or devices. 
 Data Integrity  - Condition existing when data is unchanged from its 
source and has not been accidentally or maliciously modified, altered, or 
destroyed. 
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 Nonrepudiation  - Assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of 
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender's identity, so 
neither can later deny having processed the data.  
The CNSS 4009 defines information assurance as measures that protect and 
defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.  These measures include providing 
for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.  This system does not explore network availability in regards to XML 
encryption and authentication. 
It is assumed that other elements of security such as physical security, information 
security, etc. have been resolved for each secure-enclave endpoint and are thus beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  This thesis does not address unauthorized physical access to the 
platform used to generate the document, nor does it address viral infections on either the 
host or destination machine.  It is thereby assumed that point of origin and point of 
destination are secure and the network path by which the document is to arrive is 
insecure.   This arrangement matches multiple agency or coalition-nation operations. 
The suggestions and recommendations for implementing the encryption are 
derived from the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) XML Encryption Working Group 
(W3C Working Group).  Document-centric security enhances the security posture of an 
organization when properly implemented.  Furthermore, it is designed to support the 
goals and objectives of existing organization security policy.  It is not intended to replace 
existing measures or policies for classified information.  Due care must be taken to 
properly implement document-centric security.  Failure to adhere to the principles of due 
care may result in the compromise of a network-centric organization and other affiliated 
organizations to which it may be interconnected.  
3. Methodology 
The chapters explore XML encryption and authentication verifying that it is a 
viable option under multiple operating systems using various languages derived from 
XML and translated via a respective extensible stylesheet language transformations 
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(XSLT) using the Naval Postgraduate School’s TrackDataConversionHub repository.  
Case studies explored in which this technology can be applied.  This thesis also examines 
the ordering of events to determine the optimum sequence of checking for well-formed 
XML documents, validating document against a schema (as appropriate), processing the 
document to ensure that it is in canonical form, compressing the document using EXI 
compression, and finally processing the document using digital signature and encryption.    
X3D-Edit version 3.2, Oxygen and XMLspy served as the primary tools for 
generating and processing XML data to show proof of concept for the developing 
framework (Brutzman 2009)(Altova 2009)(SyncRO Soft Ltd. 2009).  Cases studies 
include an in-depth analysis of modeling secure attributes embedded at the document 
level that supports the establishment of dynamic communications in multi-agency 
Homeland Defense task force, civilian-military operation, multinational humanitarian 
assistance disaster relief, Civilian Joint & Coalition communications, and secure 
transmission of information through an untrusted network.  Dynamic communications 
refers to the ability to construct and tear down a trust network utilizing DAC. 
B. MEASURABLE SUCCESS GOAL 
The methodology presented study provides a framework to pass unclassified 
structured data to multiple platforms, in a safe and secure fashion, from a secure point of 
origin via untrusted intermediate networks to its secure destination, utilizing standards-
based approach to XML document-centric security.   
Secure distribution of keys for encryption/decryption and signature authentication 
is left as future work.  Interested readers are directed to the corresponding W3C 
Recommendation for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as one candidate for this approach.  
It is noteworthy that establishing a secure set of channels (as described in this thesis) for 
information transfer can also be used for secure distribution of key updates. 
C. THESIS QUESTIONS 
This work addresses the following questions. 
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1. Can an XML document that includes XML Encryption and XML 
Signature Elements provide adequate security commensurate with the 
security level of the data contained therein?   
2. How can the use of XML encryption and authentication best assist in the 
confinement of data to trusted partners? 
3. Do the standardized XML Signature, XML Encryption and authentication 
recommendations within the construct of Discretionary Access Control 
(DAC) satisfy Information Assurance (IA) requirements while 
transmitting or sharing data for which different gradients within the 
unclassified classification level for which each group of users are 
authorized to view?   
4. Can an XML document or message fragment be restricted to showing the 
appropriate level of allowed data access by automatically checking the 
credential store local to the machine from which it is being accessed?    
5. Do these techniques further apply when used in Web Services and real-
time XML chat messaging, as well as X3D visualization and simulation 
streaming?  
6. What role might Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) play in 
concert with these document-centric design patterns? 
7. Can document-level XML security be compatibly applied within the 
current and projected restrictions and best practices governing coalition 
and multiagency operations?  
D. INITIAL CONSTRUCT 
This thesis topic developed from talks with Don Brutzman about potential design 
of a prior program called Coalition Secure Management and Operations System 
(COSMOS), a system intended to facilitate collaborative information sharing among 
multinational military coalitions.  By applying intent-based constructs to the Command 
and Control systems in current use, and by leveraging the Command and Control 
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Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM) as a sharing medium, COSMOS was 
intended to show the ability for multinational military coalition partners to cooperate and 
collaborate (CADS 2009). The initial system discussed is illustrated in the Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Design alternatives for the COSMOS program inpired the initial construct for 
the thesis.  This architecture diagram shows secure sharing via trusted virtual 
private networks (VPNs). 
In Figure 3 , there are four nation states (NS) that are exchanging information via 
COSMOS.  Each nation has their own respective firewall such that the security policies 
of that particular nation are enforced.  In other words only limited sharing is taking place 
between partners.  To enhance security, each NS logs into a VPN in this manner data can 
flow between CENTRIXS and the respective NS.  Each trusted VPN is overlayed on a 
shared network 
Several fundamental problems exist with such an approach.  Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) gateways are often implemented via proprietary software and/or 
hardware, which cannot be trusted by most partners.  CISCO uses IPSEC, which is 
standards-based, but may have some proprietary parts (CISCO).  A common network 
 11
backbone is unlikely to be shared by all partners.  Finally, compatibility or compliance 
with the security policies abd requirements of a notional network like CENTRIXS cannot 
be permitted (or agreed to) by ad hoc partnerships of agencies and nations.  Thus, any 
framework architecture such as that shown in Figure 3 cannot scale up to accommodate a 
diverse set of participants.   
In 2007, the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) conducted an 
assessment on COSMOS.  The assessment focused on interoperability objectives by 
providing data to and receiving data from external interfaces, as well as using standard 
communications ports, protocols, and data formats (Joint Interoperability Test Command 
2007).  Although COSMOS was able to demonstrate information exchange between 
coalition partners it experienced reliability and connectivity issues during the Coalition 
Warfighter Interoperability Demonstration 2007.  For additional information detailing the 
final report visit JITC Web site at  
http://www.cwid.js.mil/public/CWID07FR/htmlfiles/314int.html. 
Design requirements for COSMOS, nevertheless, establish the long-term needs 
with a realtime virtual environment to support communication coordination and 
cooperation across mixed untrusted network environments supporting varying levels of 
trust between participating organizations became apparent.   
Another related effort was also inspired by the challenges facing the COSMOS 
program.  Structured XML data is a core requirement for coherent information exchange 
among multinational parties.  However, XML tends to be verbose compared to legacy 
protocols, and bandwidth throughput is limited.  Due to XML’s verbose nature, XML 
documents must be compressed to be useful to coalition partners.  There are multiple 
potential solutions to this issue.  One early candidate solution was XML schema based 
binary compression (XSBC), a software algorithm to compress and decompress 
documents and images.  However, XML documents must have a schema reference else 
XSBC cannot be used (xmsf.sourceforge.net)(Seren, 2003). 
Given the broad requirement to establish shared security using XML documents 
and XML compression, this work focused on applying XML Encryption and 
Authentication within a framework that allows partners to share information across 
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multiple information domains.  For clarity and respectability, this thesis is focused solely 
on unclassified information.  It explores alternatives that encourage multinational 
cooperation for joint and coalition operations by implementing an approach based on 
international standards to the broad challenge: Securely communicating with 
nontraditional entities to achieve a common goal. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides a general overview of the thesis topic describing in general 
terms the scope of the thesis.  It also provides the initial set of thesis questions that were 
posed during the thesis 
Chapter II provides a summary of background knowledge with references that in 
order to understand the thesis.   
Chapter III presents XML Security capabilities in regards to structure, XML key 
management, order of operations as well as a brief look at the individual operations 
required by XML Digital Signature and Encryption. 
Chapter IV defines the overarching problem, summarized in 3 as follows: 
Multinational/Multiagency communications between multiple actors within a 
heterogeneous networking environment employing discretionary access control via 
cryptographic key distribution. 
 Navigation of multiple security and procedural frameworks to acquire secure 
communications over insecure medium. 
 Providing secure embedded communications at the document level to enable 
multiple XML fragment access based upon cryptographic key.    
Chapter V identifies several use cases and approaches to using efficient XML 
interchange compression with XML Digital Signature and Encryption.  Some of the 
topics included in chapter V are: 
 Application of XMPP Chat in relation to XML Encryption and Digital 
Signature 
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 Possibility of SAML Interactions with XMPP Chat 
 Requirements for a basic XML message 
 A brief exploration of the Basic XML Document Structure 
 Approaches with EXI to include suboptimal, recommended, and ultimately a 
goal state for the application of EXI compression with XML security 
 Application of XSLT translations to pass track data between two systems 
using dismiliar XML-based languages 
 Document and Message Disemination Types in relation to Authenticity, 
Message Integrity, and Confidentiality 
Chapter VI explores applications of technologies and looks at the possible 
integration of those technologies based upon ATALANTA and CTF 151 operations 
within the Gulf of Aden / Horn of Africa.  This section explores the following: 
 Preliminary steps prior to initiation of operations involving OPTASK 
COMMS  
 Practical Encryption technologies 
 Time to crack encrytion methodologies based upon key size. 
 XML Security vulnerabilities 
Chapter VII explores provides conclusions and recommendations  
Appendix A explores a variety of naval MTF messages as well as illustrates 
sample data that was converted from a CSV to an XML file format. 
Appendix B is contains a chart that takes a snapshot of 37 maritime leaders from 
around the world.  This information is a synopsis of information contained in Proceedings 
March 2009 edition. 
Appendix C contains and XSLT stylesheet that was taken from the NPS 
SAVAGE TrackDataConversionHub as of August 2009.  The date is specified here as it 
is likely that the title and date of this archive may change several times as it evolves. 
Appendix D contains an overview of X3D-Edit’s integrated security features that 
facilitate XML Verification and Validation, C14N, XML Digital Signature, XML 
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Encryption.  XML EXI compression integration with X3D-Edit is mentioned briefly.  It 
was released September 2009 hours prior to the finalization of this thesis. 
 15
II. RELATED WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet was originally developed to pass information between two end 
points.  With technological improvement and the Web became easier to use and far more 
manageable.  Therefore, Security of web-based information grew in importance.  
Hypertext Markup Language was one such catalyst that initiated social change and 
brought the web to public’s desktop.  However, the evolution of the Web as we know it 
today has its origins with the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arpanet.  It has enable the 
transition of official correspondence using Message Text Format systems.  Those systems 
have evolved and XML messages can also be generated to enable commanders to 
communicate to an international audience.  Though able to communicate, information 
must be safeguarded in in transit as well as storage similar to the manner in which 
documents are stored.  As the number of documents increased, there must be some 
mechanism to ensure that documents of a certain type contain a common format.  This is 
accomplished by the use of DTDs or Schemas.  Their use assists in expediting the 
retrieval of documents by ensuring that they meet a defined format to establish validity.   
Throughout the evolution of the web, real time chat and the available technologies for 
controlling items remotely were a concern that were met with XMPP and DIS XML.  To 
enhance the user experience X3D technologies were developed which brought a pleasant 
environment to engage in computer-based activities.  
B. SECURITY OVERVIEW 
The Internet was not initially designed with security in mind.  It was designed to 
expeditiously share information between multiple networked computers.  Security was an 
afterthought.  Unlike brick and mortar organizations security safeguards utilizing 
procedures, security guards, physical vaults, and log sheets that exist for securing paper 
based documents and valuables are insufficient for electronic documents.  The 
aforementioned protection mechanisms would be part of an organizational security 
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policy.  A security policy is documentation that is designed to enforce specific rules and 
or regulations to safeguard information, personnel and equipment.  An information 
systems security policy is a statement that outlines how entities access each other, what 
operations different entities can carry out, what level of protection is required for a 
system or software product, and what actions should be taken when these requirements 
are not met (Harris, 2007).  The policy outlines the expectations that the hardware and 
software must meet to be considered in compliance.  This thesis focuses on a flexible 
generalized information systems security policy that provides protection of electronic 
data from unauthorized personnel.   
In providing the level of protection warranted and guaranteeing authenticity, 
message integrity, and non-repudiation, one must sign a document.   When a consumer 
purchases an item on credit he/she can endorse an IOU promissory voucher stipulating 
that he/she agrees to repay the organization that owns the card at a later date.  Both the 
consumer and the retailer retain copies of the invoice.  The signature is valid because no 
two people write exactly alike.  If a payment is in dispute at a later date, the retailer can 
present the invoice that bears the signature and an arbitration authority or judge can 
verify that the signatures match.  Therefore, non-repudiation, message integrity, and 
authenticity have been achieved.  Since both the consumer and the retailer have copies of 
the receipt, the contents can be compared to verify the correctness of the charges agreed.  
A similar concept is applied to the digital world.  Using XML digital signature, an entity 
or corporation can sign the document using their unique private key that can later be 
verified using their corresponding public key.  XML digital signatures by design provide 
for authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation (W3C XML Security 
Specifications  Working Group 2008). 
1. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control 
(DAC) 
In particular, the interest lies in the passing of a document from a secure network 
to a secure network via an unsecured medium such that the document can only be 
accessed by a given individual possessing the corresponding cryptographic key.  
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Unsecured simply refers to the fact that the organizations system administrators lack the 
ability to control what takes place within the region.  The message originator decides who 
is authorized to access the document and therefore encrypts either the entire or parts of 
the document with the appropriate key.  This concept is known as discretionary access 
control (DAC) because it is not a protocol that determines access but the message 
originator.  A system in which access is predetermined is known as mandatory access 
control (MAC).  Using DAC, there is no firm system policy of who is entitled to a given 
key.  The author determines to whom the key is sent.  The recipient of the key is entitled 
to access to the information.  DAC is handled by key distribution described in later 
chapters.  However, it must be stressed that the originator’s control is limited to whom 
he/she sends the document.  Upon receipt, the recipient of the document has control over 
distribution of the document. 
2. XML in 10 Points 
XML is the language of choice for a variety of reasons.  (Boss) “XML in 10 
Points” delivers ten valid critical design points in support of the deployment of XML 
within an enterprise network.  The 10 points are as follows: 
 XML is for structuring Data 
 XML looks a bit like HTML 
 XML is text but isn’t meant to be read 
 XML is verbose by design 
 XML is a family of technologies 
 XML leads XML to XHTML 
 XML is modular 
 XML is new but not that new 
 XML is the basis for Resource Description Framework (RDF) and 
Semantic Web 
 XML is license-free, platform-independent and well supported.    
It has evolved as an industry standard since 1998 and has steadily been adopted and 
integrated in several products and as part of information and technical educational 
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curriculum throughout the country, which mitigates the risk of supportability.    Being 
license-free and platform independent are another great boon because it enhances an 
organizations flexibility in regards to intellectual property rights, which in turn promotes 
information sharing between heterogeneous networks having dissimilar security policies 
(Boss 1999).   The possibilities using XML are endless. 
3. Encryption 
Encryption is a method of representing human readable text (plain text) into a 
non-intuitive form by using an algorithm that manipulates the characters.  The new text 
string that is formed is known as ciphertext.  By encrypting the document, a degree of 
confidentiality is attained.  The strength of the confidentiality is based upon the algorithm 
used and the key length.  Further discussions on the strength of the algorithm are beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  In this manner, anyone may receive or intercept the document, 
but only those with the corresponding cryptographic keys can open the document.    An 
example of encryption is a sentence that each character has been transposed by 3 letters 
e.g. “the cow jumped over the moon” would read “wkh frz mxpshg ryhu wkh prrq” .  
Naturally, this algorithm can be swiftly broken and would only be sufficient for a child’s 
game.  Today’s encryption algorithms such as blowfish, advanced encryption standard 
(AES), triple data encryption standard (3DES), etc., are far more advanced and would 
yield the level of protection required to transmit sensitive material with relative 
confidence that the contents would not be easily revealed.   
C. BENEFIT OF STORED ENCRYPTED FILES 
The secure exchange of electronic data has always been an area of concern.  
Current technologies may implement a electronic portal in which you log in and make a 
database query.  However, such systems require the organization to grant limited access 
to their network.  It may be via file transfer protocol (ftp), trivial file transfer protocol 
(tftp), telnet, etc. but either way the system is exposed to vulnerabilities such that a 
command shell can be created or the system later compromised.  If files are encrypted at 
the document level, they cannot be accessed by personnel that do not have the 
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corresponding key.  Therefore, even if the system is compromised, the encrypted files 
continue to have a level of protection above those that are not encrypted.  No file 
protection means that a brother Donald can read sister Duck’s journal because she left 
herself logged on.  However, if sister Duck is encrypts or even password protects the file, 
chances are that brother Duck, though curious, would not invest the time to continue to 
break into the file.  He may have access to her system but not to the plaintext contents of 
her file. 
D. THE TRANSPORT MEDIUM 
The medium is the physical path by which a bit of data transits from one point to 
another.  It consists of radio frequency (RF), copper wire, fiber optics, and even water.  
Drop a stone in a pail of water and you’ll see ripples.  Place an object in the path of those 
rips and you’ll see the ripples go around the object.  Data transmission is the same.  You 
do not have control of the data once it leaves your network.   
Similar to brother Donald and sister Duck, documents transmitted over the 
internet and radio frequency spectrum face similar issues.  Both of these mediums are 
insecure.  If two vessels, SS Bobmansky and USS McCloud, want to communicate with 
one another, they may send a low frequency message.  However, since the HMS Scotts is 
also in the area, she may passively intercept the message.  If the message is not encrypted 
then the content is not protected and therefore its availability extends the intended 
audience.  For example, take the international soccer tournament in which Brazil and the 
UK are playing against each other.  The SS Bobmansky, HMS Scotts, and USS McCloud 
are in the midst of a multinational exercise.  The SS Bobmansky sends an unencrypted 
message to USS McCloud saying “Go Brazil!!! ”  Sports enthusiasts aboard the HMS 
Scotts passively intercept the transmission and are not very happy with the content.  
People that actively follow the teams are very passionate over their particular sport of 
choice.  Although the described situation is benign the issue could have been avoided by 
simply encrypting the documents.   
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E. MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT (MTF) 
The United States (U.S.) Message Text Format (USMTF) is a designed to provide 
a standardized format for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and associated U.S. 
agencies to facilitate the exchange of information.  Its format is governed by military 
standard (MIL-STD) 6040A Department of Defense Interface Standard U.S. Message 
Format Description.  To provide interoperability amongst the services it requires its data 
to be well formed with a base structure.  All messages have three common parts, which 
are heading, body, and ending.  The heading contains introductory text including overall 
security classification, flag words, and special handling instructions. (Air Support Control 
Officer/ Air Support Operations Operator Course Student Handouts, 2008)  The Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) is the sponsor of the USMTF program and 
maintains the configuration management of the USMTF standard for the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  USMTF enhances coalition warfighting effectiveness through the 
standardization of message formats, data elements, and information exchange procedures 
(Sullivan, 2006). 
F. EXTENSIBLE MARK-UP LANGUAGE MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT 
(XML-MTF) 
XML MTF is USMTF that is designed to utilize the World Wide Web.  It uses 
structural notation that fully utilizes the power of native XML.  Interoperability is 
provided through a common message syntax which can be processed by user systems 
through use of commonly available tools and techniques and can leverage future Web 
techniques.  NATO formats addressed by the Standard Agreement (STANAG) 5500 
Allied Data Publication-3 (AdatP-3) are also supported by XML-MTF via the XML-MTF 
Schema Generation Specification which serves as a point for converting standard MTF 
messages into W3C XML.  The NATO Message Text Format Working Group (MTFWG) 
manages the STANAG 5500 ADat-P3.  XML-MTF is currently supported by several 
products to include Common Operating Environment Common Message Processor (COE 
CMP), IRIS Message Formatting System (MFS), Turboprep, and various others.  (DoD, 
2003) 
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G. HYPERTEXT MARKUP LANGUAGE (HTML) 
HTML is a language based on the Standard Generalized Markup Language 
(SGML) that allows graphic and text based data to be uploaded to the World Wide Web.  
It is a computer language for representing the contents of nonsequential writing inclusive 
of links, media, and text (Berners-Lee, 1999).  Most web pages are written in HTML with 
a growing shift to extensible hytpertext markup language (XHTML) which is HTML 
following the stringent rules of XML which in turn improves structure and ensures that 
the file is valid and ready for parsing by any browser.  HTML is perhaps the main reason 
why the popularity of the web has increased exponentially such that it is now a household 
term.   
H. EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE DOCUMENT TYPE DEFINITION 
(DTD) 
A DTD is a collection of rules that define the content and structure of a valid 
XML document (Carey 2007).  XML files must either match a schema or a DTD.  A file 
is checked against a DTD to ensure that it strictly adheres to the structure defined.  If a 
file is found to be invalid, then an error occurs.  The following is an example DTD 
embedded within an XML file. 
 
 
Figure 4.   An XML file must be valid and can be validated against a schema.  The DTD 
portion starts with the “<!DOCTYPE” declaration. 
<!DOCTYPE place ( 
    <!ELEMENT place (name, latitude, longitude, elevation)> 
    <!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)> 
    <!ELEMENT latitude (#PCDATA)> 
    <!ELEMENT longitude (#PCDATA)> 
    <!ELEMENT ELEVATION (#PCDATA)> 
]> 
<place> 
    <name>Cat City</name> 
    <latitude>95.3</latitude> 
    <longitude>138.6</longitude> 




The DTD is the only definition and validation mechanism embedded within the XML 
recommendation that facilitates the DTD to be embedded directly into an XML document 
(Ayers 2007). 
I. EXTENSIBLE MESSAGE AND PRESENCE PROTOCOL (XMPP) 
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is an open technology 
for real-time communication, which powers a wide range of applications including 
instant messaging, presence, multi-party chat, voice and video calls, collaboration, 
lightweight middleware, content syndication, and generalized routing of XML data 
(XMPP.org).  XMPP is used for instant messaging over the Internet.  It is a form of 
middleware that does not rely upon a central server.  Anyone can set up an XMPP server 
and host chat sessions.  Several open source and proprietary organizations have 
implemented XMPP to facilitate collaboration.  XMPP has several strengths: 
 Decentralized Architecture-no single point of failure because anyone can run 
his/her own XMP server 
 Open Standard-Formalized by the Internet Engineering Task Force, XMPP is 
an approved instant messaging and present technology under the RFC3920 
and RFC 3921.   
 Industry Support-XMPP has been implemented and vetted through several 
large organizations such that security tactics techniques and procedures exist 
to securely isolate XMPP servers from the public Jabber network.  This 
facilitates communications on closed networks. 
 Customizable-Additional functionality can be added to XMPP to ensure 
interoperability  
Despite the strengths, the XEP-0024 Publish/Subcribe XMPP specification had a few 
drawbacks that include issues with scalability and presence data overhead.  However, this 
was corrected with XEP-0060 Publish-Subscribe XMPP update (XMPP Standards 
Foundation).   
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J. XML SCHEMA 
An XML Schema is an XML document that can validate the content and structure 
of other XML documents (Carey 2007) .  They fully support the W3C Namespace 
recommendation, and are created using basic XML.  Schemas can be customized.  A 
namespace provides a simple method for qualifying element and attribute names used in 
Extensible Markup Language documents by associating with namespaces identified by 
the internationalized resource identifiers (IRI) references (XML Core Working Group 
2006).  The XML Schema namespace name is http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema.  It 
contains all the vocabulary used to build a schema definition.   
 
 
Figure 5.   Schemas are written entirely in XML, and in turn validate the correctness of 
other XML documents.   
XML schemas have two types of categories: simple and complex.  Figure 6 above 
uses a simple datatype.  A simple datatype is defined in the XML Schema using the 
empty element e.g. <xs:element name=”Drug” type=”xs:string”/>  Simple types contain a 
single value.  A complex type contains at least one value placed within a defined 
structure as in Figure 6.  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
   <xs:element name="Drug" type="xs:string"/> 
   <xs:element name="ExpirationDate" type="xs:date"/> 




Figure 6.   Schemas can have combination of complex and simple types.  The 
complexType is the element Drug which has two children DrugName and type. 
K. DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION (DIS XML) 
Distributed Interactive Simulation is a binary standard for exchanging information 
in military simulations.  Binary format Protocol Data Units (PDUs) are exchanged in 
order to update positions of entities in 3D virtual worlds.  DIS XML represents the PDU 
in an XML format such that they can be read from the wire in a binary format, turned into 
Java objects, and then written out in XML format thereby enhancing the interoperable 
nature of the simulation.  DIS XML is created using a combination of automatically 
generated code and hand written code. The features of DIS-XML include: 
 The ability to read and write PDUs in XML format 
 A simple networking framework 
 An implementation that includes about twenty PDUs, and XML schema 
descriptions for about 30 more 
 A slider application that allows the user to rotate an X3D box in a window 
using Yumetech’s Xj3D libraries 
 Ability to send and receive packets to Xj3D implementations 
 A rudimentary JUnit test framework 
 A modified BSD open source license 
 An XML schema that describes much of the DIS protocol 
 Some code that can be used in MATLAB to read and write PDUs 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema 
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
   <xs:element name="Drug"> 
       <xs:complexType> 
           <xs:attribute name="DrugName" type="xs:string"/> 
           <xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/> 
       </xs:complexType> 
   </xs:element> 
   <xs:element name="ExpirationDate" 
type="xs:date"></xs:element> 
l t "Q tit "
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 An XMPP (jabber chat) bridge that passes XML-ified DIS PDUs across a 
chat channel 
 Simple sender and receiver programs 
 An ant build file 
(Sourceforge Retrieved August 2009). The following is an example screen shot of 
XML-DIS in action using X3D-Edit. 
 
 
Figure 7.   XML and XML-DIS can be integrated in a number of tools.  The screenshot 
above is taken from X3D-Edit tool DIS Console interface using Yumetech’s 
Xj3D Browser plug-in (Blais 2006).   
L. EXTENSIBLE 3D (X3D) 
X3D is a royalty-free open source International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) standard XML based file format and run-time architecture for representing and 
communicating computer graphics in 3D.  “It is an initiative to leverage 3D as digital 
media as easily as we do with text and 2D graphics.  It provides the technology to enable 
customers to view, modify, customize, and reuse 3D visualizations in other applications 
on the web or on any network device from cell phones to supercomputers.  X3D is 
features a lightweight core 3D runtime delivery engine and is broadcast ready.  It is well 
specified and runs in near real time.  It is the successor of virtual reality markup language 
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and is an absolute must to efficiently render graphics via web services, distributed 
networks, or cross platforms (Web3D.org). 
M. EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE SCHEMA-BASED BINARY 
COMPRESSION (XSBC) 
XSBC is a library designed to compress XML documents and messages.  
It is designed to support both large documents like X3D and SVG files, as 
well as short messages such as SOAP and XML Remote Procedure Call 
(XML-RPC).  A major feature of this library is the ability to register 
compressors for an attribute type, and element or document fragment.  
This allows data-aware compressor algorithms to get much better 
compression than typical generic routines. (Sourceforge )  
N. EFFICIENT XML INTERCHANGE (EXI) 
EXI is a potential successor to XSBC.  It is currently in last call for the W3C and 
shall soon be an official recommendation.  The W3C defines EXI as follows: “EXI is a 
very compact representation for the Extensible Markup Language (XML) Information Set 
that is intended to simultaneously optimize performance and the utilization of 
computational resources. The EXI format uses a hybrid approach drawn from the 
information and formal language theories, plus practical techniques verified by 
measurements, for entropy encoding XML information. Using a relatively simple 
algorithm, which is amenable to fast and compact implementation, and a small set of data 
types, it reliably produces efficient encodings of XML event streams (Efficient XML 
Working Group, 2008).” Sheldon Snyder, a graduate student in Modeling Virtual 
Environment and Simulations Program, is in the process of refining an EXI compressor 
in accordance with the specification.  As of this writing the compressor is not online but 
it is expected to eventually be fully integrated into X3D-Edit.  From preliminary test 
results, the EXI compressor appears promising.  The results are display in the Table 1 . 
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Appendix A contains the messages that were compressed and contrasted using 
EXI compression and GZIP.  
O. EXTENSIBLE STYLESHEET TRANSFORMATION (XSLT) 
An XSLT is a method of converting data from one structure to another without 
changing the original data source.  Unlike XSLT 1.0, which can only convert XML to 
XML, XSLT 2.0 has the potential of converting a comma separated file or other file 
format to XML via the use of regular expressions.  Review the XSLT 2.0 specification 
for further information on XLST (XSL Working Group 2007).  
P. SUMMARY 
Due to the popularity of the Internet, security is a growing concern.  Personal and 
business, and fiduciary data sent via the World Wide Web require some level of 
protection from theft, unauthorized modification, and unauthorized access.   Some 
systems allow the user to specify who may access the information, whereas, in other 
systems, it is based upon a mandatory policy such as any user cleared to use the system 
may access the information which is a form of mandatory access control. Nonetheless, 
access control mechanisms alone are not enough.  There must exist a method of verifying 
that the authenticity of the document.  XML digital signatures perform this function in 
addition to message integrity verification and non-repudiation.  Encryption covers the 
confidentiality piece of the pie by scrambling data.  In regards to data, confidentiality, 
message integrity, authentication and non-repudiation are critical factors in regards to 
properly securing a document.  Protecting the document from unauthorized access is 
accomplished via encryption.  Digital signatures properly employed assist in the 
reassurance that the message is authentic, unaltered, and from a specific individual/entity.   
To mitigate the expense of the verbose nature of XML Encryption it is critical to employ 
some method of binary compression such as EXI.  EXI compression assists pertinent data 
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III. SECURITY-RELATED XML CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
XML Security is a mature technology that enables financial transactions and 
transmissions of personally identifiable information via the World Wide Web.  To this 
end there must be some measure to define what it means to be secure.  By examining the 
Dolev-Yao model of security and the two party cascade models in addition to the XML 
Key Management Specification (XKMS) within the scope of XML security, an 
understanding of what it means to be secure is attained (Dolev and Yao 1983).   
XML Security has several intermediary processes to ensure authenticity, message 
integrity, and confidentiality. Before any of these things can take place, the encryption 
algorithm must be negotiated between the clients such that keys can be exchanged 
appropriately.  Thereafter, when both parties confirm that they can securely exchange 
data with the other then information exchange of data can take place.  Each XML 
message must be checked to ensure that it is valid and well formed prior to being placed 
on the wire.  Failure to perform checks generally result in a message-rejection error.  
XML Encryption provides confidentiality.  The digital signature provides authenticity, 
and message integrity.   
B. BASIC ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOLS 
The organization is sending Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to many 
personnel at once.  However, each participating organization employs a different set of 
protocols and methodology for sending and receiving and validating documents for both 
integrity and authenticity.  Many other other organizations may join the group as time 
progresses.  Some of the participants are permanent members of the group and others 
may remain for as long as it continues to focus on objectives that are mutually beneficial 
to the organization.  The lead organization decided to use a standards-based approach 
using user datagram multicast protocol such that the messages are broadcast to 
participating group of internet protocol addresses.  Based upon the transmission medium, 
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there is a need to protect the content of the transmission against unauthorized access 
while providing a robust content without requiring major alterations of the participant’s 
architecture.  By employing XML Encryption and authentication at the document level, 
secure dissemination of material can be achieved. 
Prior to deployment of the technology, it is critical to tailor the implementation to 
the lowest common denominator in terms of network capability when developing the 
architecture in regards to type of XML cryptographic technology to use.  The more 
verbose the technology the more bandwidth consumed per transmission.  Throughout this 
document E_x and D_x is used to represent the encryption keys.  In order for a 
transmission to be secure, there must be an E_x for each D_x.  This allows for 
asymmetric keys, symmetric keys, and Public Key Infrastructure. 
 Encryption is the conversion of plaintext such as “The Fox Jumped Over the 
Moon” to ciphertext such as “Yjr Gpc Ki,(rf Pbrt yjr <ppm”.  The algorithm used for 
decryption of the example given is simply using the key to the right of a standard 
QWERTY keyboard to denote the appropriate letter.  However, usable encryption is far 
more sophisticated as to conceal the content of the data.   Therefore, authentication, the 
process of determining that an entity is who they claim to be, is accomplished via 
encryption because it is assumed that in a utopian society that only the authorized parties 
have the appropriate keys to encrypt and decrypt the message.     
 This alone is not enough, there needs to be some mechanism in place to prove that 
the message was sent by an authorized entity and ensure that the message has not been 
compromised since its transmission.  To achieve the verification of the sender’s identity, 
a digital signature denoted by S_x … S_n is used.  Depending upon the ordering of 
operations a digital signature can be used to ensure the integrity of operations on a 
document.  A digital signature is an electronic signature specific to an individual or 
organization.  It is mathematically computed and combines the hash of the document with 
the certificate of the user.  A hash is a deterministic function that takes a variable-length 
block of data and returns a fixed-length bit string such that a change to the data changes 
the hash value (Schneier 1996).  Given the following process from A  B would the 
message remain secure: 
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The transmission from A B is E_x D_x S_x ,which using the cascading two party 
protocol for simplicity would be secure because the E_x D_x reduces down to 1, which 
means that a key pair exists leaving only the digital signature.  XML encryption is based 
upon the digital signature.  This issue is discussed in more detail in later sections of this 
chapter. 
 This chapter examines the set of operations required to securely exchange 
information in which security is embedded at the document level.  The operations 
required are verification of well formed XML, validation against a schema, XML 
canonicalization, digital signature, Efficient XML Interchange Compression (EXI), XML 
in generation of the document and the decryption, EXI  decompression, XML validation, 
signature and integrity validation and finally display or rendering of the data within the 
recipient designated format and structure. 
 XML encryption can be used to encrypt Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) 
files and non- XML files (XML Encryption Working Group 2002).  Document-centric 
security is ideal in situations requiring traditional and non-traditional partners to work in 
a cooperative manner to achieve a common objective.  Multi-agency and multinational 
partners that form a task force requires flexibility such that XML and non-XML based 
content are passed securely via the same medium.  Therefore, it is not uncommon for 
photographs, documents in other formats such as MS Word 2003 or Adobe Portable 
Document File (PDF) format to be exchanged between players.  This thesis examines 
XML security applied against XML documents within an operational environment in 
further detail in later sections. 
C. XML ENCRYPTION OPERATIONS  
1. Key Management 
 Key management is an integral part of XML encryption.  The exact operation is 
covered described in detail in the W3C XKMS Specification.  It is necessary to have a 
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key management framework in place to support dynamic messaging with participants that 
join the task force for a brief period as well as those entities that are semi-permanent 
partners.  The base requirements for any key management program are the following: 
 Time To Live (TTL) for any key within the system 
 Nounce – a randomly generated number  
 Type of system  -- ring of trust or centralized methodology 
 Key distribution mechanism 
The following discussion presents a brief overview of details necessary to establish the 
exchange of cryptographic keys.  To meet this objective, cryptographic key exchange 
between participating members is required.  Key exchange falls into one of two different 
arenas: Symmetric in which keys are previously exchanged and Asymmetric in which 
key participants exchange keys.  In regards to public key infrastructure (PKI), the 
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (Fabrega 1999) protocol is used to illustrate the key 
exchange.  For example, a new participant joins the task force and requires keys to 
participate in the exchange of data.  Let us call this new participant entity B.  Entity B 
sends a request to entity A encrypted with entity A’s public key and a nonce (a randomly 
generated number).  Entity A decrypts the message and sends back a nounce it generated 
in addition to entity B’s nonce, as well as its identity.  Entity A encrypts the message with 
B’s public key.  Entity B receives the message and sends entity A back its nonce 
encrypted with A public key.   
In shorthand notation, the flow for Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol would be 






Figure 8.   The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol is a secure method for establishing 
secure data transmission. 
In this manner A and B each have securely passed their public keys to the other 
and also have verified that they were able to decrypt the other’s message.  For Symmetic 
key exchange after mutual verification, as described in Steps 1–3 above, there would be a 
Step 4 in which A sends the B Symmetric Key encrypted with B’s public key and a 
combination of the nonce from A and B.  Upon receipt, B would retrieve the symmetric 
key and forward a reply to A including B’s nonce and identity encrypted with the 
symmetric key as a step 6.  Step 7 would be A responding to B with its identity and A’s 
nonce encrypted with the symmetric key.  Hence both parties are able to communicate 
securely using the shared symmetric key.   
 XML key exchange follows the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 2005 XML 
Key Management Specification recommendation.  The following XML code has been 
generated based upon Bilal Siddiqui’s tutorial “Exploring XML Encryption, Part 1 
Demonstrating the secure exchange of structured data” article that was posted on IBM’s 




Figure 9.   Step 1 of the XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) implementation  
is similar to the Needham-Shroeder Lowe protocol in which is an XML Request 
Message encrypted with recipient public key. 
Step 1.   B  A: {Nb, B}KB 
Step 2.   A  B: {Nb, Na, A}KA 
Step 3.   B A: {Na}KB 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<AssymetricKeyExchangeDemonstration> 
 <EncryptedKey  CarriedKeyName="John Paul Jones."     
              xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'> 






The XML Signature <KeyInfo> element identifies a public key.  The XML Key 
Information Service Specification (X-KISS) defines a protocol for a trust service that 
resolves public key information contained in XML Signature <KeyInfo> elements.  X-
KISS supports two service tiers: Locate and Validate.  
 
 
Figure 10.   This figure depicts XML Key Information Service Specification (X-KISS) 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 when used within a public key infrastructure environment (After 
W3C XKMS Working Group 2009) 
The XML Request Message Example—Step 1 displays a message that would be sent 
containing Jeffrey’s public key.  This is a request message as identified in step 1 of the 












Figure 11.   Responding to the XML request message, the sender returns the message 
containing the recipients public key encrypted with the senders public key. This is 
step 2 of the specification entitled the XML Response Message. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<AssymmetricKeyExchangeDemonstration> 
 <EncryptedKey CarriedKeyName="Jones Brutzcowski"     
               xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'> 
  <EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
  <CipherData> 
  
 <CipherValue>safr3425fdot49sdfsfadfhydbceydf3rfdsgcv</CipherValue> 





Figure 12.   In the final 3rd and final step, both parties now know that they can 
communicate securely with one another and start to exchange data.  The above 
figure utilizes the 3DES cipher block chaining encryption algorithm.  
The XML text is the response message in which Brutzcowski supplies a randomly 
generated secret key encrypted with Williams’ public key.  This is equivalent of Step 2 of 
the protocol described above. 
Figure 12 is step 3 of the protocol described in Figure 8, which the Jones sends 
Brutzcowski a message with some data that has been encrypted with Brutzcowski’s 
public key.  The aforementioned discussion on key exchange was integrated to present a 
general idea of what is involved within the process, however, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to discuss in detail and contrast the various methods of key exchange.   
Key management is an integral part of the overall process, and it is assumed that 
the corporation implementing the technology has competent system architects that are 
capable of deploying systems capable of the various forms of key management that is 
acceptable within their security policy.  In accordance with the specification version 2.0 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<AssymmetricKeyExchangeDemonstration> 
    <PosHostile> 
         <track>97856</track> 
         <Id>Pos - sub</Id> 
         <LAT>12 06 N</LAT> 
         <LONG>23 56 W</LONG> 
         <contact>sight</contact> 
         <unit>P-3</unit> 
         <EncryptedData Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element'  
    xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'> 
      <EncryptionMethod Algorithm='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc '/> 
  <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds='http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'> 
   <ds:KeyName>Jone Brutzcowski</ds:KeyName> 
  </ds:KeyInfo> 
  <CipherData> 
   <CipherValue>KHHIKSUCFERV834322</CipherValue> 
  </CipherData> 
 </EncryptedData> 




for XML key exchange, there are no nounces generated in the initial request.  It is 
generated during the response to the initial request as illustrated in Figure 13. 
 Request 1 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LocateRequest Id="Ia1d6ca7a067fdd545f1a1396d2f26779" 
      Service="http://www.example.org/XKMS" 




  <QueryKeyBinding /> 
</LocateRequest> 
Response 1 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LocateResult Id="Idbc77142059a3a51c9eccd2425d77757" 
      Service="http://www.example.org/XKMS" 
      Nonce="Rj2BoUZM7PisPX2ytSAAWA=="  
      ResultMajor="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Represent" 
      RequestId="Ia1d6ca7a067fdd545f1a1396d2f26779" 
      xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#" /> 
Request 2 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LocateRequest Id="I47804adaec32e34afeecdb51f3e0f765" 
      Service="http://www.example.org/XKMS" 
      Nonce="Rj2BoUZM7PisPX2ytSAAWA==" 
      OriginalRequestId="Ia1d6ca7a067fdd545f1a1396d2f26779" 
      xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#"> 
  <QueryKeyBinding /> 
</LocateRequest> 
Response 2 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LocateResult Id="I3b0111d2232507a56444c1bc85409a94" 
      Service="http://www.example.org/XKMS" 
      ResultMajor="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Success" 
      RequestId="I47804adaec32e34afeecdb51f3e0f765" 
      xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#" /> 
Figure 13.   The W3C XML Key Management Specification 2.0 two-phase key exchange 
protocol implements the use of nonces which further enhances security (Hallam-
Baker et al 2005). 
To register, renew, revoke, recover, and provide services for roaming the XML Key 
Registration Service Specification (X-KRSS) protocol provides a trust service for key 
information.  For further information on XML Key Exchange review the W3C XKMS 
2.0 recommendation (XKMS Working Group 2005). 
2. Well-formed XML 
An XML document can be created from a variety of tools, including simple text 
editors.  However, there are certain requirements that are characteristics to all XML 
 37
documents.  All XML documents must be well-formed at bare minimum.  Simply put a 
well formed document is one that consists of valid XML syntax as defined by the W3C.  
The base requirements for well-formedness are (XML Core Working Group 2008):  
 Documents must have a root element  
 Elements must have a closing tag  
 Tags are case sensitive  
 Elements must be properly nested  
 Attribute values must always be quoted 
Strict adherence to the standard is required to ensure data is processed correctly by all 
participants within a hastily formed network with multinational and/or multi-agency 
participants.  Failure to comply may result in rejection of the message by one or more of 
the participants.   Refer to the W3C at http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#sec-well-formed for 
additional information on the specific constraints on well formed XML.  
 A simple example of a well formed document can be generated utilizing the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s 3D Dimensional (X3D) graphics authoring tool X3D-Edit 
3.2.  An example of a simple set of shapes constructed utilizing the tool follow. 
3. XML Validation Against a Schema 
An XML Schema  provides a means for defining the structure, content and 
semantics of XML documents. It expresses shared vocabularies and allows machines to 
carry out rules made by people (NIST MSID).  Schemas are not required for every XML 
document.  However, they simplify tasks if properly integrated within the operational 
environment.  It ensures that data is in the appropriate format to be viewed by all others 
using the same schema.  Alternatively, if another entity views data in a different manner, 
the schema can be constructed to converted data between an industry specific format and 
a general base format such that multiple users can exchange information from a common 
data repository. 
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4. XML Canonicalization 
Canonicalization (C14) is the process of converting data to the simplest and most 
significant form or schemata to which general equations, statements, or expressions may 
be reduced without loss of generality.  This can be done to compare different 
representations for equivalence, to count the number of distinct data structures, to 
improve the efficiency of various algorithms by eliminating repeated calculations, or to 
make it possible to impose a meaningful sorting order (Rawlings 2004). This thesis uses 
XML Canonicalization as specified in W3C Canonical XML specification (IETF/W3C 
XML Signature Working Group 2001).  The Canonical form of an XML document is the 
physical representation of the document produced in which the following list is satisfied: 
 The document is encoded in UTF-8  
 Line breaks normalized to #xA on input, before parsing  
 Attribute values are normalized, as if by a validating processor  
 Character and parsed entity references are replaced  
 CDATA sections are replaced with their character content  
 The XML declaration and document type declaration (DTD) are removed  
 Empty elements are converted to start-end tag pairs  
 Whitespace outside of the document element and within start and end tags 
is normalized  
 All whitespace in character content is retained (excluding characters 
removed during line feed normalization)  
 Attribute value delimiters are set to quotation marks (double quotes)  
 Special characters in attribute values and character content are replaced by 
character references  
 Superfluous namespace declarations are removed from each element  
 Default attributes are added to each element  
 Lexicographic order is imposed on the namespace declarations and 
attributes of each element 
Figures 14 and Figure 15 depict a simple XML document written with X3D-Edit 
3.2 before and after C14N has been applied. 
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Figure 14.   X3D files are XML compliant.  However, before the application of  
Canonicalization (C14N) unnecessary space is consumed. 
Notice in Figure 14 , there is space which may make the document easier to read for the 
average human.  However, each character makes the file larger.  Additionally, in 
accordance with the W3C XML Signature Syntax and Processing recommendation 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2//EN" "http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-
3.2.dtd"> 
<X3D profile='Immersive' version='3.2' xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' 
xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation='http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.xsd'> 
  <head> 
    <meta content='HelloWorld.x3d' name='title'/> 
    <meta content='Simple X3D example' name='description'/> 
    <meta content='30 October 2000' name='created'/> 
    <meta content='30 May 2009' name='modified'/> 
    <meta content='Don Brutzman' name='creator'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3D.org' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://x3dGraphics.com' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorld.x3d' name='identifier'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorldTall.png' name='image'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/license.html' name='license'/> 
    <meta content='X3D-Edit 3.2, https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit' name='generator'/> 
  </head> 
  <Scene> 
    <!-- Example scene to illustrate X3D nodes and fields (XML elements and attributes) --> 
    <Group> 
      <Viewpoint centerOfRotation='0 -1 0' description='Hello world!' position='0 -1 7'/> 
      <Transform rotation='0 1 0 3'> 
        <Shape> 
          <Sphere/> 
          <Appearance> 
            <Material diffuseColor='0 0.5 1'/> 




          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
      <Transform translation='0 -2 0'> 
        <Shape> 
          <Text solid='false' string='"Hello" "world!"'> 
            <FontStyle justify='"MIDDLE" "MIDDLE"'/> 
          </Text> 
          <Appearance> 
            <Material diffuseColor='0.1 0.5 1'/> 
          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
    </Group> 
  </Scene> 
</X3D> 
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canonicalization is a prerequisite for creation of a digital signature.  All implementations 
of C14N that are compatible with the specification are allowed with XML Encryption 
and Authentication.  It is helpful for interoperability within a cooperative multinational 
and multiagency environment whether at sea or ashore that default attribute values be 
omitted to resolve message size as in the example of X3D C14N.  Digital signatures are 
discussed later in the document.  X3D Edit supports both the X3D specification and also 
the XML specification for Canonicalization throught the X3D-Edit menu option.  X3D 
Edit offers an array of robust security features that are in full compliance with the W3C 
XML, W3C Digital Signature and Syntax Processing, and W3C XML Encyption 
Recommendations.  It is a graphic and visualization authoring tool that sets the bar for 
integration of security products within to facilitate code signing and encryption in 
addition to the ability to process, verify and decrypt encrypted and digitally signed 
documents.  See appendix D for further a further description of X3D edits security 
capabilities, as it relates to XML Encryption and authentication. 
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Figure 15.   After C14N the XML document maintains its form and removes unnecessary 
white space.  Compare the previous figure with this one and it becomes evident 
that it has a smaller file size. 
In contrast with the previous figure, all unnecessary space has been removed from the 
document and now the document has a valid format and is ready for additional 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2//EN" 
"http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.dtd"> 
<X3D profile='Immersive' version='3.2' xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' 
xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation='http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.xsd'> 
  <head> 
    <meta content='HelloWorld.x3d' name='title'/> 
    <meta content='Simple X3D example' name='description'/> 
    <meta content='30 October 2000' name='created'/> 
    <meta content='30 May 2009' name='modified'/> 
    <meta content='Don Brutzman' name='creator'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3D.org' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://x3dGraphics.com' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorld.x3d' name='identifier'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorldTall.png' name='image'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/license.html' name='license'/> 
    <meta content='X3D-Edit 3.2, https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit' name='generator'/> 
  </head> 
  <Scene> 
    <!-- Example scene to illustrate X3D nodes and fields (XML elements and attributes) --> 
    <Group> 
      <Viewpoint centerOfRotation='0 -1 0' description='Hello world!' position='0 -1 7'/> 
      <Transform rotation='0 1 0 3'> 
        <Shape> 
          <Sphere/> 
          <Appearance> 
            <Material diffuseColor='0 0.5 1'/> 




          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
      <Transform translation='0 -2 0'> 
        <Shape> 
          <Text solid='false' string='"Hello" "world!"'> 
            <FontStyle justify='"MIDDLE" "MIDDLE"'/> 
          </Text> 
          <Appearance> 
            <Material diffuseColor='0.1 0.5 1'/> 
          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
    </Group> 
  </Scene> 
</X3D> 
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operations.  When this file is operated upon, it produces a useful representation of the 
Earth with a welcoming banner, as displayed in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   X3D Edit Scene displayed within XJ3D Browser 
5. XML Digital Signature 
XML Digital Signatures provide integrity, message authentication, and/or signer 
authentication services for data of any type, whether located within the XML that 
includes the signature or elsewhere (IETF/W3C XML Signature Working Group).  
However, there is a specific order of operations that must be adhered in order for the 
digital signature to be generated.  Figure 17 is an illustration of the order of operations as 
defined by the W3C. 
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Figure 17.   Digital Signature Order of Operations 
In order for a document to be a valid XML, it must be well formed.  Therefore, it is 
required to verify that the document is well formed prior to any other operation on it.  In 
accordance with the XML Signature Syntax and Processing specification a document 
must be well formed, and must have a canonicalization method that is applied prior to 
being passed through a function to compute the message digests.  In computing the 
message digest, there may also be external references within the document that are also 
covered by the digital signature.  These elements are also used within the computation of 
the digest.  Finally, the digest is used to generate a signature value that by combining the 
digest and a key dependent algorithm to create the digital signature.  Any changes made 
to the document or external references would invalidate the digital signature.  By 
invalidation the computations generated by the recipient of the XML message would be 
different than the computation from the original message.  For example, let us examine 
the value of the secure hash and the message digest of the X3D-Edit XML file before and 
after XML canonicalization by utilizing Linux based tools (md5sum and sha1sum) 
packaged within CYGWIN and is displayed in Table 1. 
File Name: C14N-Example 
    
MD5SUM before C14N   120b2fd35f85649bb62a4e17eeb9389d 
MD5SUM After C14N     7ce6c6f5b71b46e73b89631421550a87 
SHA1SUM Before C14N c67db0b2427517940ee1f2ce6fa5dc1e7024760c 
SHA1SUM After C14N   7c2990813c0adbd16eae86ce54337280e1a85eab 
Table 1.   Contrast of Canonicalization against X3D-Edit file shows that any 
alteration to a file changes the integrity hash value of the file even though the 
content may remain the same.   
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It is noted from the table above that both the message digest and the secure hash yield 
different values for the file in it is initial state and its canonicalized form.  Based upon 
this observation, it follows that if a change to the serialized document occurs the 
signature cannot be verified and thus the file would be rejected from a system, which 
depends upon the integrity of the file and authenticity of the sender. 
6. XML Digital Signature Structure 
The XML digital signature follows a specific format as shown in Figure 18:  
Figure 18.   The digital signature format contains mandatory and optional parts  
 Strict adherence to the format is essential to avoid compatibility issues.  
Examining the figure above, the symbols “?” , “+”, and “*” are appear.  These symbols 
have a definite meaning for anyone that is developing or using a uniform translation 
utility.  The “?” symbol specifies zero or one occurrences.  The “*” indicates zero or 
more occurrences.  The “+” indicates one or more occurrences.  Therefore, it is possible 
to have a digital signature element without a Reference, Transform, Object or KeyInfo 
tag set.  However, for the purposes of this thesis it is assume that all tags are employed 
and that those that go unused remain empty or converted to a singleton via the C14N 
process.  X3D-Edit 3.2 implementation of digital signature is an excellent working 
example of it being integrated in an open source application.  All that is necessary is to 
<Signature> 
    <SignedInfo> 
        (Canonicalization Method) 
        (Signature Method) 
        (<Reference (URI=)?> 
            (Transforms)? 
            (DigestMethod) 
            (DigestValue) 
          </Reference>)+           
    </SignedInfo> 
    (SignatureValue) 
    (KeyInfo)? 
    (Object)* 
</Signature> The <KeyInfo> element indicates the key to be used for validate 
the system.  Possible forms for identification include certificates, 
key names, and key agreement algorithms and information 
The <Signature Value> element carries the value of 
the encrypted digest of the <SignedInfo> element 
The <DigestValue> element carries the value of the digest of 
the referenced resource 
The <Transform> element specifies n ordered list of processing steps that 
were applied to the referenced resource’s content before it was digested 
Each reference to be signed has its own <Reference> 
element identified by the URI attribute 
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encode a well formed XML document, specify the name space for digital signature and 
append the digital signature elements at the end of the document as shown in Figure 19, 







Figure 19.   A digitally signed XML document can be much larger than the initial file as 
shown in the X3D document that generates a primitive sphere 
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Figure 19 can be viewed in a host of X3D viewers.  It is viewed in the open source 
application Xj3D Browser that is available via World Wide Web Consortium site at 
http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/X3dResources.html#Applications. 
D. ENCRYPTION 
1. XML Encryption Format 
Confidentiality is a key element in attaining the goals ascribed to a secure 
document. Encryption is the means by which confidentiality is attained.  Encryption itself 
is a mathematical method of scrambling readable data into a non-readable form called 
cyphertext.  XML has a very simple format for establishing encrypted data.  Figure 20 
describes the base structure: 
   
Figure 20.   Encryption Data Element Structure (Dillaway, Blair et al 2002)  
The language and terminology for natural expressions is uniform and the symbols have 
the same meanings as those previously identified for digital signatures: “?”  denotes zero 
or one occurrence, “+” denotes one or more occurrences, and “*” denotes zero or more 
occurrences and the empty element tag means the element must be empty (Dillaway 
2002).  There are a host of reasons why values may be left to include security by 
obscurity or to hide in plain sight.  Security by obscurity may be implemented by making 
the EncryptionMethod an empty element.  This act complicates the job of unauthorized 
<EncryptedData Id? Type? MimeType? Encoding?> 
    <EncryptionMethod/>? 
    <ds:KeyInfo> 
         <EncryptedKey>? 
         <AgreementMethod>? 
     <ds:KeyName>? 
     <ds:RetrievalMethod>? 
     <ds:*>? 
  </ds:KeyInfo>? 
    <CipherData> 
      <CipherValue>? 
      <CipherReference URI?>? 
    </CipherData> 
    <EncryptionProperties>? 
 </EncryptedData> 
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recipients of the document because they must search for other clues as to which algorithm 
was used to encrypt the document.  This may increase the complexity of cracking the 
code by a sizable amount to the point where the information encrypted becomes stale.  
Stale information is obsolete and can no longer be used to the advantage of potential 
attacker.   For additional information on XML Encryption formats visit 
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core.  Figure 21 represents a encypted X3D-Edit 
implementation of a primitive sphere that has been encrpted. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Encryption changes plaintext to cyphertext such that the original information 
is not discernable from the encrypted variant.  This establishes confidentiality. 
Encrypted data files generally exceed the length of the original file.  Each 
character that is viewed in this document is represented as bits of 1s and 0s such that 
there are 2key length different possibilities for a symmetric key system.  Each bit is 
processed by the encryption algorithm, which utilizes the encryption key.  The encryption 
key may be some very large prime numbers.  As each bit is processed by the key, there 
exists a degree of randomness, commonly referred to as entropy.  As the degree of 
entropy increases, the level of difficulty to break the key follows suite.  However, this is 
not to say that the key key length determines the degree of entropy.  The algorithm that is 
employed also determines the degree of entropy in play. The ASCII equivalent of the file 
after processing is vastly different than the original.  Therefore, a relationship exists 








<!—Additional Data omitted --> 
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2. Two Party Cascade Protocol Example 
Encryption is a method of secure communications exchange in which parties have 
a key such that the message can be deciphered and read.  There are a number of methods 
for encrypting data.  To simplify the initial discussion, the cascade two party protocol is 
presented.  Given arbitrary users X and Y, desiring to exchange messages in which 
operations  and   are applied to a message M .  We can denote this as shown in the 
Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22.   The Dolev Yao Cascade Two Party Protocol is a simple protocol in which the 
agents   and  can apply several layers of encryption or decryption to the 
message. 
For a transaction to be considered secure utilizing the Dolev Yao cascade two party 
protocol, the following condtions must be met:  
 The intersection of the initial set of operations acted upon alpha with the 
encyption key of containing the encryption key of X and Y ≠ Ø.   For example, if 
the initial operation was DxEx where D is the decryption process and E is an 
encryption process then it would violate the rule because DxEx yields no 
encryption and therefore, is null.  However, DxExEy = Ey such that the taget is 
secure meaning encrypted. 
 After the initial step for subsequent steps must hold balanced with respect to X. 
(Bebaïssa 2008) 
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E. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY (PKC) 
1. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 
Public key cryptography is an asymmetric encryption standard that covers RSA 
Encryption, Diffie-Hellman key agreement, password-based Encryption, extended-
certificate syntax, and certification request syntax, as well as selected attributes (Web and 
XML Glossary). The W3C recommends public key cryptography as the primary means 
of achieving confidentiality for web based communications. 
2. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is an asymmetric encryption scheme that involves 
a key pair (public and private) that is associated with an entity that needs to electronically 
authenticate its identity, sign or encrypt data.  As the name suggest, the public key is 
published and accessible to all whereas the private key is kept secret and is known only 
by the message originator.  For PKI to function properly, every client must have a PKI 
plug-in that is configured in such a manner to recognize the location of the local PKI 
repository as displayed in the following image (Hallam-Baker B).  
 
Figure 23.   With the traditional PKI model each enclave has its own PKI repository which 
complicates the maintenance of certificates (After Hallam-Baker, P. et al.)  
Implementing an XML Key Management Specification variant of the Traditional 
PKI utilizing a trust service that interfaces with the underlying PKI achieves a smaller 
footprint, simpler implementation, centralized configuration of trust relationships, and 
flexibility to incorporate additional features with neither modifying nor replacing existing 
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clients.  Therefore, it essentially makes seamless integration of the technology with the 
existing architecture as seen in the image below (Hallam-Baker B). 
 
 
Figure 24.   Clients enlist a certificate authority for authorization within the XKMS Trust 
Services Model (After Hallam-Baker et al).   
F. EFFICIENT XML INTERCHANGE (EXI) 
1. Compression 
EXI is a binary syntax for XML based upon the conclusions of the W3C XML 
Binary Characterization Working Group (Worthington 2009).  Due to the verbose nature 
of Extensible Markup Language (XML), compression is required to normalize the cost of 
implementing XML within a bandwidth-constrained environment.  As of September 
2008, The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) published a last call working draft for 
EXI format 1.0 (Efficient XML Interchange Working Group 2008).  EXI is a general-
purpose format that has shown to work on the entire range of the XML family of 
languages.  Because of its adaptive and flexible nature it achieves compactness results 
equal to, and normally superior to, alternative compression formats as indicated in the 
Figure 25 (Sheldon 2009).  
Figure 25 is a descriptive illustrative comparison of the performance of various 
compression compression algorithms in relation to EXI Encryption.  It is evident that EXI 
is the superior lossless compression algorithm in regard to compactness. 
 52
 
Figure 25.   EXI performance comparison with well known compression methods (W3C EXI Working Group 2009) 
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Table 2 displays results obtained from processing several message files from 
Appendix A in contrast to GZIP and ZIP compression algorithms.   As of this writing, 
EXI is in final call for the W3C and is on it’s way to being a W3C recommendation.  The 







visitRequest.xml Original 6258 6258 100% 
visitRequest.xml GZipped 6258 1695 27.09% 
visitRequest.xml Zipped 6258 1979 31.62% 
visitRequest.xml EXI, No Schema 6258 1084 17.32% 
confrencePlanningMSG.xml Original 19725 19725 100% 
confrencePlanningMSG.xml GZipped 19725 4960 25.15% 
confrencePlanningMSG.xml Zipped 19725 5260 26.67% 
confrencePlanningMSG.xml EXI, No Schema 19725 4045 20.51% 
EXEMPLAR COMMS PLAN.xml Original 27793 27793 100% 
EXEMPLAR COMMS PLAN.xml GZipped 27793 5650 20.33% 
EXEMPLAR COMMS PLAN.xml Zipped 27793 5948 21.40% 
EXEMPLAR COMMS PLAN.xml EXI, No Schema 27793 5098 18.34% 
farewellMSG.xml Original 3349 3349 100% 
farewellMSG.xml GZipped 3349 1336 39.89% 
farewellMSG.xml Zipped 3349 1618 48.31% 
farewellMSG.xml EXI, No Schema 3349 795 23.74% 
Table 2.   Table 1 displays test results of various methods of compression using EXI.  
Visit the World Wide Web Consortium’s Web site at http://www.w3.org/XML/EXI for 
additional information on EXI compression.  To date EXI compression algorithms are 
worthy of supporting secure business transaction and are compatible with XML 
compliant encryption algorithms. 
G. SUMMARY 
The effective use of XML key management, digital signature, compression and 
encryption effectively illustrates a valid secure user-centric interface that seamlessly 
integrates the security to provide message integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and 
confidentiality.  These are the four major tenants of network security.  The order of 
operations is of grave concern because if performed in the wrong order the integrity of 
the message would be in question as the message may be equivalent but not matching the 
original message due to something as simple as space removal.  This leads us to conclude 
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that C14N must be performed prior to generating the digital signature for either the 
overall message or a fragment thereof.  The remaining steps assume that the message has 














IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION: MULTI-
AGENCY/MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONAL DATA SHARING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to secure the sea lines of communications within a global scope, it is 
essential to have a means to securely and efficiently exchange information between 
international entities.  Due to the nature of XML as relayed in the XML in 10 points 
(Chapter III), it is a viable candidate ready for international adoption.  However, as with 
any security implementation, does message and document-centric XML Security address 
the intended task of facilitating secure dynamic data exchange between partners?  XML 
security is a lightweight security mechanism that when followed in strict accordance with 
the W3C working group specifications provides an interoperable, efficient means of 
exchanging data with minimum risks to the existing network architecture.  Each process 
within XML security requirements satisfies a specific function to achieve sender 
authenticity, message integrity, and confidentiality such that the incorporation of XML 
security at the document and message level mitigates risk to the corporate network while 
providing adequate security from secure endpoint to a secure endpoint with minimal 
exposure to either the sender’s or the receiver’s network architecture.    
B. PROBLEM OVERVIEW 
Different agencies and different nations are not able to securely communicate and 
share structured information with each other.  The reasons for this are that the 
information is stored in different data formats and each organization may have a security 
policy different from that of another agency.  The current evolution of data and security 
policies by different agencies and nations do not resolve this issue.  The solution must 
allow for a diverse communications framework to securely enable shared/common data 
exchange between traditional and non-traditional actors.  Additionally, a mechanism must 
exist to provide the minimal exchange of cryptographic technology, which can be 
achieved by implementing open standards technology.  The reasons for this are quite 
simple:   
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 No nation trusts another nation’s security software  
 Innate trust of World Wide Web security because multiple independent 
implementations are available  
 Requirement for a substitute alternative cryptographic algorithm.   
Within the scope of a more secure infrastructure, there must be a shift from persistent 
access to security embedded at the document level.  Within this scope document-centric 
security can be achieved. 
The March 2009 issue of Proceedings interviewed 37 international naval 
commanders-in-chiefs and inquired what they perceived to be the most significant 
maritime security threat facing their respective nation.  70% of the authors mentioned 













Figure 26.   This chart depicts the national concerns of 37 international commanders in 
respect to their nation’s interests.  It is viewed as their nation’s most significant 
maritime threat.  See appendix D for data set constructed from Preceedings March 
2009 article. 
In order to support the operational objectives of Anti-piracy, Counter 
Drugs/Human Trafficking, and Anti-terrorist operations, jointly with coalition partners, 
there exists a requirement to improve upon existing architecture to provide a secure 
enriched environment capable of passing data dynamicly to members joining and/or 




record that exists is what is written in the log.  By using voice-to-text tools, it is possible 
to provide support bridge to bridge in concert with maintaining a virtual log of all 
communications that have transpired.  Data communications can also be passed securely 
from one entity to another using the XML encryption and authentication.   
1. XML Encryption and Authentication—Is it Task Appropriate? 
The first issue that must be addressed is not whether XML Encryption and 
Authentication can secure all communications, but is it the right tool to employ to 
perform an exchange of data between traditional and non-traditional partners in which 
formal diplomatic agreements may not exist?  The answer to this query can only be 
discerned by performing a task analysis and marrying it to the standing organization’s 
security policy such that the operational commander can be well informed on his decision 
to deliver pertinent content to a foreign entity in support of national interests.  The 
following is a pseudo-task analysis generated for a notional situation in which each 
partner nation X are in a position to assist in the pursuit, search and seizure, of a possible 
narcotics or human trafficking smuggler vessel.   
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Figure 27.   The task analysis represent the flow of knowledge that evokes a specific 
response from decision makers in pursuit of a possible contact of interest. 
Pre-planned responses originate with a task analysis.  Figure 27 is a task analysis for 
pursuit of a vessel suspected of malicious activities. 
As seen in Figure 27, the pursuit requires a substantial amount of automated XML 
processing in the retrieval, interim calculations, and display of queried information based 
upon request initiated by the operator.  The source and techniques employed to query the 
information from the SQL data store is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Therefore, based 
1.0 Identify Vessel 
1.1 Receive XML based tracks from multiple data sources  
1.2 Correlate track information with intelligence profile to isolate contacts of interests (COI) 
1.2.1 Query data repository for COI 
1.2.2 Pull history file on COI 
1.2.3 Project COI course and speed based upon track history 
2.0 Identify other Military/Agency Vessels in proximity to COI. 
2.1 Query data repository for other combatants/agency vessels operating in vicinity of COI 
2.2 Pull combatant/agency vessel capability list from repository. 
2.3 Compute projected time to intercept COI for each vessel based upon vessel characteristics 
2.4 Display result of combatant/agency vessels within vicinity capable of pursuing boarding and/or detaining COI 
3.0 Share track information to combatant/agency vessels  
3.1 From 2.4 contact vessels via bridge to bridge to meet on channel XX  
3.2 Notify vessels track info of COI will be sent via unclassified means within XML format  
3.2.1 Identify and authenticate self to member participants 
3.2.2 Negotiate encryption algorithm 
3.2.3 Exchange encryption keys 
3.2.4 Forward XML enriched track info via available means 
3.2.4.1 Determine track data required to ensure combatant/agency vessel can safely accomplish 
mission (Small Arms/ Possible Nukes/ Possible Chemical or Biological/ Threat category  
i.e. pirate, smuggler, terrorist, etc..) 
3.2.4.2 Digitally sign, encrypt, and compress position info 
3.2.4.3 Deliver to appropriate communications suite and forward to critical participants 
4.0 Negotiate vessel to pursue COI 
4.1 Designated combatant/agency vessel acknowledge receipt 
4.2 Consistent with political stance and mission requirements of agency/combatant vessel most capable available unit 
accepts assignment     
5.0 Pursue COI 
5.1 Increase course and speed to most efficient to overtake/intercept COI 
5.2 Launch Asset & Team to expedite search & seizure  if COI is over the horizon (assuming helicopter is available) 
5.3 If no aviation assets are available Military/Agency Vessel Issue Level I Query to COI 
5.3.1 Approach within LOS to COI 
5.3.2 Issue Level I Query issued via bridge-to-bridge channel 13 
5.3.3 Observe action of COI 
5.3.3.1 If COI increases speed or changes course fire warning shot across the bow. 
5.3.3.2 If COI slows and CBDR condition exist proceed till within safe distance to launch small 
boat  
5.4 Board and search COI 
5.4.1 If COI is confirmed (illegal drugs/slaves/illicit arms, etc.) found onboard then detain vessel and 
crew until maritime law enforcement official arrives on scene.  
5.4.2 If unconfirmed take note and release COI 
6.0 Military/Agency report status at end of board and seizure operation 
6.1 Consolidate report 
6.2 Digitally Sign, Encrypt, and Compress Report 
6.3 Forward report to all participating combatant/agency units 
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upon the displayed pursuit task analysis focus on item 3, 4 and 6, all of which employ the 
use of XML digital signature, encryption and authentication elements. 
Probable cause is an important attribute to the pursuit and must be included in the 
transmission especially if the closest participating unit is a coalition partner.  Under title 
14 U.S. Code article 89a, the U.S. coast guard may make inquiries, examinations, 
inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the 
United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations 
of laws of the United States (USC Title 14).  The reason this law is in scope of the task 
analysis is that it establishes precedent for the U.S. to pursue the vessel.  Other nations 
may have such laws on the books that grant their maritime force the legal ability to 
pursue, detain, search, and seize vessels involved in criminal activity as well.  The 
collection and chain of custody of this information is essential to properly prosecution of 
the suspected vessel after the operation has come to conclusion.  The XML messages 
properly time stamped and holding a persistent XML signature to verify the originator is 
designed to verify and validate the information for any interval after the event occurred.   
Therefore, there are information assurance is vital beyond the systems on which the 
document was created.  It must also be a factor from transmission through reception.       
2. Information Assurance (IA) Requirements 
Information assurance are measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  These include providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.  In 
view of information assurance requirements with regards to protection of information the 
commander has to make a decision within moments as critical aspects of the data 
collected that is required to make a pursuit.  The political and mission objectives of the 
actors involved may be quite different from those of the commander’s unit.  
Nevertheless, a common interest exists under UNCLOS for piracy or regional agreement 
that supports the cooperation to ensure the sea lines of communications.   Therefore, there 
exists a need to develop a trust relationship for the flow of communications beyond the 
standard bridge-to-bridge that also minimizes risk to the network or data.  Applying XML 
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Encryption and Authentication at the document level can help based upon the information 
assurance requirements.  The general questions that are of interest to information 
assurance specialist are in line with the four basic aspects of security (Berners-Lee 1999): 
1. Authenticity–Can structured information be delivered to designated parties 
over an untrusted network? 
2. Confidentiality–Is the actual originator of the file an authorized participant? 
3. Message Integrity - Has the file been tampered with or altered during 
transmission? 
4. Non-Repudiation–Can the sender later refute that his/her organization sent the 
information?  
For the purpose of this thesis, it is assumed that participating parties bear no 
malicious intentions towards each other and that their systems are free of malware.  
Therefore, the analysis of whether XML encryption is the appropriate tool for the task is 
based on items 1–4. 
a. Can Content Rich Data be Delivered to Designated Parties over 
an Untrusted Network? 
An untrusted network is a network that is external to the networks 
belonging to an organization and which is out of the organization’s ability to control or 
manage (PCI Security Standards Council 2008). The internet is such a creature.  
Although an organization can put up firewalls, establish demilitarized zones, enable 
MAC filter, etc., once information leaves the organization’s network, it is out of the 
control of the organization’s control.  Therefore, if either the internet or direct point to 
point RF technology is employed there exists the possibility of signals exploitation by 
unknown entities or an adversary.  To guard against exploitation, the life of the data 
being passed over the network needs to be assessed to properly conduct the risk 
assessment to national security.  Base track data generally has a brief valid lifespan.  As 
long as the principle of need-to-know, the minimal set of information given to 
accomplish a given task, is strictly adhered, the threat is minimal.  For example, to pursue 
the COI requires at a minimum base course, speed, associated track number, vessel 
classification, and justification for pursuit to satisfy international political requirements.  
 61
The greater the details embedded within the body of information, the more likely the 
elevation of the level of classification of the information passed.  In the example of the 
task analysis of the pursuit, XML-based data was encrypted to ensure that if 
compromised in transit, the information would be stale before the discovery of decryption 
keys by the infiltrator.  Therefore, only authorized parties would be able to decrypt and 
act on the data contained. 
In the field of information assurance in relation to cryptography, it is not a 
matter of if the system can be broken, it is a matter of how long it takes and the number 
of resources required to break the encryption.  For this reason, it is crucial to evaluate the 
cryptographic algorithms for their inherent characteristics in relation to the data it shall 
protect.    In a well-designed algorithm the larger the key the longer it takes to break via a 
brute force attack.  With document and Message centric security, we aren’t concerned 
with the document being intercepted although precautions are normally taken to 
discourage the act.  If the document were intercepted and XML document-centric 
security is used, the data contained is preserved.  If the data is encrypted, confidentiality 
is retained for a finite period of time.  
b. Is the Originator of the File an Authorized Participant? 
The initial step in phase 3 of the pursuit task analysis is the mutual 
authentication of all actors involved in the pursuit. This can be done in a myriad of ways 
during the key exchange process.  For example, consider the Needham-Shroeder-Lowe 
protocol in which all participants have access to each other’s public key. Let A and B be 
separate entities that have access to a common trust service (certificate authority) from 
which they can confirm each other’s public key.  Therefore, each actor needs only verify 
his or her identity by sending a randomly generated (value known as a nounce) to the 
recipient.  The nounce (N) is known only to the originator and can only be decrypted by 
the authorized actor with the corresponding private key.  Entity B sends () a request to 
entity A that he wants to communicate with her.  Enclosed within his request is his 
nounce and his identity encrypted with his public key (KB).  A responds back to B with 
his own nounce B’s nounce and its own identity all encrypted with A’s public key.  B 
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decrypts the message and sees A’s nounce.  B now knows that he can talk with A and that 
it is indeed A.  Now B needs to send back a message to A to let A know that he can 
indeed communicate, which is done on step 3 of Figure 28, and it illustrates the protocol.  
It is discussed in greater detail as it relates to XML key management specification 
(XKMS) in later sections of this thesis.   
 
 
Figure 28.   The Needham-Schroeder Lowe Public Key Encryption Protocol is an example 
of how information is exchanged within an environment implementing public key 
infrastructure (After Dinolt 2009). 
After step 3 of the protocol, the actors know that they can securely 
communicate with one another and are free to transmit and receive sensitive unclassified 
information.  If PKI is used the identity of the sender is confirmed.   
However, let us assume that the network was hastily formed and a key is 
based upon a shared secret.  Whether using a one-time-pad in which plaintext is 
combined with a secret random used only once or other cryptographic algorithm, the 
secret key is disseminated to each participant.   Since the key is a shared secret, a digital 
signature element is required to facilitate authentication otherwise, the participants would 
not be able to identify themselves to one another.  A key slogan of Dr. Don Brutzman 
that he states frequently to his students is “… you get what you inspect not what you 
expect...” Making no assumptions about the transmission medium the situation may be as 
illustrated in Figure 29. 
Step 1.   B  A: {Nb, B}KB 
Step 2.   A  B: {Nb, Na, A}KA 
Step 3.   B A: {Na}KB 
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Figure 29.   Digital signature clearly identify and distinguish entities from one another as 
well as provide a means to support non-repudiation.  
In Figure 29, Master receives all messages over an unspecified medium.  
However, as opposed to trusting the message header information, he’s looking for proof 
of the sender’s identity prior to making a decision to release resources or issue directives.  
On the right side, the Masters receives the messages from all parties and now certain of 
their identity, is ready to allocate resources to pursue the contact of interest.     
c. Message Integrity—Is this the Same as the Original Message 
Another information assurance concern with the data is whether or not it 
had be altered prior to being received.  Was the message a victim of the infamous man-
in-the-middle attack.  The man-in-the-middle attack occurs when the message is 
intercepted by a third party and during transmission the third party masquerades acts as 
an intermediary between party A and party B while recording the information.  While 
party A believes that he is coversing with party B, he is communicating with party C and 
party C forwards messages to party B.  Therefore, party A and party B both unwittingly 
have created secret keys with party C but believe that they are communicating securely 
with each other.  Therefore, if coordinated effectively, transmissions between party A to 
party B via party C are in accordance with the W3C recommendation for XML 
encryption.  Unknown to parties A and B, party C takes the messages transmitted and 
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repackages them with its own signature.  Once the document arrives at its intended 
recipient, the hash is recomputed and compared with the original message.  If it matches, 
then no compromise occurred; else, reject the message, as it cannot be trusted.   Below is 
the typical flow chart of the generation of a digitally signed XML document.  Therefore, 
XML innately provides an avenue to validate message integrity with a high assurance of 
confidence.    
 
 
Figure 30.   XML Digital signature specification requires that a message be well formed 
and validated prior to XML Canonicalization.  The Canonicalization precedes the 
generation of the Message Digest .  The digest does not only include the XML 
document but also the digest of any other document or link to which the document 
refers.  After a digest is generated the XML Signature is computed using the 
digest and the senders private key. 
d. Non-repudiation—Can the Sender Later Refute Having Sent the 
Message? 
Non-repudiation is accomplished by means of identity management and 
audit tracking.  It is assumed that the sender is the only entity that has access to his/her 
digital signature.  Therefore, if both the digest and the digital signature are valid then it 
follows that the message was sent from said individual.  “The digital signature utilizing 
the public and private key must be recognized and not-repudiated (Hwang 2004).” 
If authenticity, confidentiality, document integrity and non-reputability are 
resolved, does XML encryption and authentication applied at the document level provide 
sufficient information assurance support to satisfy the stringent requirements to make it a 
general purpose tool?  This is an interesting question; however, the answer lies in the 
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strength of the cryptographic algorithm used when sending the message.  Once the 
content is encrypted, it is in a non-intelligible form it reaches a entity with the appropriate 
corresponding key.  However, once the document arrives at its destination and is 
decrypted security rests solely with the systems security configuration and protections.  
XML encryption and authentication cannot protect an organization from malicious code 
nor can it protect it from intrusions.  However, it can be used to safely transmit the 
document from a point A to point B.  An encrypted XML document can be transported 
via a secure sockets layer, which further minimizes the potential hostile exposure to the 
document.  However, for any authentication to work there must exist a level of trust 
between parties such that the originally distributed keys are trusted and verifiable.  
Document-centric XML encryption and authentication takes advantage of this trust by 
ensuring that the discretionary access controls constraints placed upon the file remain 
valid throughout transmission until the file is decrypted and opened.  As such it is not an 
all-encompassing security mechanism, but it can serve the purpose of transmitting 
unclassified information among diverse partners over insecure networks in support of 
combined operations.      
C. INTEROPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY 
Secure exchange of data amongst national and international entities with minimal 
exchange of hardware and software is required to support dynamic secure 
communications with traditional and non-traditional partners.  However, standing 
organizations have years of experience with one or more systems of document 
organization.  Tim Berners-Lee wrote “… the key would be to emphasize that it would let 
each person (organization) retain his own organizational style and software on his 
computer…” (Berners-Lee 1999) This was stated in during the evolution of what is 
known today as the World Wide Web.  The statement is suitable and continues to hold 
true today especially when coordinating tasks with multinational and multiagency 
organizations.  The employment of Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformation 
(XSLT) resolves this to a trivial matter.  “XSLT is a declarative programming language, 
written in XML, for converting XML to some other output without changing the original 
document.” (Hunter 2007 p. 287)   
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The purpose of an extensible stylesheet transformation (XSLT) is to convert a 
data file from one format to another without altering the host file.  XSLT ranges in 
complexity from the very simple to computationally complex. A simple method would be 
to simply declare the fields that are of interest that is desired for the output file such that 
the output file contains only the desired information.   
 
 
Figure 31.   The extensible stylesheet (XSLT) can have a very detailed source and extract 
only that data which needs be available for a particular group or organization.  
There is no limit to the number of XSLT employed on a processed dataset.  
Adding complexity, as in Figure 31, a robust array of data containing personal 
identifiable information  (PII) and as well as financial records, home and office address 
can be extracted and parsed using the XSLT to produce subsets of the original files.  The 
XSLT can be used to assist in enforcing organization security policies thereby supporting 
either a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) in which access to data is restricted only to 
those that are within certain groups to certain subset of data or using Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) in which privileges are even further restricted and generally unyielding.  
Implementing a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) system, it is possible to rapidly 
forward data to other organizations.  However, caution must be employed whenever the 
use of DAC is employed, since once information is released the originator no longer has 
control of the data.  Using DAC, the recipient now has full control of the data.  By 
implementing message and document centric security, which protects the data in transit 
from one endpoint to another endpoint, security can be further embedded to document 
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such that only those individuals with appropriate credentials can have read access.  
However, it is beyond the scope of this document to investigate document and message 
centric security on the system once the document arrives on the system.    
 By isolating the data via an XSLT a very complex system can be made into very 
simple datasets that contain no PII.  There is no limit to the number of times that data can 
be processed via XSLTs.  This means that an XSLT output file can be used as an XSLT 
input file as seen in the preceding figure.   Note that there exist many tools that can take 
data in one format other than XML and produce XML output.  These tools enhance 
interoperability and extend the life of legacy systems such that a smooth planned 
migration to XML based infrastructure can occur over a given period of time.   
With the advent of XSLT 2.0, the original data source need not be XML.  It can 
be an array of different formats such as comma separated value (CSV) file format 
(Hunter 2007). This was a major breakthrough in technological development and 
adoption of XML because only minor, more palatable changes in established 
organizational cultures is required.  Therefore, translations are now a trivial process that 
may use a java applet, the proper implementation XSLT 2.0 set, or some other method.   
 
FirstName MiddleInitial LastName Rank Service Location Status 
John  Phineas Doe CAPT USN USS Bainbridge Up 
Peter Demetrius Jones LCDR USCG USS Comanche Up 
Mathais Plasidius  Montique GS-15 DOD Mombassa, Kenya Up 
Ameila NMN Starr CIV N/A Fulton Co., GA Deceased 99 
Floyd  Morgan Williams  CIV Clergy Boston, MA Deceased 06 
Tang Vu Chiang CIV N/A Siagon, Vietnam Up 
Awanstar Schaeffer Lines CIV Contractor Detroit, MI Up 
Eunice Kennedy Schriver CIV N/A Monterey, CA Deceased 09 
Rovert F Kennedy CINC US Washington, DC Deceased 72 
Ferdinand Dubia Cascinco 1st LT USA Ciaro, Egypt Up 
Geoffrey Xavier Parsons SGT LAPD Los Angelos, CA Up 
Felipa Cordoves Kerr CIV N/A San Diego, CA Up 
Christina Sunshine Johnson CIV USN Dependent San Diego, CA Deceased 90 
Timothy Antwoine Cooper GYST USMC Newport, RI Up 
Antonio Steamer Anderson LCDR USN Baltimore, MD Up 
Vitterio Julius Crisp CDR USN Sigonella, Sicily Up 
Julius  Von Ceasar CIV N/A Naples, Italy Deceased 88 
Loren Jascupisco Peterson CIV N/A Beaumont, TX Up 
Eula Janet Praylor CIV N/A Guam Up 
Adorn Vanessa Johnson CIV N/A Manilla, Philipines Up 
Breanna Naiomi  Santos MAJ USA Muscat, Oman Up 
Table 3.   The file above depicts a spreadsheet with an unknown native format.  
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 Spreadsheets whose formats are unknown can generally be saved as comma 
delimited files ,otherwise known as Comma Separated Value (CSV) files.  CSV files are 
simple text files in which each field is separated by a comma and each row by a carriage 
return.  Most spreadsheets can read and output files in CSV formats.  As such, there are 
several tools that can convert through the CSV or other files to produce an XML file.  
Altova XMLspy for PC based systems and Oxygen XML Editor for Apple Macintosh 
Systems are among several tools that are available.  There are also a plethora of open 
source freeware and shareware resources available with functionality to support 
structured text-to-XML and XML-to-structured-text conversions.  However, structured 
plain text, while occasionally convenient, can also be parsed by custom software.  
Structured plain text also remains significantly inferior to XML encoding since it cannot 
be validated and is further vulnerable to garble error.  
 
 
Figure 32.   Comma Separated Value (CSV) file formats are one of many that XSLT can 
parse through.  The CSV file above was created from a spreadsheet that may or 
may not have a native XML form. 
For example, suppose that an organization’s data is contained in the format of a 
spreadsheet as in the Table 3.  The data might be saved in the CSV file format (illustrated 
in Figure 32) to support being converted to XML with a given tool such as XMLspy, as 
shown in the Figure 33. 
FirstName,MiddleInitial,LastName,Rank,Service,Location,Status 
John ,Phineas,Doe,CAPT,USN,USS Bainbridge,Up 
Peter,Demetrius,Jones,LCDR,USCG,USS Comanche,Up 
Mathais,Plasidius ,Montique,GS-15,DOD,"Mombassa, Kenya",Up 
Ameila,NMN,Starr,CIV,N/A,"Fulton Co., GA",Deceased 99 
Floyd ,Morgan,Williams ,CIV,Clergy,"Boston, MA",Deceased 06 
Antonio,Steamer,Anderson,LCDR,USN,"Baltimore, MD",Up 
Vitterio,Julius,Crisp,CDR,USN,"Sigonella, Sicily",Up 




Breanna,Naiomi ,Santos,MAJ,USA,"Muscat, Oman",Up 
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Figure 34.   Several tools are available to convert files to XML compliant XML.  This is a 




Depending on the tool used, the root of the output file may be different.  The 
resulting file would be an XML file with the contents grouped by row each containing the 
elements FirstName, MiddleInitial, LastName, Rank, Service, Location, and Status as 
shown in the Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35.   The generated XML data file can be viewed from the applications window.  
Above is a fragment of the output from the XML Spy conversion tool.    
Alternately, for some ingenious individual, using an updated version of the SAXON 
engine, there exists XSLT 2.0 which supports direct conversion using regular 
expressions.   In regards to the previous files, both XSLT 1.0 and XSLT2.0 can translate 
XML to another XML format or translate the file to the desired format.   Consider the 
following, a human resources manager needs to provide a print out of her employees for a 
random Urinalysis screening.   The administrator does not want to provide personally 
identifiable information (PII) to the requesting organization but provides the least amount 
of information required for them to complete their mission objectives.  The administrator 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Import> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>John</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Phineas</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Doe</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CAPT</Rank> 
                       <Service>USN</Service> 
                       <Location>USS Bainbridge</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Peter</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Demetrius</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Jones</LastName> 
                       <Rank>LCDR</Rank> 
                       <Service>USCG</Service> 
                       <Location>USS Comanche</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Mathais</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Plasidius </MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Montique</LastName> 
                       <Rank>GS-15</Rank> 
                       <Service>DOD</Service> 
                       <Location>Mombassa, Kenya</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
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utilizes an XSLT such that only the rank and last name are generated as seen in the 
following example.  The first step is to write the XSLT which is displayed in Figure 36.: 
 
 
Figure 36.   The XSLT file above translates the XML file to a streamlined format to obtain 
rank and last name elements.  
The resulting XML output file would appear as in Figure 37. 
Figure 37.   The output of an XSLT is in a customized format in contrast to the original.  
Since all of the data was not required it simply printed only that which was asked.  
The file is now ready to be processed by any tool that needs this format. 
By performing transformation in this manner, it is possible to convert data in a 
variety of formats such that it satisfies the requirements for XML well-formedness, and 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xsl:stylesheet version="2.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"> 
<xsl:output method="xml" indent="yes" /> 
<xsl:template match="/"> 
 <Import> 
   <xsl:apply-templates select = "Import/Row/Rank" /> 
 </Import> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <xsl:template match="Rank"> 
  <Officer> 
   <xsl:element name="Rank">       
     <xsl:value-of select="."/> 
         </xsl:element>  
   <xsl:element name="LastName"> 
    <xsl:value-of select="../LastName"/> 
   </xsl:element> 
  </Officer> 
 </xsl:template> 
</xsl:stylesheet> 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Import> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CAPT</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Doe</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>LCDR</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Jones</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>GS-15</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Montique</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <!—additional rows and data omitted    . 
           <Officer> 
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XML validation such that XML C14N, digital signature, and XML encryption can 
follow.  On the aft end of the transmission, the message is decrypted, digital signature 
and message digest verified, and output file is eligible for display or further manipulation.  
If the output file requires further conversions to match the recipient’s data format, either 
an XSLT or a conversion tool such as XMLspy can be used to convert to the appropriate 




Figure 38.   XMLspy is equipped with tools to convert XML files to other formats such as 
CSV as illustrated in this figure.  
The resultant file of the conversion follows, which requires minor modification to be 
compliant to the database or spreadsheet system that uses the information.  It is listed in 
the Table 4.  
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Thereafter, the file can be opened with MS Excel or any other application that 
accepts data in CSV file format, as displayed in the Table 4. This is a SQL Table. 
Table 4.   The use of tools may require further tweaking of the resultant file to get it 
in the appropriate data format to be used by the system of choice. 
 
Unlike XSLT 1.0, XSLT 2.0 supports direct up-conversion from a text based 
source to XML which means that no other tools are required.  Up-conversion refers to the 
generation of a format with detailed markup from a format with less-detailed or no 
markup, where it is necessary to generate the additional markup by recognizing structural 
patterns that is implicit in the textual content itself (Kay 2009). 
The aforementioned discussion represents the flexibility of XML as a viable tool 
that can be rapidly adopted and implemented with existing systems with minimal learning 
curve.  The variety of acceptable source and corresponding output data files from an 
XSLT contributes to XML rapid acceptance by national and international groups.  This in 
turn allows the discussion to focus to be placed upon the processes required for providing 
secure communications with non-repudiation via digital signature and XML encryption.  
################################################################################ 
# PrimaryKey   
# ForeignKey   
# Rank    
# LastName    
################################################################################ 
PrimaryKey ForeignKey Rank LastName 
1 1 CAPT Doe 
2 1 LCDR Jones 
3 1 GS-15 Montique 
4 1 CIV Starr 
5 1 CIV Williams  
6 1 CIV Chiang 
7 1 CIV Lines 
8 1 CIV Schriver 
9 1 Commander-in-Chief Kennedy 
10 1 1st LT Cascinco 
11 1 SGT Parsons 
12 1 CIV Kerr 
13 1 CIV Johnson 
14 1 GYST Cooper 
15 1 LCDR Anderson 
16 1 CDR Crisp 
17 1 CIV Ceasar 
18 1 CIV Peterson 
19 1 CIV Praylor 
20 1 CIV Johnson 
21 1 MAJ Santos 
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The world is in a constant state of change which means that organizations that 
seek to maintain their information superiority affordably need to seek out and adopt web 
based technologies that require little or no change to their network architecture.  The 
application of XML Encryption and Authentication is one of many possible solutions to 
achieve this goal.  By utilizing digital signatures, secure hashing algorithms, compression 
and encryption techniques; it is possible to provide adequate security for perishable 
pertinent information.  Perishable information is data that is valid for a brief period of 
time such as ship or personnel global positional data.     
D. DIGITAL SIGNATURE 
A digital or electronic signature is a cryptographic process used to assure message 
originator authenticity, integrity, and nonrepudiation (CNSS Glossary Working Group).  
XML Signatures provide all of theses features as defined by XML Signature Syntax and 
Processing (W3C XML Security Specifications Maintenance Working Group 2008 
Second Edition).  On June 30, 2000, the U.S. Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures 
in Global and National (ESIGN) to facilitate the use of electronic records and signatures 
in interstate and foreign commerce by ensuring the validity and legal effect of contracts 
entered into electronically with special requirements for businesses via section 101(c)(1) 
of the Act (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Commerce 2001).  Thus an 
electronic signature holds the same weight as a written signature.  Therefore, as specified 
within the definition there exists a method to ensure that neither the signature is forged 
nor the document altered.  This is accomplished by running the document through a 
mathematical hashing algorithm to obtain a reproducible fingerprint (Message Digest) of 
the document combing the message digest with the entity’s private digital certificate to 
encrypt the message digest to generate a unique signature.  Thereafter, the signature is 
appended to the document, which is unique to both the user and the document.   When 
the document is received at the point of destination, the recipient of the document can 
validate the identity of the sender by decrypting the digital signature with the sender’s 
public key and compare the document’s fingerprint with the computed has of the 
document.  If the message digests match and there exist a trusted third party, the 
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Certificate Authority (CA), which can verify the authenticity of the signer, then there can 
be no doubt that it was indeed the sender that sent the document.  The validated digital 
signature assures signer authenticity, accountability, data integrity, and non-repudiation 
of the electronic document.   
Non-repudiation is the assurance the sender of data as provided with proof of 
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither can 
later deny having processed the data (CNSS Glossary Working Group).  To completely 
satisfy the CNSS definition of non-repudiation there must also be a means to assure the 
sender of data proof of delivery so neither can later deny having processed the data.  It 
must be noted that the use of a digital signature alone is not enough to protect the 
document during transmission from point A to point B.  It nevertheless remains sufficient 
to validate that the document was sent by a specified entity. 
XML digital signature contains several processes as depicted in the following 
figure.  Each document must be well formed.  A well-formed XML document complies 
with the syntax rules contained within the XML specifications.  Any deviations, however 
slight, makes the document invalid.  Within XML compliant browsers, editing tools, and 
compliant software, there exist an XML parser that checks to ensure that the file is valid.  
Invalid XML files are usually rejected and therefore not displayed.  After XML 
validation, the document is processed to be represented in a standard canonical 
representation.   
 
 
Figure 39.   Basic function flow path for XML Digital Signature from document 
generation to signature creation. 
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1. Canonicalization (C14N). 
During XML canonicalization (C14N) all non-essential characters are removed to 
include white spaces.  The acronym C14N comes from the number of characters between 
the C and the N in the word Canonicalization: Forteen.  There is more than one method of 
performing canonicalization.  X3D-Edit specifies two methods: XML C14N and X3D-
Edit C14N.  The most distinctive difference between the two methods is that with X3D-
Edit C14N empty elements are converted to singletons, whereas, XML C14N will ensure 
that for every opening tag, there is a corresponding closing tag.  For more information on 
XML canonicalization, visit the World Wide Web Consortium Web site and review the 
technical specification at http://www.w3c.org/TR/xml-c14n.html.  By performing the 
process of canonicalization, the document generated is representative of that produced by 
other canonicalization processes on other systems.  A document in canonical form may 
be substituted for the original document without any loss of generality.  Canonicalization 
is a critical piece to attaining universal interoperability with systems of various origins.   
2. Message Digest 
Once the document has been canonicalized, a message digest of the document and 
all associated documents referenced within the main document must be computed.  A 
message digest is the product of a unidirectional mathematical function that takes a 
variable length input string (document) and converts it to a fixed-length output string 
(hash value / message digest) (Schneier 1996 p. 30).   With the XML digest process both 
internal and external digests are computed to derive a hash value that is unique to that 
particular document.  The value generated is used only once and large enough such that it 
cannot be reproduced.   
If a digitally signed document is sent in the clear without any other form of 
protection, the XML digital signature does not guarantee the confidentiality of the 
document.  The document is susceptible to interception by devices or applications such as 
wireshark, airsnort, etc. (The Schmoo Group 2009 Retrieved August 2009, Combs, 
Retrieved August 2009).  For the intent of this thesis, it is assumed that the hashing 
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algorithm used does not produce two message digests that are equivalent to each other 
but that each hash is unique to that particular document.  
This information is in turn passed to the XML signature generation process. The 
digital signature process encrypts the message digest with a unique private key ensuring 
message integrity and sender non-repudiation.  When the recipient receives the 
document, he/she computes a message digest using the same algorithm as was used in its 
generation and compare that result with the message digest decrypted with the public key.  
In order to ensure compatibility across the board, all systems need to meet the 
minimum requirements for digital signature.  Although it does not grant confidentiality, 
the assurances provided when properly implemented satisfy the majority of the 
information assurance requirements previously discussed.  Strict adherence to the W3C 
standards is key to successfully producing an interoperable XML document that can be 
processed by multiple agencies and by national assets of various countries.  Its open 
source and non-proprietary, which means no organization can legally lay claim to the 
ideas, which in terms makes it an appealing architecture for budget conscious 
organizations which can grow their own tech support infrastructures and obtain 
reachback support via online communities, newsgroups, IRC chats, etc.  The W3C 
community forum is an excellent source of information that may be appropriate for 
several Web-based specialist supporting an organization.  Others may elect to purchase a 
service from on-call professionals particularly skilled in the open source technology for a 
fee.   
3. Identity Management 
Digital signature technology offers the opportunity to investigate identity 
management.  Too often the technology employed is encumbered by warnings and pop-
ups that act as an annoyance to the average end user.  Over time the user looses their 
security awareness and just click on the dialogue to quickly move to the next task.  In so 




network.  XML digital signature in concert with modern browser technology can help in 
communicating in a user-centric, user-friendly, environment the authenticity of the sender 
such that the content can be trusted.   
A user-centric approach incorporates techniques and skills of human-system 
integration specialist such as those used in the construction and operation of the apple 
Macintosh computer and operating systems.  The approach focuses on how the computer 
can provide information to the user in a more usable fashion.  Consider the scenario of a 
user requesting a document from a Department of the Defense server, as shown in Figure 
40. 
    
Figure 40.   Browsers employ different mechanisms to assist the user in protecting 
personal identifiable information.  The figure above illustrates Mozilla Firefox 
implementation of identity management by having the user decide whether the 
site is trustworthy via certificate verification. 
Without access to the certificate authority (CA) database, a trust relationship 
cannot be established.  Therefore, the user must ultimately determine the trustworthiness 
of the Web site.  Browser awareness can assist in alerting the user of a potentially 
dangerous situation without negatively impacting the user experience.  The use of colors, 
such as red, within the browser bar denotes proceed with extreme caution, as seen in 
Figure 41. 
Firefox has notified the user that the site has failed because the identity of 
the server has not been validated by a trusted/ recognized authority 
The site Naval Postgraduate School secure website for webmail 
via secure sockets layer  
Certificate information showing a valid certificate offered 
provided by the United States government 
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Figure 41.   Internet Explorer warns the user at the command bar of possible invalid 
certificate.  Keep in mind that the user still has full control as to whether or not 
he/she precedes to the site. 
 
Figure 42.   Mozilla Firefox is displayed the PayPal site as secure by verifying its identity 
in which its logo is within the address bar the color is green for go and there is a 
lock-&-key representing a secure Web site. 
The use of colors and symbols shows a visual flag to enhance the user’s 
situational awareness, to include revealing the accountable party and the identification of 
the trusted organization that issued the certificate without detracting from the user’s web 
based browsing experience.   The padlock immediately alerts the user to the site’s trusted 
nature by a central authority to which the browser application has access to verify the 
source identity.  If both the certificate is valid and the document is secure for web 
services, then both the padlock, the credentialing authority, and the toolbar color 
Internet Explorer indicating a 
certificate problem 
Displays extended validation of this 
Versign protected site. Green means go!   
Site is secure 
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illuminates the change.  XML digital signatures provide identity management because 
only the author has custody of his/her private key for signing a document.  As seen in 
Figures 41 and 42, the information is displayed in an unobtrusive manner consistent with 
the alerts the user is communicating with a secure document or receiving a secure 
transmission from an identified source.  Therefore, within the scope of the 
aforementioned, accountability is placed with the certificate authority (CA), as it is the 
central authority that validates the identity of the sender.   SSL based transactions are 
denoted by a lockbox within the browser.  Certificate endorsement is crucial to establish 
a sufficient ring of trust.  Since anyone having the proper software and equipment can 
generate a certificate, the certificate authority must be trusted by both sender and 
originator else no trust relationship exists.  This is a matter of proving identity.  The 
DotCrime Manifesto speaks about the concepts of identity management and of the 
initiatives that multiple proprietary and open source companies are undertaking to 
implement it.   
Within the scope of this topic, identity management comes in the form of a digital 
signature.  Digitally signed documents and the respective ordering of encryption-
signature-compression is critical to ensuring that the document’s point of origin is 
authentic.  Again, it must be iterated that the term, security, in the sense used herein is 
focused from the secure endpoint to secure endpoint.  All transmissions and transports are 
potentially insecure. 
Communications with multinational military organizations and civilian agencies 
alone is not sufficient to successfully accomplish the mission of international 
interoperability.  The oceans are used by commercial, military, and civilian pleasure 
vessels (yachts, sailboats, fishing boats, etc.).  As such, there exists a need to exchange 
data, track information, and status with the civilian craft.  Bridge-to-Bridge radio 
communications has been the method by which information has been exchanged for 
several years.  Now with the threat of piracy on the rise, this method needs to be 
augmented by data exchange technology such that any military or law enforcement vessel 
can quickly send assets to the problem area to offer a would-be aggressor an incentive to 
rethink their intentions.  The world is no longer seen as havens of democracy, fascism, or 
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communism that protect its citizenry from piracy.  The view has changed out of necessity 
because no single nation can have its forces transcend space and time to be on station 
during an attack upon its citizenry while at sea.  Such actions require collaboration 
amongst traditional and nontraditional partners to get the job done.    
Suppose a United States flagged warship ALPHA receives a distress message 
from a civilian vessel, BAKER that is 50 miles away.  The distress message has a 
universal code that signifies an pirate attack is in progress.  Even at flank speed the U.S. 
flagged vessel would arrive after the damage had been done.  However, it is noted that 
another ship CHARLIE in which no formal agreement is on file is within 15 miles of the 
scene.  At flank speed and with aerial assets it may be able to avert the attack and detain 
the suspected pirate vessel.  Ship ALPHA decides to initiate a secure communications 
exchange with ship CHARLIE in support of non-military unit BAKER.  Unit BAKER is 
neither ofU.S. nor ship CHARLIE origin, but pirates are attacking it.  Since the host 
nations of Ship ALPHA and Ship CHARLIE lack a formal agreement in regards to secure 
secret communications, there must exist an alternative method to securely communicate 
and exchange information without alerting the pirates.  Bridge-to-Bridge communications 
can be intercepted since it is sent in the clear which may be monitored by the pirates and 
thus potentially provide them with an early warning mechanism.  A method of 
establishing a viable and secure communication path is to utilize World Wide Web 
Consortium (WC3) standardized based XML encryption and authentication protocols.  It 
is assumed that the problem of key distribution has been resolved and both ALPHA and 
CHARLIE has access to each other’s public key.   Ship CHARLIE is closer but lacks 
pertinent data that Ship ALPHA possesses.  Therefore, Ship ALPHA initiates voice 
communications to Ship CHARLIE such that they can be on the alert for an electronic 
transmission.  Ship ALPHA generates the XML document, computes a message digest 
using secure hash Algorithm (SHA1) and digitally encrypts the message digest with its 
private key.  Now the document along with the digital signature are compressed and 
encrypted with Ship ALPHA’s private key.  It is afterwards encapsulated and transmitted 
to Ship CHARLIE with secure sockets layer (SSL).  Ship CHARLIE utilizes Ship 
ALPHA’s public key to decrypt the message and verify that it was indeed from Ship 
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ALPHA.  It afterwards decrypts the message digest and compares it with the computed 
hash.  They match!  Now the XML document is translated and imported into Ship 
CHARLIE’s database such that they can take appropriate action against the confirmed 
pirates to include pursuit into coastal waters barring international agreements until a 
proper handoff can take place.  The secure exchange of information between Ship 
ALPHA and Ship CHARLIE whose internal systems were indeed dissimilar would have 
resulted in the capture, detainment, and subsequent arrest followed by extradition of the 
pirates such that they may be tried by the host nation to which they committed the 
offense.  Thus, a win-win scenario envelopes such that the world is less one threat to 
piracy, both Ship ALPHA and Ship CHARLIE receive credit for their contributions 
leading to the capture of pirate ship FISHER and the country which held legal arrest 
authority can show its people that it is taking a proactive stance against piracy by 
cooperating with both traditional and non-traditional international players in keeping their 
coastal waters secure without giving up their sovereignty.  Upon accepting custody of the 
alleged pirates, Ship CHARLIE transmit all data relating to the act to Ship ALPHA, and 
also to the respective country officials using the same secure means as previously 
described.  Naturally, both Ship ALPHA and CHARLIE forwards a synopsis of events to 
their respective officials using approved secure means and promptly depart for 
international waters as the task has been completed.   
Upon further analysis of the scenario described above, it was void of the apparent 
military standard Mandatory Access Control (MAC) for the encryption and decryption of 
the document.  What was employed was the Discretionary Access Control (DAC) in 
which the originator made a decision as to which entities needed to receive and decrypt 
the information.  Therefore, a socially generated trust relationship is developed between 
sender and recipient such that both parties acknowledge that they shall not misuse and/or 
abuse the privilege of viewing, processing, and disseminating the information to other 
parties.  However, by using DAC the originator no longer has control over the 
information sent to the recipient.  The recipient further process and distribute the 
information, which is why the information sent via this means must not carry a 
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classification higher than controlled unclassified information (CUI).  The DAC protocol 
is discussed in more detail in later sections of this document.   
In contributing to the efforts of creating a comprehensive national security 
strategy for cyberspace, fostering the public-private partnerships, military-civil coalitions, 
authenticate digital identities, and taking the lead in developing a framework for 
acquisitions, utilization of a standards based approach to document-level XML 
encryption and authentication for sensitive unclassified communications guarantees a 
multinational cost effective solution to an ever evolving net-centric environment.  The 
major issues confronting several organizations desiring to exchange information may be 
lack of infrastructure to exchange data dynamically with cooperating partners, identity 
management, and the threat of providing an avenue for malware to propagate throughout 
their respective network.  Trust relations established amongst familiar organization are a 
step in the right direction.  However, in certain environments such as coalition 
partnerships amongst nations in which no formal treaty and where the expeditious nature 
of communications determines the outcome of a potentially hazardous situation, it may 
not be prudent to establish a system-high trust relationship.  Therefore, communications 
take place over the unclassified network.  Nonetheless, sensitive but unclassified 
communications still require a level of security commensurate with the information 
contained therein.  To this extent, there must be a mechanism in place such that messages 
can be passed between to the partners with minimal exchange of technology.   
The term Document-Centric Security is a unique concept.  Instead of solely 
focusing on the system and network architecture, it focuses on the securing information 
content within the document itself.  This concept coupled with XML security and 
authentication augments the security posture an organization and prepares a path for the 
implementation of a Discretionary Access Control policy on the document within the 
constraints of the organizational security policy.  The compression, digital signing and 
encrypting of the document afford the originator and recipients a measure of assurance 
that the confidentiality, integrity, the authenticity of the message is maintained.  
Therefore, it is highly plausible to provide document-level framework for dynamic 
security requirements for unclassified but sensitive material.  
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Dynamic communications is often times referred to as on-the-fly 
communications.  It refers to the dynamic establishment of time sensitive electronic 
communications due to urgent matters or affairs within or around the immediate 
environment or area of operations (e.g., During the Katrina Humanitarian Assistance 
Disaster Relief Effort hastily formed networks were established to connect volunteers, 
civil and military entities to support theU.S. citizens of Louisiana.).  Over the last few 
years, there exist an increase multinational and/or multi-agency collaboration around the 
globe.  This trend extends beyond military organization and quite possibly may be the 
basis for current and future terrorist/hostile cells throughout the globe.  Both economic 
health and the need for each nation/corporation to safeguard their national interest against 
asymmetric threats have prompted a global response for short and long term cooperative 
operations.  Thus, there exists a need for a secure framework that can securely exchange 
message-based based information with traditional and non-traditional partners without 
significant lockstep hardware or software requirements.  XML documents shared 
dynamically as messages must be accessible to each specific site without compromising 
the integrity of the document.  To achieve this objective, encryption and authentication 
must be performed in concert with compression techniques. 
E. DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC) 
A discretionary access control (DAC) policy is a means of restricting access to 
objects based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong.  The 
controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with certain access permission is 
capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject.  DAC is 
based on the identity and need-to-know of a subject (e.g., user, process) and/or groups to 
which the object belongs.   In accordance with the Department of Defense 8500.2, DAC 
is sufficient information assurance mechanism to interconnect information systems 
operating at the same classification but with different need-to-know rules.  To 
interconnect between DoD and non-DoD systems a controlled interface is required.  This 
brings us back to the concept of employing Document-Centric Security and transmitting 
the data from the unclassified enclave to unclassified enclave without digitally signed, 
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compressed, and encrypted such that when opened within the virtual machine of the host 
system, the data can be viewed in a secure fashion by authorized personnel.  Although 
this paper does not delve into the virtues of virtual machines, the author highly 
recommends their use in regards to minimizing potential damage or system infections.  If 
the message is either generated or read on an infected machine, a virus may potentially 
propagate.  It is recognized that discretionary access control implementations are prone to 
Trojan Horse attack.  A Trojan Horse is malicious code that appears benign to the user.  It 
may be in the form of a game, a photographic image, or streaming video.  However, once 
loaded the Trojan Horse may commence its attack with inherited system access rights as 
the user.  Additionally, the user may not be able to discern if there is any malfeasance 
because the Trojan may access the disk with every disk access of the user or log all 
keystrokes and send them back to the attacker.  However, if constrained with rights on a 
virtual machine whose user rights are less than the owner’s rights; widespread infection 
can potentially be contained to the virtual machine.  For more information on virtual 
machines see Pokek paper entitled “Formal Requirements for Virtualizable Third 
Generation Architectures” (Pokek 1974). 
F. PIRACY CASE STUDY 
1. Piracy 
Piracy is a war-like act committed by a non-state actor, especially robbery or 
criminal violence committed at sea, on a river, in the air above the seas.  The act is 
committed outside the jurisdiction of any nation and without the authority from any 
government  (Encarta Encyclopedia).  Under article 100 of part VII of United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) all States shall cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State. On the high seas, or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or 
aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize 
the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide 
upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with 
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regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good 
faith (Pokek 1974). The language within the UNCLOS makes it quite difficult to bring 
pirates that seek out prey in international waters and upon completion of the act retreat to 
coastal waters.  UNCLOS defines a warship as a ship belonging to the armed forces of a 
State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality under the 
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose 
name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew 
which is under regular armed forces discipline.    As such, there is a requirement for ships 
to expeditiously handoff vital information and obtain approval to continue the pursuit of 
the pirate vessel and/or aircraft in which all states maintain their sovereignty and the 
criminals are brought to justice.  An increase in bureaucracy is counter to the solution 
sought.  However, using a standards based approach to securely pass perishable 
information from the set A = {military, national agency, law enforcement, government 
entity} to a set B = {military, national agency, law enforcement, government entity} 
regardless of nationality with each entity having dissimilar systems XML encryption and 
authentication can bridge the gap.  To facilitate the exchange a trust relationship must be 
established between the participants such that each player has access to the others public 
key to verify their identity.  Additionally, the secure hash algorithm must be known to 
verify the integrity of the document.  In situations in which there are no formal agreement 
between A and B, it is critical that both entities possess a means of identity management 
such that both sender and receiver can verify the identity of the other.  Upon validation of 
the document integrity and the identity of the sender, the receiver can take appropriate 
action in regards to hot pursuit and detainment of suspected pirates until law enforcement 
officials arrive.   
Some of the issues regarding piracy are the following: 
 Automated Communications.  There must be some form of internationally 
recognized mechanism aboard civilian and commercial craft to report the 
act an act of piracy in progress to include basic information such as 
geolocation data, unit name, time and date stamp, base course and speed.  
The automated communications alerts military and civil authority of the 
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problem quicker such that the probability of capturing the suspects 
increases.  It allows capable units to vector in on the suspected location 
and deliver assets to support the victim. 
 Standardized Communications Protocols.  Dissimilar systems must be able 
to securely exchange data between one another with minimal transfer of 
cryptographic technology and associated hardware.  
  Legal Liability.  A nation may be held liable for the loss of review of 
legitimate businesses if the court finds that there is insufficient evidence to 
support detainment and/or seizure of craft and personnel suspected of 
piracy. 
Modern piracy may not be an overt act clearly visible from sea, air or shore.  Therefore, 
the laws themselves restrict law enforcement and military vessels from taking immediate 
action on suspected pirates.   
 Automated emergency communication that electronically sends geolocation and 
identity data via the use of digital signatures and XML Authentication alerts cognizant 
entities and organization that illicit acts are occurring and paves the path for international 
and littoral direct support without overtly alerting the suspects that are committing the 
offense.  This in turn reduces the time the pirates have to orient, observe, decide and act 
(OODA).  By disrupting the pirates’ respective OODA loop by increasing the response 
time via multicast transmission to capable units, the cognizant authorities can make their 
case, detain the crew of the suspected vessel, and make subsequent arrests as warranted.  
G. SUMMARY 
Securing sea lines of communications in today’s world extends beyond the 
borders of a single nation and requires both multiagency and multinational support and 
cooperation.  However, trust is of a major concern to all organizations and entities facing 
the engaged in operations.  Other issues include but are not limited to confidentiality, 
message integrity and verification, as well as message authentication.  The result of the 
merging requirement is the extension and execution of an open source international 
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standard employing extensible markup based languages and translation services to render 
an unbiased secure communications infrastructure.  
Piracy is a threat to the international community but working towards a single 
consolidated goal with multiagency and multinational traditional and nontraditional 
partners, the threat can be minimized.  Using XML enables even those that do not 
currently play work together swiftly assimilate into a cohesive organized unit with a 






V. EXEMPLAR APPLICATION CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Stable secure communications do not happen by chance.  It requires proper 
planning prior to execution.  Therefore, in looking at the day-to-day operations of a 
multinational force, it is critical to first examine the level of planning that went before it.  
Whether things go according to plan or not, the base plan serves as a point of reference 
for ongoing and future evolutions.  The XML specification provides the blueprint for 
system design that facilitates the exploration of various implementations to achieve 
security.  This allows the open source community to evaluate the recommended and 
future goal for the most efficient operation of an XML-based security solution, which can 
be illustrated by operational examples.   
1. Day-to-day Communication Exchange Between Nations 
Everyday afloat and ashore data is exchanged between coalition, multinational, 
and multiagency partners in efforts to achieve a common goal.  Although these players 
work together, they are apprehensive of the other.  The story of the how Troy fell 
resounds with data exchange.  History states that the Greeks left a wooden horse at the 
gates of Troy after years of fighting.  The Trojans pulled the horse into its city.  However, 
within the wooden horse hid the Greek warriors.  They eliminated the opposition opened 
the gates and the Greek army took the city.   Software developed by a single country 
faces the same issue as the Trojan horse.  There is no way to ensure that it is devoid of 
back doors or other glitches that may be used in an adversarial manner.  Therefore, open 
standards-based technology is the key to overcoming this Trojan horse scenario because 
each country is able to build its own solution that is interoperable with any other that 
utilizes the standard.   
By utilizing an open standards-based solution, secure communication exchange 
with joint, coailition, and multinational partners are possible with a high level of 
assurance because the technical implementations are grown and developed within country 
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based upon international standards such as those provided by the W3C for XML which is 
already adopted in several commercial products.  The use of open source standards-based 
technologies promotes interoperability between dissimilar systems operating on various 
platforms.   
Interoperability is a key factor whenever data exchange is required especially with 
unknown or new participants.   Whenever interoperability for data exchange fails or is 
not plausible it must be passed by radio, semaphore, or other method, which may require 
the partners to be closer than that which is comfortable such as two afloat units that have 
never practiced with one another sailing abreast each other at distances of under 1000 
yards.   If one ship makes a mistake then a collision at sea might occur.  It only takes a 
few moments when ships are operating in close proximity to one another.  
The combinations of voice enhanced by data intechange reduces time lag and 
increases the accuracy of information passed.  Various flavors or XMPP Chat can be used 
to enhance communication between participants.  With XMPP Chat anyone can establish 
a communications server and other can join.  The partners would still utilize voice 
communications that would vbe supplemented by XMPP chat such that an official log of 
the communications exist that can be referred back to at a later date.  XMPP Chat can be 
supplemented using either Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) while 
implementing each message as an independent document with encrypted elements.  The 
micro message would be decrypted and decompressed on the recipients location but this 
may cause additional delay in processing the information to the screen because additional 
CPU cycles are required for each encryption and each decryption of the information 
contained.   
SAML enables single sign-on such that each client node logs into a single site and 
have the ability to log onto other systems that are tied to that client’s associated 
credentials.  XML Security supplements this technology such that the recipient has 
additional assurance that the document is authenticated and unaltered via the use of XML 
digital signature.  Enhanced confidentiality can be achieved through the use of XML 
encryption.  This assures that even with application of SAML, documents are available 
only to those personnel and entities available with the appropriate credentials.   This 
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futher assures that the person accessing the information has a valid need-to-know, by 
two-factor authentication—successful access via SAML and the possession of the 
appropriate certificate.    
Two entities that lack a current formal agreement need to communicate with one 
another.  However, the only record of their communications exchange is in a bridge-to-
bridge logbook in which the operator records short hand notation of information passed.  
Vital information may be lost, recorded in error, or misinterpreted by either party. 
B. SCENARIO MESSAGE-TYPE REQUIREMENTS 
1. Requirements 
Although XML is a structured language, there is no general requirement for the 
structure of one message or document to be the same as another structure.  However, to 
obtain interoperability the structures the XML schemas that are in use must be available 
to convert the format between the various flavors of XML.  The base requirements that 
must exist for all XML messages processed using XML signature and XML encryption 
are:  
 XML messages must be well formed. 
 XML messages must be valid.  
 XML messages must be canonicalized when implementing XML 
encryption 
If the base requirements are satisfied, then any XML-based document format can be 
translated to any other XML-based document format via an extensible stylesheet 
language transformation (XSLT).  This feature in addition to the application Unicode 
makes XML a universal language that breaks down barriers inherent with spoken 
languages.  Unicode is a character code that defines every character in most of the 
speaking languages of the world.  It does this by associating each character with a 
specific number (The Unicode Consortium).  All tools that support use UTF-X are 
Unicode compliant.    
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C. SIGNED, ENCRYPTED, AND COMPRESSED DOCUMENTS 
1. Use Cases using XML Signature, XML Encryption, and Compression 
There are various approaches for applying the World Wide Web Consortium 
specification for XML Signature, XML Encryption, and Compression.  Figure 44 shows 
a suboptimal use case that achieves XML digital signature, encryption and EXI 
compression. 
 
Figure 43.   XML files can be fragmented and maintain its XML authentication attributes 
when put back together.   Although recommended, the entire document does not 
need to be encrypted. 
 
Due to the verbose nature of XML, it is considered more costly than other methods of 
data transfer.  However, by applying compression techniques that are compatible with the 
W3C efficient extensible markup language (EXI) specifications, the documents size is 
minimized and authenticity still verifiable.   
 Using the suboptimal approach displayed in Figure 43, an XML document is 
signed and then broken up into fragments.  The smaller fragment which is referred to as a 
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partial document may contain critical information requiring a higher level of information 
assurance such as medical data, social security numbers and other such information that 
falls under the category of personally identifiable information (PII).  The larger fragment 
may contain general information such that confidentiality is not that great of a concern.  
With the suboptimal implementation the last process prior to transmission with the partial 
document is compression.  Compression on an encrypted document is expected to yield 
poor results.  Using the example documents from the site 
http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/index.html with the standard 
gzip tool on a MacBookPro and WinZIP on a Dell Precision M6400 both having block 










HelloWorld.x3d  2133 906 814 57.5% 61.8% 
Hello_WorldEncryptionInput.x3d  2710 1055 947 61.1% 65.1% 
HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml  5746 4481 4372 22.0% 23.9% 
HellowWorldDecrypted.x3d  3816 1321 1219 65.4% 68.1% 
HelloWorldSigned.x3d  6918 3173 3050 54.1% 55.9% 
 
Table 5.   Compression reduces the size of the file that conserves bandwidth.  
Between the two leading compression algorithm, GZIP and WinZip,  GZIP is 
better.  All compression algorithms used are lossless compression. 
An EXI tool is currently under development at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Modeling Virtual Environment and Simulation (MOVES) Institue Scenario Authoring 
and Visualization for Advanced Graphical Environments (SAVAGE).  Table 6 show 
results received from the current EXI tool.  There are some variations between Table 5 nd 
Table 6, such as a 556 bit difference in file size of original HelloWorld.x3d.   This may 
be the result of an incomplete or unsuccessful download of an automated procedure of 
extracting the files from the Web site.   It is assumed that Snyder used the partial file for 
performing his analysis for the orignal x3d file. Variations in the size of the compression 
may be indicative to different settings used by different compression applications 
experiment.  Regardless of the lossless compression algorithm used, the original file is 
always returned when decompressed.   
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  Helloworld HelloworldDecrypted HelloworldEncryptionInput HelloWorldSigned 
Original 1577  3816  2710  6918  
GZIP 692  1195   917  3029  
ZIP 836  1357  1091  3185  
EXI NO 
(SCHEMA) 833  1162  1165  2989  
EXI 
(SCHEMA) 523   737   735  2581  
Table 6.   A comparison of compression results using various lossless compression 
algorithms provides promising results for EXI integration.  
 
 
Figure 44.   The shorter the line the greater the compression with this visual comparison of 
lossless compression performance between ZIP, GZIP, and EXI.  
 
Encrypted files that are also compressed gain a slight size reduction without affecting the 
content because ASCII or Unicode representations of the encrypted data may use fewer 
bits per character generated.  The lossless compression algorithm removes the slack 
resulting in a smaller file for the same data.  
The issues that make Figure 43 suboptimal are that  
 Partial XML file is not encrypted and therefore they are transmitted in the clear 
through the insecure transport.  Therefore, confidentiality is degraded with this 
implementation. 
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 The entire document cannot benefit from EXI compression.  Therefore, the 
document may be larger.  Alternate compression algorithms can compress the 
encrypted data and thereby reclaim the unused bits used from character 
generation.  Each character exists in one or more 4 bit blocks.  If a character 
requires 6 bits then 2 blocks are used which means that 2 bits can be reclaimed by 
the compression algorithm.  Therefore, the compression algorithm removes the 
slack prior to transmission of the encrypted file that gives approximately a twenty 
percent space savings.  
 
Figure 45.    An ANOVA illustrating the effectiveness of the applying Efficient XML 
Interchange (EXI) compression over alternate forms of lossless compression 
algorithms represented in Table 6 (Snyder 2009). 
Another approach to the implementation of XML signature, XML encryption and 
Compression is illustrated in Figure 46.  Notice that in contrast to the suboptimal view 
the document is not split into multiple fragments.  The end user determines which feature 
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set is required to send the message or document through a seemingly insecure transport in 
efforts of achieving the desired levels of protection. 
 
Figure 46.   This recommended approach to combining XML Signature, XML Encryption, 
and XML Encryption supports secure exchange of messages that require various 
degrees of security and compression. 
 
In this manner, a document can be an XML digital signature can be applied to the 
document and the document can be compressed using EXI compression.  It is important 
to note that EXI and XML Encryption only works with XML files.  Therefore, XML 
compression is always performed after XML Encrytion. The benefits of this 
implementation are  
 Security is at the discretion of the user.  Based upon the message content the user 
may elect to neither digitally sign the document nor encrypt the document but 
send it as plaintext.  Likewise, if the document is of a sensitive nature, the 
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document can be encrypted digitally signed, and encrypted via XML and then 
compressed with an alternate lossless compression algorithm. 
 More secure than suboptimal implementation. Since the approach illustrated in 
Figure 45 encrypts the entire document, it is more secure than splitting the 
document and sending part of it in the form of a multipart document in the clear. 
 Full exploitation of XML EXI.  If confidentiality is not an issue and the option is 
not selected, then the document can still support the security elements of message 
integrity and sender authenticity through the use of the digital signature.   
Thereafter, the digitally signed document can utilize EXI compression to achieve 
the best compression ratio available as illustrated in Table 6 and Figure 44.  
The recommended goal for XML Encryption and Authentication is to have EXI as 
part of the XML result document.  It is evident that there are various flavors of 
unclassified information.  Each flavor can be categorized as requiring confidentiality, 
message integrity, or sender authenticity.  Therefore, if the user is aware which is 
required or desired then it is possible for either a MAC or a DAC to be employed in 
relation to the subject matter.  When using DAC, the end user enacts his or her criteria 
based upon message sensitivity to operation participants. The user’s criteria are based 
upon practicality and organizational policy in regards to the use of XML digital signature, 
XML encyrption, and the compression method.   
If Bob wanted to send Alice a message and Bob merely wanted to ensure that 
Alice knew the message was from him and that it had not been altered during 
transmission, Bob would select XML Digital Signature.  Confidentiality was not Bob’s 
concern.  Now if Alice wanted to respond to the message and add personal information 
such as medical status then confidentiality becomes and issue and she would digitally 
sign and encrypt the message.  Now that Bob has received the message he wants to 
forward pertinent portions of the document to the Charlie, a medical officer on board a 
bandwidth-constrained vessel.  He removed the PII sections of the document and digitally 
signed the document.  Bob then selects EXI compression to get the message to the 
smallest possible size for transmission.  In this configuration Bob’s goal was to satisfy 
authentication, message integrity and size reduction.  However, successful organizations 
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constantly evolve.  Therefore, organizational policy must adapt to technological and 
social advances.  Bob’s organization has deemed that it must protect all organizational 
data transmission from being susceptible to data aggregation.  This means that all 
information must be encrypted.  The recommended goal for EXI integration with XML 
performs all of the formentioned tasks and is ready for a series of new evolutions in 
organizational policy.   Figure 47 illustrates the recommended goal in relation to how 
data can be securely passed between Bob and Alice within the constraints of practicality 
and organizational policy.    
Unlike the optimal and recommended approaches this solution also supports 
multipart encryption.  The W3C specifications for XML Encryption allows for the 
encryption of XML fragments such as credit card numbers, social security numbers, etc.  
This is a common practice for secure Web enabled information exchange.  With 
technologies such as SOAP and SAML, the Web-based security mechanism assists in 
developing solutions.  However, message and document-centric security involves placing 
security at the document level without the reliance of external factors.  Once the 
document is received, the information revealed is completely dependant upon the 
recipient’s credentials.  Web-based security mechanisms can augment message and 
document-centric security by supplying a secure venue in which user rights can be 
elevated based upon need or urgency of the data.  Naturally, this would require two-factor 
authentication that is satisfied by the existing user’s certification (if valid) and something 
unique to that individual or entity (biometrics, password, physical cryptographic insertion 




Figure 47.   Incorporation of the EXI compression algorithm as a native part of XML 
document yields the benefit of maximum compression with secure 
communications.   
D. TEST CORPUS OF EXAMPLES 
1. Everyday Steaming  
Each day deployed or underway there is a requirement for to share messages 
amongst participating partners.  These messages may be as simple as the unit situation 
reports to operation reports with high order of precedence. 
In Admiral Gary Roughhead’s address to the Navy League Sea, Air, Space 
Banquet dtd May 5, 2009, he stated “People look quickly at our Navy and think My, 
those ships are so incredibly powerful, and there seem to be so many of them.  The do not 
always consider that the 283 ships that serve in our Navy today are the fewest that we’ve 
had in our fleet since 1916 … The fleet must cover Americas responsibilities around the 
world, 24-hours a day, seven days a week and at an unforgiving pace of operations.  The 
security of the oceans is an assumed constant, and so the security is forgotten at least 
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until there is a significant or newsworthy interruption like the attempted pirating of the 
Maersk Alabama … We require unimpeded use of the sea and the global commons to 
conduct 90 percent of our trade…”   
Two-hundred and eighty-three ships U.S. flagged ships is excessively thin to meet 
U.S. national interests world wide without multinational/multiagency participants such 
that a mutually beneficial relationship can be formed.  Piracy is one of issue that affects 
all nations who export to other nations by sea.  If allowed to go unchecked, several 
nations may loose a large percentage of their gross national revenue that may cause 
further global economic instability and marked increase in the unemployed populace.  To 
combat this issue several agencies and nations are operating within the same theatre of 
operations in a collaborative effort to eradicate piracy from the high seas.  Unfortunately, 
incompatibilities between communications systems still exist that may result in delays in 
pursuing and/or capturing vessels suspected of harboring, abetting, or engaging in acts of 
piracy.   
A typical day for units engaged in antipiracy operations may begin at 0000 with a 
standard checkin such that all units within the taskgroup report in.  This is normally 
performed via voice channels but can be supplemented via XMPP chat for Web enabled 
entities.  A Web enabled session supplements voice by adding a level of clarity and 
reducing man-made errors that may be made when copying instructions within the 
official log book.   All agents involved not only hear but also see the instructions or 
confirmation as they are relayed over the air.  Prescheduled check-ins are common to all 
operations especially those involving multiple partners such that the operational 
commander is accountable for each entity under his charge.  Figures 48 and 49 show the 
typical check-in process of the commands underway where HZ is the sea surface 
commander requesting participating partners to respond to its initial communiqué.   Any 
ship that fails to respond is queried again to discover the commands communication 
malfunction: equipment, lack of attention to detail, out of transmission range, etc.   In 
some cases the unit may be out of transmission range but may still be accessible via the 




Figure 48.   Text representation of a check-in process. 
 
 
Figure 49.   An example of a possible XML representation of the Daily Check-in 
Underway is presented.  All information is structured, which facilitates parsing of 
information.  
Figure 49 illustrates a potential XML-based log of the daily check-in interaction 
between all commands in company.  This log is useful in performing a cross comparison 
HZ:   All units in Romeo Tango Papa this is Hotel Zulu, over 
Ship 1: This is Golf Papa Papa, Roger Out 
Ship 2: This is Uniform Quebec Charlie, Roger Out 
Ship 3: This is Oscar Mike Echo, Roger Out 
HZ: This is Romeo Tango Papa, Roger Out.  
<MSGLOG> 
 <Originator> 
  <DTG>2008-10-20T00:00:02.0000000+02:00</DTG> 
<CallSign>HZ</CallSign> 















 <Message>DE OME RGR OUT</Message> 
</Response> 
 <Originator> 
  <DTG>2008-10-20T00:00:02.0000000+02:00</DTG> 
<CallSign>HZ</CallSign> 
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of network connectivity and associated hardware, software, user training issues because 
XML data can be parsed and it can be determined who failed to respond which is 
validated by the corresponding entity’s daily status report. 
2. Secure Information Exchange    
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) may need to be exchanged between 
agencies of different nationalities.   If a vessel is being tracked off the coast with a 
passenger manifest that contains the name of possible wanted criminals by another 
nation, then the Intelligence agencies may desire to exchange information with each other 
without exposing their national databases.  As the information ship’s track is in constant 
motion, both agencies know that the information is perishable.  Therefore, time is a major 
priority as the ship leaves international waters and enters Singapore inland waters.  The 
intelligence agent quickly establishes contact with the Singaporean harbor patrol and 
sends them a digitally signed encrypted message using XML security.    
The agent’s message does not reveal the source of the information but because it 
is digitally signed and a trust relationship has been established between the two nations 
department of homeland defense, they were able to take action.  Figure 50 illustrates a 
possible XML file prior to signing and encrypting the file.  It reveals pertinent 
information about the location of the vessel and the fact that it has both neutral and 
hostile entities onboard.  With this information the Singaporean harbor patrol can 
determine what kind of force is required to support the arrest of the individuals.    
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Figure 50.   Structured information can be passed from agent to authorities in a secure 
fashion.  Intelligence data exchanged between nations adds value to mission 
planning.   
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IntelInfo> 
    <TriggerEvent> 
        Suspected international criminals entering inland waters 
</TriggerEvent> 
    <Date> 2003-10-20T11:59:00.0000000+02:00</Date> 
    <Ship name="ALBATROS"> 
        <ShipType>FishingBoat</ShipType> 
        <Location> 
            <Latitude>1.54</Latitude> 
            <Longitude>103.9</Longitude> 
        </Location> 
        <COG> 
            <Course type="True">255</Course>  
                <Speed units="Kts">7</Speed> 
        </COG> 
        <PointOfDeparture> 
            <Port>Phuket</Port> 
            <Country>Thialand</Country> 
            <Latitude>13.75</Latitude> 
            <Longitude>100.48</Longitude> 
        </PointOfDeparture> 
        <Crew> 
            <MATE> 
                <FirstName>Osama</FirstName> 
                <LastName>BadGuy</LastName> 
            </MATE> 
            <MATE> 
                <FirstName>Charlie</FirstName> 
                <LastName>GoodGuy</LastName> 
            </MATE> 
            <MATE> 
                <FirstName>Alice</FirstName> 
                <LastName>GoodGuy</LastName> 
            </MATE> 
            <MATE> 
                <FirstName>Bob</FirstName> 
                <LastName>BadGuy</LastName> 
            </MATE> 
        </Crew> 





3. External Communication with Multinational and Multiagency 
Partners 
In years past, one would correctly assume that the flagship to which the report 
would be made is of U.S. origin for a U.S. task force.  This is an obsolete frame of 
thought.  While loyalties rest with their own country, actual operations in the world of 
today and that of tomorrow are being conducted with multinational and multiagency 
forces.  Some are formed out of necessity in which prior planning was not possible. 
Nonetheless, there exists the requirement to securely transmit information of a sensitive 
nature while maintaining records beyond that of a bridge-to-bridge conversation.  To this 
end a standards based approach must be employed to ensure that units capable of 
receiving data/information via the radio frequency spectrum can use their own tools, 
negotiate the appropriate cryptographic algorithm to use, and implement secure data 
transfer between and amongst partner nations.   
As the day develops, a ship with a multinational crew within the coalition that 
utilizes Autonomous Vehicle Control Language (AVCL) wants to send track information 
to another ship that uses Keyhole markup language (KML), such that the reports can be 
generated from the unmanned aerial vehicle to facilitate the commanders daily intentions.  
The unmanned areal vehicle examined the area of interest in which a possible hostile 
entity operating off the coast of Eritea was weighed anchor off the blind side of one of 
the islands.  The formats are incompatible.  However, they can be adapted to use the 
other via XSLT.  The XSLT adapt to the new format based upon the published schema to 
translate position information to a format that the other ship understands.  An XSLT was 
also used to adapt raw AVCL data to KML as can be seen in appendix C.  An operator 
initates the request from the ship’s data repository.  The process is illustrated in Figure 50 
Appendix C contains a sample XLST and it’s associated data output file.  At the time of 
this writing, the name of the NPS SAVAGE repository is called 
TrackDataConversionHub.     
Once the file is received, its origin is verified as well as the base requirement for 
well-formed XML.  It must be well-formed and valid XML to be processed properly.  
The document validates the recipient’s creditials as an authorized user and decrypts any 
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XML elements that have been encrypted for a select group.  This factor is important 
when transmitting sensitive data to a multiagency and multinational organizations.  There 
may be proprietary data that is not releasable to certain countries or information that may 
contain not releasable to foreign entities (NOFORN).  The capability is important for 
tactical situation as layed out in the Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5510.36, 
Information Security Program.  Other nations and other entities also have their 
restrictions in relation to releasability of information.  In operations, knowledge is key 
and XML Encryption and authentication is an enabler. 
 
Figure 51.    One approach to applying XML security is displayed such that the originator 
chooses which facet of security is important, and assign it to the message 
accordingly.    
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Throughout the day, the task force exchange messages relating to possible tracks.  
Those messages are sent to each unit’s data repository and correlated such that tracks are 
updated.  It is one of the method of conducting  over-the-horizon operations (OTH) 
which in a nutshell is simply extending the range of  own ships capability by correlating 
data from other assets to form a common operating picture (COP).  XML encryption and 
authentication is primary candidate to ensure interoperability between coaltion and 
multinagency partners. 
 At 1218 radio, the battle watch captian (BWC) receives a transmission from a 
pleasure craft.  The message is not encrypted; however, it is digitally signed.  The 
message simply reads as illustrated in Figure 52.  Although XML is readable, it is not 
meant to be read in the raw.  The output to the display is formatted such that it is more 
palatable to read.  XML is meant to be parsed by machines or programs to extract the 
information required on demand.  Figure 53 illustrates a possible representation of the 
XML file once its fully processed by a cascading stylesheet (CSS).  
Figure 52.   XML is readable, but it is not meant to be read.  It is meant to be parsed and 
processed into a more user friendly form.  This is a possible representation of one 
form in which an XML file can be represented to the user. 
The raw XML file is illustrated in Figure 53.  It is structured such that pertinent data can 
be parsed and transmitted to a host of other entities.  If a military unit had an unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) operating in the area, then it is likely that it would send it position 
and interecept course information based upon projected speed over ground Latitude and 
Longitude to revector to the current threat position.  With this information, the UAV 
arrives in the area and streams video back to the combatant vessel to properly appraise 
Time: 12:15T2009 LAT12:33.5N – 048:39E, Gulf of Aden 
Course: 151 (T) Speed: 10Kts 
Five speed boats approaching AO 151 LeBlanc at high rate of 
speed.  Each speed boat contains 5 4 to 5 people that appear to 
be arned with submachine guns.  Their speed boat bears no flag. 
Non-Lethal counter deployed and proved to be ineffective Request 
assistance.  
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the situation.  The commander can then devise a more cohesive plan to take a proper and 
preferably non-violent course of action but is always ready to be prepared to return fire if 
warranted.   
 The UAV arrives on station and begins streaming video back to its operator.  The 
operations specialist (OS) projects that the speedboat may overtake the Leblanc within 10 
minutes.  They also calculate own ships capability and other ships operating within the 
given area, if speed is increased to ahead flank.  Bottom line is that within the constraints 
of time, the pirates may achieve their goal of boarding and possibly taking over the ship 
unless another entity can intervene.   
A French flagged patrol craft that is operating in the area is alerted to the situation 
and reports that it can be there within the allotted time.  All data is passed to the French 
operations officer via voice and secured e-mail implementing XML security.  The 
message the French received resembled that in Figure 53.  The French system translated 
the message to their format and possibly to their native tongue after verifying the 
message authenticity and message integrity.  The French patrol craft take action and 
cause the pirates to abandon their chase.  However, due to the French policy the vessel is 
not boarded but the French issue Level I and II queries demanding their intentions and 
requesting that they stop or be fired upon.  They are successful in detaining the suspected 
pirates until the international vessel arrives on station that is equipped with the 
appropriate equipment to take the vessels in addition to have the appropriate personnel 




Figure 53.   XML is structured data that although  human readable is not meant to be read.  
It is meant to be processed.  The above is an XML message received from the 
notional Canadian flagged oiler LEBLANC AO 151.   Pertinent data exists within 
tags that can rapidly be parsed and sent to another entity. 
The commander’s vessel is estimated to take at least 16 minutes to reach the area.  








 <GlobalEmer>ALL SHIPS IN TRANSMISSION RANGE </GlobalEmer> 
</To> 
<Subj> SOS – ATTACK IN PROGRESS </Subj> 
<Date>05292009T12:15:34</Date> 
<Position> 
 <Latitude orientation=”N”>12:33.5</Latitude> 
 <Longitude orientation=”E”>048:39</Longitude> 





Five speed boats approaching AO 151 LeBlanc at high rate of speed.  
Each speed boat contains 5 4 to 5 people that appear to be arned 
with submachine guns.  Their speed boat bears no flag. Non-Lethal 





within 8 minutes at its maximum speed.  Notionally, all entities that send and receive 
transmissions have some method of encrypting their communications channel.  However, 
in reality there exist vessels that lack that capability.  Therefore, if confidentiality is not 
an issue a message or document would simply bear the digital signature.  Using Figure 
44, a trace of such a message can be performed.  The end result would yield message 
integrity and sender authentication. 
4. Document and Message Disemination 
 As the day progresses, several other messages are generated and transmitted.  
With each message transmitted and received, the concern is focused on one of three 
areas: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authenticity (CIA).  Each message transmitted and 
received has a specific level of assurance that must be maintained. Additionally, most 
messages require some sort of action on the part of the recipient.  That response may be 
as simple as an acknowledgement of receipt such that the sender has assurance of 
delivery.  Alternately, the response may mandate specific and deliberate action on the 
part of the recipient such as required upon receipt of an operation order (OPORD), which 
may direct a ship to support a specific humanitarian assistance disaster relief request of in 
support of another nation or group.   
XML digital signature and encryption techniques assist in achieving a high level 
of assurance by securing one or more areas within the scope of CIA.  CIA is ensures that 
the message maintains information in such a manner that only the intended individual 
may be able to view it.  Additionally, it ensures that the message has not been altered in 













Repudiation Authenticity Confidentiality Integrity 
XML Signature X X   X 
XML Encryption    X   
Table 7.   XML Signature and XML Encryption fits neatly into one of four different 
categories.  Table 7 shows which category each action satisfies within 
Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity and Non-Repudiation. 
There are times when no security is required as in the event of a “Save Our Ship” 
(S.O.S.) message (USCG 2003).    It would be nice for a message to come digitally 
signed but upon receipt, all units within the vicinity must respond until the affected entity 
is safe and secure.  This is the one of the several laws of the sea as established by 
UNCLOS.  Whenever a distress message is received, response time is critical.  All ships 
that receive the message are are in the vicinity hasten to the reported area to render 
assistance.  Table 8 illustrates a list of other document types that require a specific level 


















  Non-Repudiation Authenticity Confidentiality Integrity 
Non-Official General E-mail X X X   
Official E-mail X X X X 
Message Traffic X X X X 
Track Data X X   X 
Military Track Data  X X X 
Position Report X X X X 
General Public Distribution  X   X 
General Online Gaming  X   X 
Financial Transaction X X X X 
Save our Ship     
Blog Site  X   X 
Operation Report X X X X 
Situation Report X X X X 
Daily intentions Message X X X X 
Equipment Status Report X X X X 
Standard Automated Logistics 
Toolset (SALTS) X X   X 
Communications Report X X X X 
Public Affairs Officer News 
Release X X   X 
General Digital Imagery  X X X 
Geospatial Satelite Position 
Reports  X   X 
Global Position Report Updates  X X X 
Military Massive Multiplayer 
Online Game  X X X 
 
Table 8.   All data can be classified as requiring attributes to achieve confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity, non-repudiation or none of aforementioned.   
E. SUMMARY 
XML digital signature, XML encryption, and efficient XML compression can be 
used for a host of different operations.  It is adaptable and ready for changes in 
organization policy.   Without EXI compression, a modest savings in bandwidth can be 
achieved.  However, with the full implementation of EXI a more robost infrastructure can 
be formed that is friendly to bandwidth-constrained entities.  Security and practicality 
combine with the implementation of DAC such that dynamic decisions can be made to 
support current and future operations.  This enables unclassified information to flow 
between systems having dissimilar architectures support some or all of the W3C XML 
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recommendations.  A privately owned pleasure craft may have no need to forward 
encrypted data but supports XML digital signature and authentication. 
IA requirements vary with the message type and document content.  XML 
security is ready for the changing roles by enveloping and encrypting message fragments 
to support transactions.  As society continues to migrate to the information age, 
encryption becomes a more pressing issue.  States such as Nevada and Massachusetts 
have already taken measures to protect its citizens with Nevada’s NRS Electronic 
Transmission Lay 597-970 and Massachuesetts 201 CMR 17 (NRS 2008) (CMR 2009).  
Other states and other nations may soon join the fray and XML security can be 
considered as a prime contender for an international standard.     
Message and document-centric security is task appropriate for multinational and 
multiagency operations.  The concepts of XML Digital Signature, Encryption, and XML 
compression can be used with XMPP chat, any message and any document.     
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VI. EXEMPLAR CASE STUDY APPLICATION OF 
TECHNOLOGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To achieve national interests, maritime leaders seek a commonality to engage in 
operations jointly.  This bond facilitated the establishment of CTF 151 and NATO 
ATALANTA in support of operations throughout the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa.  All 
operations inclusive of dynamic operations require a degree of planning else nations may 
not be able to securely communicate with one another.  The communications requirement 
involves ensuring cryptographic algorithms and processes are readily available to current 
and future participants within a dynamic networked environment to include foresight as 
to the value of the information and an estimate of time to decrypt information passed via 
illicit means.  However, even if carefully planned, equipment failure generally occurs at 
inopportune times, therefore, a task force requires the ability to act exchange information 
with pertinent participants inclusive of reports of unfortuneate events.  XML Security can 
help, but there does not exist a technology devoid of vulnerabilities.  Vulnerabilities must 
be considered to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to mitigate their effect on 
operations.   
B. ENVIRONMENT 
Ensuring the sea lines of communications to ensure safe passage of commercial 
shipping through international waters is considered the topmost priority.  As much of the 
world’s commerce is conducted by sea, this exacerbates the issue of piracy such that they 
are not just a nuisance but a threat to the economic health of all seafaring nations. 
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Figure 54.   The area of responsibility (AOR) for CTF 151 and ATALNATA is the Gulf of 
Aden/Horn of Africa (Reliefweb, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 2009). 
The motivation of this set of exemplars focus on the use of document and 
message centric XML security in passing and receiving messages to and from coalition 
partners on an average day during a coalition task force.  CTF 151 Operation Allied 
Protector, Operation Ocean Shield and Nato’s Operation Atalnata have converged on the 
Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa to support maintaining the lines of communications to all 
commercial shipping.   NATO has even established a dedicated password protected Web 
site to get the word out to units operating in the area and created a Web site 
http://www.mschoa.org, to get the word out to as many as may register for the site.  
1. Preparation for Operations 
Due to the dangerous nature of the sea, a vast amount of preparations are required 
to transit across the open ocean.  Seafarers follow the seven Ps to ensure their 
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preparadness for the inherent dangers of their trade.  The seven Ps are Proper Prior 
Planning Prevents Pretty Poor Performance.  Therefore, preparations must be made for 
every evolution that the ship may encounter.  The overarching communications plan is 
known as the Operational Tasking Communications (OPTASK COMMS).  The 
requirement to have an OPTASK COMMS does not change from any other normal 
underway function.   Satellite access request for INMARSAT, EHF, and HF frequencies 
are still required.  Additionally, as seafarers transit from point to point the authorized 
frequency for the local region may be change.  The communications or radio officer is 
responsible for putting the plan together and coordinating with domestic and 
multinational organizations to obtain the appropriate frequencies.  An example OPTASK 
COMMS message is in Appendix A.   The difficult part in drafting the OPTASK 
COMMS is discovering both the communications capabilities and each unit’s requisite 
status when drafting the plan.  In the past, the cryptographic requirements were worked 
out prior to departure or might be sent via over-the-air-transmission (OTAT) to capable 
units.  However, that is with a homogenous task force.  Today’s mission heterogeneous 
force structure is more spontaneous than ever before.  More nations see piracy as a threat 
to the sea lines of communications and can no longer consider it a public nuisance.  It has 
an indirect affect on the nation’s economic health especially for those nations that depend 
upon the sea for export and imports of their goods.   For such nations in which their 
period of participation is brief, Message and Document Centric XML Security is most 
appropriate for exchanging information securely.  Assume that a Chinese flagged vessel 
desires the protection of the OP ATALANTA or CTF 151 while it conducts a night 
transit through the straits of Aden/Horn of Africa.  It is unarmed but has e-mail and basic 
Web browsing via commercial Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Communication 
(SATCOM) Internet e-mail exchange cloud computing based service onboard. The 
support facility ashore receives the e-mail and forwards to the battle watch captain 
onboard the flag ship.  Meanwhile, there is a fishing vessel conducting operations and 
covertly gathering intelligence.  It is between the Chinese vessel and the flagship.  On the 
surface, the vessel slowly trawls the ocean with the ball-diamond-ball configuration on its 
flagpost, which means that it is restricted in its ability to maneuver.  The Battle Watch 
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Captain (BWC) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force forwards the 
Chinese vessel’s master his identity encrypted with his corresponding public key.  The 
Chinese vessel’s master returns the nonce and adds one of its own along with its identity 
encrypted with its public key.  At this point both parties know that they can securely 
communicate with the other and the last response would be that the BWC forward the 
schedule of transit rendezvous times digitally signed and encrypted with the other’s 
public key and their corresponding nonce.  In the meantime, the pirate’s agent 
continuously monitors the RF spectrum and intercepts what appears to be a garbled 
message.  The vessel continues to collect transmission in hopes of collecting enough 
packets to swiftly discover the initialization vector and eventually the key to break 
current and future messages.  
Unfortunately for the intelligence collection vessel, the vessels have already 
authenticated to each other and are using message and document centric security.  The 
units can securely exchange data with a high degree of assurance using document and 
message centric security and other protocols to encapsulate and further protect the 
message the message.  The strength of the encryption is dependent upon the algorithm in 
use and the key length; therefore, both the algorithm and key length is based upon the 
value that the organization places on the information.   For example, if the organization 
decided to use data encryption standard (DES) which is weaker than triple data 
encryption standard (3DES) for information that may be deemed to be of high national 
interests but not yet satisfy the requirements for more stringent safeguards then the 
estimated time to break the encoding can be achieved by an entity of modest technical 
ability.  By the time the encryption keys are broken, the knowledge is stale and therefore 
useless to the pirate collection vessel.  Currently advanced encryption standard (AES) is 
the National Security Agency (NSA) approved and recommended algorithm for the 
United States government.  As of this writing, there are no international laws against 
passively scanning and collecting of packets.  However, several domestic laws within the 
United States prohibit such action.  For example, the state of Nevada Senate Bill Number 
125 Section 1 Chapter 205 prohibits the capture, storage, or reading of information from 
the radio frequency identification document of another person without the other person’s 
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knowledge and prior consent for the purpose of committing an illegal act.  Piracy by 
definition is an illegal act (Nevada Represented in Senate and Assembly).   
The escort commander wants to forward information such that everyone knows 
what the plan by using the X3D-Edit tool to generate a visual representation of the plan 
such that each civilian ship in company can visually see and make preparations for the 
transit through pirate infested waters.  The plan indicates the rendezvous, the standard 
distance that each ship must maintain from the other, the transit path, the turn around 
point, preplanned responses to pirate attack, and brevity code words to be used over 
bridge to bridge.  It also mentions that a P-3 is scheduled to periodically patrol the 
airspace to further ensure that the path is clear of unnecessary threats.  The information is 
compressed, digitally signed and encrypted using XML security.  From this point all 
future messages are short and poignant.  The system by which messages and documents 
are passed is e-mail because commercial vessels may not have requisite communications 
equipment aboard.  However, each ship is required to download and install or use their 
own implementation of the World Wide Web standard for XML Encryption and 
Authentication.    
If keys are not periodically changed, the pirate agent may eventually be able to 
crack or compromise the encryption key and decipher previous and future messages 
without being privy to either the secret key or digital signature.  
Using the established encryption keys, the message is relayed to all ships 
scheduled to participate in the convoy.  The message requests all units send a 
communications and engineering status report as well as their maximum achievable 
speed.  The information is factored into the line up such that the slowest ship takes the 
lead position.  A graphical representation of the procession is posted to a protected site 
such that each unit can download the X3D encoded data to their C4I suite and review 
offline as applicable.  Naval Aviation Command has directed that flight crews be 
deployed in a standby posture in efforts of extending flight crew on station via reduction 
of hours in flight.  Therefore, P3s and other assets are used to extend the OTH view of 
combatant vessels engaged in convoy duty.     
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The appointed hour approaches and all participants are required to check in with 
the lead convoy ship.  The convoy ship performs a series of communications checks both 
voice as well as data.  Secure XMPP chat channels are also verified with those units that 
are capable of performing chat.  Each ship is directed to forward an XML message to the 
lead ship to verify their reported transmission capability is functioning properly.  Upon 
completion of communications checks the lead ship issues a single order to all ships 
operating under the banner of HOA.  The message “HOA DE HZ STANDBY TO 
EXECUTE PERSIAN SPEAR, OVER”.  This is understood by all ships to mean “All 
participating units in operating in the Horn of Africa transit, standy to perform the transit.  
Please acknowledge receipt of this message.  Upon receipt of acknowledgement from all 
participants , the order is given to begin as planned.”  The ships respond “DE [CALL 
SIGN], RGR OUT.”  Once all ships are accounted for the lead ship releases the statement 
“DE HZ, EXECUTE PERSIAN SPEAR, AR M SPEED 10 M CORPEN 250, OUT”.  To 
reduce the language barrier between civilian and military shipping, XMPP chat channels 
used employ standard terminology with the civilian merchants that clearly spell out the 
message intent.  The message the operators relay over chat simply state the following 
“This is the officer in charge of the convoy, please proceed in the prescribed order as 
planned.  My course is 250 True and my speed is 10 Kts.”  The military forces escorting 
the merchants are well aware that although brevity is preferred, it is meaningless to if the 
ships in company cannot understand what is being relayed, therefore, a general 
translation XSLT was available to all participants prior to the start of the event.  The 
XSLT converted the standard terminology used with the brevity codes to the more 
civilian friendly equivalent.  Military unit would have no need for the XSLT as all 
language used is within the scope of their standard voculary.   
An hour into the transit, a P3 reports a small vessel dead in the water along the 
track which the convoy is taking.  After failed attempts to bring the vessel up on bridge to 
bridge radio, the lead ship’s navigation team projects the time to intercept and assumes 
the vessel is non-hostile.  However, erring on the side of caution new coordinates are 
transmitted to ships in company to avoid the contact-of-interest (COI) by 8000 yards.  
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Additionally, a message is sent to the country who has jurisdiction over the maritime 
region that the vessel occupies to investigate it further.   
2. Casualty Reported  
           Communications checks proceed at regular intervals of 60 minutes to ensure all 
participants are on track are proceeding without incident as planned.  During the transit, a 
situation report (SITREP) comes in from one of the merchant vessels stating that it has a 
casualty in the number 2 generator and is now degraded.  The convoy is slowed to 7 kts 
in response to the added information.  HZ dispatches a technician to the affected vessel to 
assist in repairs as the convoy continues to transit the Straits of Hormuz.  Upon arrival 
onboard, the dispatched specialist reviews the damaged part and notes that there are no 
spares onboard.  The dispatched specialist requests the unit’s machine shop to restore the 
component to a serviceable condition.  The estimated time of the repair is 2 hours.  The 
technician returns to his ship, delivers the part to the machinist who completes repairs 30 
minutes ahead of estimated time.  The technician returns to the affected unit, reinstalls the 
part, observes the component working properly and returns to the HZ.  HZ thereafter 
issues the command to increase speed to 15 kts to make up for lost time.  Within hours, 
the transit is complete and all units at dispersed.  HZ’s commander releases a farewell e-
mail to all ships within participating units, as it travels to the next rallying point to meet 
up with the convoy for the return voyage.   
3. Aftermath of a Pirate Attack 
Enroute to the rallying point, a message regarding the vessel that was dead in the 
water is received.  MV MEARSKE ALASKA “ALL SOULS LOST TO SMALL 
WEAPONS GUN FIRE” was the bottom line of this message.  The MV MEARSKE 
ALASKA was reported missing a week ago shortly after refusing to await a convoy to 
facilitate the transit with the comment that it would take them too far off schedule.  The 
XML-based message and response were maintained at central headquarters as well as 
onboard the MV MEARSKE ALASKA.  Evidently, they attempted to send out an S.O.S. 
message but according to the ships master’s log, a rocket-propelled granade (RPG) 
destroyed their transmitting antenna prior to them getting the opportunity to successfully 
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send out a message.   Surviellance recovered indicates that the pirates became enraged 
when one of the crew tried to ward off the attackers with a butcher knife. 
C. VULNERABILITIES OF XML SECURITY 
All technologies employed have a measure of vulnerability associated with their 
implementation.  Vulnerabilities are based upon the surface area accessible for attack, the 
transmission medium, the interaction methods and technology by which messages are 
passed, etc.  Vulnerabilities can be a direct attack against the specification or attacks 
against the variations in implementation.  In the view of the author, there it is a fools 
mission is to declare that a given technology and its associated implementations are 
perpetually secure and lack vulnerabilities.  This section briefly covers a few of the 
vulnerabilities associated with the technology.  It is not all encompassing . (Hill 2007)    
1. Man-in-the-Middle 
XKMS  is vulnerable to the  man-in-the-middle attack during initial key 
exchange.  Party A wants to communicate with part B but uninvited party C wants to 
listen in.  If party A sends the request to communicate to party B, but party C intercepts 
and masquerades as party A to party B, then party B forwards its credentials to party A 
via party C.  When the handshake is complete, party A believes its talking to party B, but 
it is in fact talking to party C who is relaying information to party C such that all data 
transmitted is visible to party C. 
2. Improper Implementation of XML Security 
Proper implementations of security protocols are an essential factor in applicable 
security factors.  A document that is compressed using EXI compression cannot be 
encrypted using XML encryption because it is no longer an XML document once 
compressed.  Likewise, the order of operations is of concern when using XML digital 
signature.  The hash of the document is never taken before C14N processing else the 
digital signature would be invalid.   
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Within the XML Encryption specification, there exists a set of optional elements 
that present an opportunity for a key to be sent in the clear.  If a key is ever distributed in 
the clear without any form of encryption applied, then all traffic transmitted using the key 
must be considered compromised.  If the organization policy is to include the key in the 
clear as part of the transmission, then what is the point of securing the document in 
relations to confidentiality?  It may never be achieved (W3C Encryption Working 
Group). 
3. Frequency Analysis Attack 
A major component of any cryptographic algorithm is its degree of entropy in 
regards to ciphertext.  Entropy is the degree of randomness produced by the encryption 
routine.  By studying the patterns of the ciphertext a pattern might be discovered that may 
reveal clues to the plaintext.  Ciphertext is encrypted text wheras plaintext is the original 
message.  Within the English language, there are a plethora of words containing the 
subset of common combinations of letters such as  {“th”, “ing”, “sc”, “ph”, “fr”, “ed” 
etc.}.  A pattern of these common charactersets may emerge in the ciphertext thereby 
revealing the plaintext.  Based upon the cryptographic algorithm selected, XML 
encryption may be vulnerable to a frequency analysis attack.  This is an attack on the 
algorithm and not XML encryption in general.   
4. Element Wrapping Attacks 
Based upon the approach used, an XML signed document is prone to an element 
wrapping attack if only a portion of the document is signed.  The remaining portions are 
left unprotected and vulnerable to modification.   Therefore, it is recommended that the 
full document be signed whenever possible (Hill 2007). 
5. Untrusted Keys 
Although not an attack on the specification, this is an attack on the application 
processing the document.  Anyone that has access to the appropriate software and 
hardware can create and sign a key.  Therefore, the applications in practice must have a 
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method of resolving the keys via some method of establishing a trust authority.  Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP) is an option whose trust is established via a ring of faith.  For 
example, if Bob trust Jack and Jack trust Alice then Bob Trusts Alice.  Everyone that is 
contained within the ring of Trust is vetted by another entity that is trusted by someone 
that they know.  Now, if the symmetry of the trust relation is broken such that Bob trusts 
Jack but does not trust Alice, but Jack trusts Alice, and Jack’s content can be viewed by 
Alice because of the trust relationship, then that means that there is a potential that Bob’s 
information may also be viewed by Alice, if not properly protected.  The impact in the 
use and acceptance of untrusted keys is a weakened or ineffective encyrption key.  
6. Attack on the External Elements of an XML Document  
An XML document may utilize one or more references that may not be local to 
the secure enclave to which it is written.  This means that an attack on the reference is an 
indirect attack on the document, which impacts validation.  In an attacker can access a 
URL to a schema or DTD and change it then any files that rely on it for validation would 
fail thereby creating a denial of service.   If an arbitrary schema pertinent to validation for 
a given site was altered in a malicious fashion then all XML that was validated by that 
site would no longer validate against the schema or DTD.  This would attack the second 
step in XML digital signature process, XML validation.    Therefore, depending upon the 
implementation, an indirect attack on the implementation of the XML specification 
would adversely affect the ability of the originator to generate and XML document and 
the recipient to successfully to receive an XML document (Hill 2007). 
D. STILL-NEEDED FUNCTIONALITY 
XML digital signature and XML encryption perform much-needed tasks in the 
advancement of web services, but further integration with XML-based high performance 
compression methodology is needed.  Extensible binary schema-based compression 
(XSBC) was a good first start.  However, being dependent upon a schema is in itself a 
weakness in that not all XML would be able to benefit from the technology.  Efficient 
XML Interchange (EXI) is a step further in the right direction but once it has been  
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processed under EXI it cannot be encrypted using XML Encryption.  Therefore, further 
integration with the XML specification is required to support the full integration of EXI 
in XML Encryption technologies.   
E. SUMMARY 
XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption is  useful in coordinating activities 
between civilian and government agencies.  Used in conjunction with XMPP, XML 
security offers a robust array of features that enables secure realtime chat.  However, 
XML Security is not without vulnerabilities.  Several vulnerabilities can be mitigated 
with appropriate approach selection, implementation techniques and procedures.  Indirect 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The XML digital signature, efficient extensible markup language interchange 
(EXI), and encryption specification provides a robust framework to provide an 
international standard for secure information exchange.  The use of EXI makes XML 
technology viable for providing secure communications across multiple nodes within a 
bandwidth-constricted environment.  EXI is the superior to other compression 
implementations in that with either schema-based or schemaless compression, results 
indicate that it has massive performance and compression gains over other methods.    
The application of XML digital signature provides message and document 
integrity via the generation of the message digest, authenticity through the combination 
of the message digest with the private key, and signer authentication via the public 
private key pair.  XML encryption provides message confidentiality.   
XML security is a primary contender to become an international standard because 
it is a license-free, platform-independent and well-supported technology that is modular 
and designed for structuring data (Boss).  It can interface with multiple other formats 
through the use of XLST, thereby, reducing the requirement for expedited integration of 
new structures within an economic repressed society.  The modularity of XML facilitates 
full integration with existing command and control suites for national and international 
messaging.  COE CMP can generate XML MTF messages and can also process and 
support messages generated for NATO operations as well as other coalition operations.   
Therefore, the application of XML Encryption and Authentication works all variants of 
XML.  XML security provides a lightweight infrastructure that can apply various 
cryptographic algorithms to satisfy the prevalent security policy while simultaneously 
providing a framework for global interoperability through a standards-based approach to 
security. 
The application of applying security at the document and message level enhances 
security of the material being transmitted.  Security at the document level increases the 
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cost of infiltration to the would-be attacker and increases.  The signatures applied to the 
document would remain valid with the document until the document has been changed in 
which case the signature would no longer be valid.  However, unaltered digitally signed 
documents can be used for several legal matters inclusive of non-repudiation.    
The drawback of using discretionary access control (DAC) is that once the sender 
releases the document, he or she no longer has control of the document.  Therefore, a 
trust relationship must exist between the sender and recipients.  In particular, the sender 
must trust that the recipient does not violate standing agreement and use the information 
for the purpose it was sent.  Nonetheless, sometimes these issues are unavoidable i.e., 
depending upon implementation, if (Alice trusts Bob) and (Bob trusts Alice) and (Alice 
trusts Charlie) and (Charlie trusts Alice), then it follows that (Bob trusts Charlie by 
association with Alice).  However, if Bob does not trust Charlie, but Alice trusts Charlie, 
then protocols must be established, such that documents entrusted and accessible by 
Alice are not accessible to Charlie.                
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
The following is a list of topics for future research: 
 Certification and accreditation of XML Encryption and Authentication for 
the unclassified architecture.  XML is new but not that new therefore, it 
needs to be properly vetted by an non-partisan official certification and 
accreditation authority such that the technology can be adopted by 
sovereign powers as an official alternative for communications.    
 Applicability of XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption for real web 
time services in relation to continued use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).  
This thesis covered embedded security with XML documents.  However, 
the technology can be adopted to compare and contrast Web Services in 
relation to secure sockets layer in terms of technologicial development, 




SSL, but it does a great deal more.  Web Services encompasses these 
XML Digital Signatures and XML Encryption and makes this a viable 
area for continued study.   
 Application of XML encryption and authentication with the classified 
arena.  Although a thorough study of the vulnerabilities associated with 
XML encryption and authentication should be conducted prior to any 
discussion of applying the technology within either a multilevel security or 
classified environment, the process at its core does have the same 
methodology but on different platforms.  Each browser and associated 
XML implementation as well as a thorough analysis of the underlying 
protocols need to be explored via formal methods.  Only a formal method 
methodology may give entities seeking to preserve data the assurance they 
require that the techniques employed may not compromise their security.   
 A comparative analysis and potential for document centric XML Security 
in support of CENTRIX and COSMOS.  In 2007 JTIC performed an 
analysis of COSMOS and declared it a promising technology that needed 
improvement.  It was based on routers and VPN technologies.  However, 
changing the technology to embed the security within the XML message 
itself may affect transmissions and delivery of messages in a more positive 
manner. 
 An in-depth analysis of how message-based and document-centric security 
using XML authentication and encryption can be integrated with Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML).  SAML, provided by Organization 
for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), is 
generally known for its single sign-on abilities.  However, single sign-on 
is merely one of the capabilities of SAML.  However, if multifactor 
security is the goal, the application of SAML, with another set of 
credentials using XML Security, make it more powerful protocol. 
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 An analysis of XML document-centric security within the Web Services 
Security infrastructure may provide further insight that decouples security 
attributes from its respective base platform.   
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APPENDIX A.  EXEMPLAR FILE CONVERSIONS AND 
MESSAGES 
Open source and proprietary tools possess the capability of converting a comma 
separated value file to a well-formed valid XML file, as described in Chapter IV.  The 
resultant structured data is ready to be used by any application that accepts its format. 
A. FULL XML FILE REPRESENTATION OF CSV DATA FILE FROM 
CHAPTER IV FIGURE 35 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Import> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>John</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Phineas</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Doe</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CAPT</Rank> 
                       <Service>USN</Service> 
                       <Location>USS Bainbridge</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Peter</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Demetrius</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Jones</LastName> 
                       <Rank>LCDR</Rank> 
                       <Service>USCG</Service> 
                       <Location>USS Comanche</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Mathais</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Plasidius </MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Montique</LastName> 
                       <Rank>GS-15</Rank> 
                       <Service>DOD</Service> 
                       <Location>Mombassa, Kenya</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Ameila</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>NMN</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Starr</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Fulton Co., GA</Location> 
                       <Status>Deceased 99</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
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                       <FirstName>Floyd</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Morgan</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Williams </LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>Clergy</Service> 
                       <Location>Boston, MA</Location> 
                       <Status>Deceased 06</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Tang</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Vu</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Chiang</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Siagon, Vietnam</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Awanstar</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Schaeffer</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Lines</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>Contractor</Service> 
                       <Location>Detroit, MI</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Eunice</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Kennedy</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Schriver</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Monterey, CA</Location> 
                       <Status>Deceased 09</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Rovert</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>F</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Kennedy</LastName> 
                       <Rank>Commander-in-Chief</Rank> 
                       <Service>US</Service> 
                       <Location>Washington, DC</Location> 
                       <Status>Deceased 72</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Ferdinand</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Dubia</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Cascinco</LastName> 
                       <Rank>1st LT</Rank> 
                       <Service>USA</Service> 
                       <Location>Ciaro, Egypt</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Geoffrey</FirstName> 
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                       <MiddleInitial>Xavier</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Parsons</LastName> 
                       <Rank>SGT</Rank> 
                       <Service>LAPD</Service> 
                       <Location>Los Angelos, CA</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Felipa</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Cordoves</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Kerr</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>San Diego, CA</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Christina</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Sunshine</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Johnson</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>USN Dependent</Service> 
                       <Location>San Diego, CA</Location> 
                       <Status>Deceased 90</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Timothy</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Antwoine</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Cooper</LastName> 
                       <Rank>GYST</Rank> 
                       <Service>USMC</Service> 
                       <Location>Newport, RI</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Antonio</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Steamer</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Anderson</LastName> 
                       <Rank>LCDR</Rank> 
                       <Service>USN</Service> 
                       <Location>Baltimore, MD</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Vitterio</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Julius</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Crisp</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CDR</Rank> 
                       <Service>USN</Service> 
                       <Location>Sigonella, Sicily</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Julius</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Von</MiddleInitial> 
 132
                       <LastName>Ceasar</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Naples, Italy</Location> 
                       <Status>Deceased 88</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Loren</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Jascupisco</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Peterson</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Beaumont, TX</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Eula</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Janet</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Praylor</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Guam</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Adorn</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Vanessa</MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Johnson</LastName> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <Service>N/A</Service> 
                       <Location>Manilla, Philipines</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
           <Row> 
                       <FirstName>Breanna</FirstName> 
                       <MiddleInitial>Naiomi </MiddleInitial> 
                       <LastName>Santos</LastName> 
                       <Rank>MAJ</Rank> 
                       <Service>USA</Service> 
                       <Location>Muscat, Oman</Location> 
                       <Status>Up</Status> 
           </Row> 
</Import> 
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XML is a structured modular language that facilitates data extraction and customization. 
By extracting only the portion that is required, data customization is achieved.  It is 
performed natively via an XSLT or with some other open source or proprietary 
customizable tool.    
B. XML OUTPUT OF FILE GENERATED BY XSLT FILE FROM 
CHAPTER IV FIGURE 36 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Import> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CAPT</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Doe</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>LCDR</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Jones</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>GS-15</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Montique</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Starr</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Williams </LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Chiang</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Lines</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Schriver</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>Commander-in-Chief</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Kennedy</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>1st LT</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Cascinco</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
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           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>SGT</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Parsons</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Kerr</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Johnson</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>GYST</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Cooper</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>LCDR</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Anderson</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CDR</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Crisp</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Ceasar</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Peterson</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Praylor</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>CIV</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Johnson</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
           <Officer> 
                       <Rank>MAJ</Rank> 
                       <LastName>Santos</LastName> 
           </Officer> 
</Import> 
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Organizations require coordination between participating entities to ensure that each 
participant is clear on their role and responsibilities for specific events.  This also serves 
as the venue for participating entities to discuss items of concerns to include capabilities, 
limitations, policy differences, etc.  Such meetings assist the principle organization in 
creating the ideal structure.  Visit request are critical to assure that all participants can 
communicate at the requisite security level to engage other members attending in 
additional to being able to attend all briefings.  The following message is an example of a 
notional visit request that would be sent from one organization to another. 
 




REF/A/MSGID:GENADMIN/NAVPGSCOL MONTEREY CA/YMD:20040319// 




GENTEXT/VISIT PURPOSE/ANTIPIRACY CONF// 
LOCSITE/UNIT:CCSG12/PHUKET THIALAND// 
PERSDAT/HARD U.P./LCDR/SSAN:012345678/S/SAN DIEGO, 
CA/23MAY1975/US// 
GRANTOR/DONCAF/29AUG2002// 








XML is a verbose structured language and therefore has more levels of granularity than 
data contained in other formats.  Due to this nature, XML data can easily be parsed and 
customizable subsets of data can be pulled from their overall file with little effort. 
D. COMMON OPERATING ENVIRONMENT COMMON MESSAGE 





    xmlns:mtf="urn:mtf:mil:usmtf:2004" 
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> <message_identification> 
        <message_text_format_identifier>VISITREQ</message_text_format_identifier> 
        <originator>NATO BRUSSELS</originator> 
        <month_name>MAR</month_name> 
    </message_identification> 
    <reference> 
        <amplification> 
            <free_text xml:space = 'preserve'>REF MUILTI NATIONAL ANTIPIRACY COORDINATION 
CONFERENCE</free_text> 
        </amplification> 
        <serial_identifier>A</serial_identifier> 
        <type_of_reference> 
            <message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier> 
        </type_of_reference> 
        <originator>NAVPGSCOL MONTEREY CA</originator> 
        <date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
            <date_of_reference_year_month_day> 
                <year>2004</year> 
                <month_numeric>03</month_numeric> 
                <day>19</day> 
            </date_of_reference_year_month_day> 
        </date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
    </reference> 
    <visit_request> 
        <point_of_contact_name>MS. BOYD</point_of_contact_name> 
        <primary_telephone_number>DSN 773-7583</primary_telephone_number> 
        <visit_begin_date_day_alphamonth_year> 
            <day>19</day> 
            <month_name>JAN</month_name> 
            <year>2005</year> 
        </visit_begin_date_day_alphamonth_year> 
        <visit_end_date_day_alphamonth_year> 
            <day>25</day> 
            <month_name>JAN</month_name> 
            <year>2005</year> 
        </visit_end_date_day_alphamonth_year> 
        <discussion_information_classification>CONFIDENTIAL</discussion_information_classification> 
    </visit_request> 
    <general_text_information_1> 
        <gentext_text_indicator>VISIT PURPOSE</gentext_text_indicator> 
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        <free_text xml:space ='preserve'>ANTIPIRACY CONF</free_text> 
    </general_text_information_1> 
    <visit_site_location_data> 
        <facility_location_unit_name> 
            <unit_name>CCSG12</unit_name> 
        </facility_location_unit_name> 
        <sub_organization_identifier>PHUKET THIALAND</sub_organization_identifier> 
    </visit_site_location_data> 
    <personnel_data_and_clearance_segment> 
        <personnel_data_and_clearance> 
            <name_of_individual>HARD U.P.</name_of_individual> 
            <military_rank_rating_or_grade>LCDR</military_rank_rating_or_grade> 
            <social_security_number_or_service_number> 
                <social_security_number>012345678</social_security_number> 
            </social_security_number_or_service_number> 
            <security_clearance>S</security_clearance> 
            <birthplace>SAN DIEGO, CA</birthplace> 
            <birthdate_day_alphamonth_year> 
                <day>23</day> 
                <month_name>MAY</month_name> 
                <year>1975</year> 
            </birthdate_day_alphamonth_year> 
            <nationality>US</nationality> 
        </personnel_data_and_clearance> 
        <security_clearance_grantor_data> 
            <security_clearance_granting_agency>DONCAF</security_clearance_granting_agency> 
            <date_clearance_granted_day_alphamonth_year> 
                <day>29</day> 
                <month_name>AUG</month_name> 
                <year>2002</year> 
            </date_clearance_granted_day_alphamonth_year> 
        </security_clearance_grantor_data> 
    </personnel_data_and_clearance_segment> 
    <personnel_data_and_clearance_segment> 
        <personnel_data_and_clearance> 
            <name_of_individual>-BYTE M.E.</name_of_individual> 
            <military_rank_rating_or_grade>CIV</military_rank_rating_or_grade> 
            <social_security_number_or_service_number> 
                <social_security_number>754627532</social_security_number> 
            </social_security_number_or_service_number> 
            <security_clearance>TS</security_clearance> 
            <birthplace>DES MOINES, IA</birthplace> 
            <birthdate_day_alphamonth_year> 
                <day>22</day> 
                <month_name>JAN</month_name> 
                <year>1962</year> 
            </birthdate_day_alphamonth_year> 
            <nationality>US</nationality> 
        </personnel_data_and_clearance> 
        <security_clearance_grantor_data> 
            <security_clearance_granting_agency>CCF</security_clearance_granting_agency> 
            <date_clearance_granted_day_alphamonth_year> 
                <day>05</day> 
                <month_name>FEB</month_name> 
                <year>2004</year> 
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            </date_clearance_granted_day_alphamonth_year> 
        </security_clearance_grantor_data> 
    </personnel_data_and_clearance_segment> 
    <point_of_contact_information> 
        <contact_name>CEASAR, J</contact_name> 
        <rank_or_position>CDR</rank_or_position> 
        <unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
            <unit_identifier>NATO SHAPE MIL CMTE</unit_identifier> 
        </unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
        <poc_location> 
            <location_name>SHERATON, PHUKET</location_name> 
        </poc_location> 
        <group_of_fields> 
            <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
                <nonsecure_telephone_number>DSN 563-6426</nonsecure_telephone_number> 
            </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        </group_of_fields> 
        <group_of_fields> 
            <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
                
<electronic_mail_address>CEASARJ(AT)USDELAGTIONAUTHTHIA.US.GOV</electronic_mail_addre
ss> 
            </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        </group_of_fields> 
    </point_of_contact_information> 
</mtf:visit_request> 
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E. ACP-126 USMTF INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE (IPC) 
Most events requires a planning conference to investigate the best course of 
action, areas of responsibility and available assets.  In conducting such conference, the 
task force commander is endowed with sufficient information to draft coordinate the 
projection of proper assets within the appropriate locations within the battlespace.  For 
example, if an attack is in progress and is in excess of 50 miles away, either a fixed wing 
or helicopter may be tools of choice.  The object is to reduce the response time of an 
attack within the area of interest to a few minutes thereby making it extremely expensive 




SUBJ/NOTIFICATION OF ANTIPIRACY SOUTHERN WATCH INITIAL PLANNING 
/CONFERENCE// 
POC/CDR OMAR DENZEL/FPO/ESG2/-/TEL:001-757-445-9595/TEL:312-565-8750 
/TEL:001-757-621-6352/EMAIL:OMAR.DENZEL@NAVY.MIL// 
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. AUTHORIZATION GRANTED BY NAVEUR AND SIXTH FLEET 
FOR CTF151 TO SEND SUBJ MSG TO USDAOS. REQUEST USDAOS DISSEMINATE  
THIS MESSAGE TO APPROPRIATE HOST NATION COMMANDS AND STAFFS. 
2.COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS STRIKE GROUP TWO WILL HOST THE INITIAL 
PLANNING CONFERENCE (IPC) AT THE SHERATON WATERSIDE HOTEL 
3. MISSION OVERVIEW:   THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS CURRENTLY 
UNDER ATTACK BY A NON-TRADITIONAL ADVERSARY.  THE ADVERSARY IS NOT A 
SOVERIEGN ENTITY BUT THIEVES AND MURDERERS THEY PREY ON DEFENSELESS 
MERCHANT AND PRIVATELY OWNED VESSELS.  THE ADVERSARY RESPECTS NO 
AUTHORITY. IT'S MOTIVATION IS NEITHER POLITICAL NOR TERROR BUT IT IS 
GREED.  THE ADVERSARY IS EVERY NATION'S ARCH ENEMY FROM TI’MES 
ANCIENT TIMES.  IT IS THE MODERN DAY PIRATE.   
THE ASSEMBLED MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE IS A HQ USEUCOM DIRECTED, 
COMUSNAVEUR 
MARITIME AND LAND OPERATIONS WILL BE HELD IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AREA 
CONTINUOUSLY TILL THE THREAT IS ELIMINATED.  MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT 
IT WE ARE IN FOR THE LONG HALL.  COMMAND WILL ROTATE BETWEEN MEMBER 
NATIONS.  THE PRIMARY PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION 
COMMAND IS COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS STRIKE GROUP TWO. 
4. THE FOLLOWING NATIONS ARE INVITED TO SEND NAVY AND MARINE 
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE IPC: DENMARK, ESTONIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, 
GERMANY, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, NORWAY, POLAND, RUSSIA, SWEDEN, UNITED 
KINGDOM, CHINA, ISREAL, BAHRAIN, UAE, PAKISTAN, IRAN, SOMOLIA, 
SPAIN, SOUTH AFRICA, JAPAN, ITALY, UNITED STATES. 
   A. FURTHER, NATIONS ARE INVITED TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVES TO 
DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES AT WORKING GROUPS AS FOLLOWS: 
     EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP/ROE: ALL 
     COMMUNICATIONS: ALL 
     SURFACE: NATIONS OFFERING SURFACE FORCES 
     AIR: CAOC-1 AND NATIONS OFFERING AIR FORCES 
     SUBSURFACE: CINCGERFLEET AND NATIONS OFFERING SUBMARINE 
        ASSETS OR VARIABLE DEPTH SONAR SHIPS 
     LAND: USMC 2-23, MARFOREUR AND NATIONS OFFERING LAND FORCES 
     AMPHIB: USMC 2-23, MARFOREUR AND NATIONS OFFERING AMPHIBIOUS 
        SHIPPING 
     OPFOR: UK (HMS SUTHERLAND) 
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     LOGISTICS: ALL 
     MCM: UK (MCM HQ) AND NATION OFFERING MCM FORCES 
ESG-2 RECOGNIZES THAT IT MAY NOT BE PRACTICAL FOR ALL NATIONS TO 
SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO ALL WORKING GROUPS LISTED ABOVE. HOWEVER, IT 
IS REQUESTED THAT THE DESIGNATED IPC REPRESENTATIVES BE SUFFICIENTLY 
KNOWLEDGEABLE TO PROVIDE INPUT TO THE ABOVE WORKING GROUPS. 
   B. ACTION OFFICER PARTICIPATION/KEY PLANNING DATES ARE 
7-9 DEC. 
   C. ACTION OFFICERS MUST BE PREPARED AND AUTHORIZED TO MAKE 
DECISIONS REGARDING COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND OTHER 
ISSUES LISTED AS IPC OBJECTIVES. 
5. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO FORWARD A LIST OF PARTICIPANTS TO 
ESG-2 POC (PARA 10.H.) BY 20 NOVEMBER, 2004 IN THE 
FOLLOWING FORMAT: 
       (1) NAME/RANK/SERVICE 
       (2) NATION/COMMAND REPRESENTED 
       (3) CONTACT PHONE NUMBER/EMAIL ADDRESS 
       (4) WORKING GROUP(S) TO ATTEND 
       (5) SPECIFIC TACTICAL OBJECTIVES 
REQUEST USDAO ADDRESSEES PROVIDE POC FOR BALTOPS ISSUES TO ESG-2 
POC TO FACILITATE FOLLOW ON COMMUNICATIONS. 
6. OBJECTIVES OF THE IPC ARE: 
   A. FINALIZE COMMAND AND CONTROL, WORKING GROUP ASSIGNMENTS 
AND TASK ORGANIZATION 
   B. PROPOSE AND APPROVE DRAFT INITIAL TASKING ORDERS 
   C. COMMENCE PLANNING AND FUNCTIONAL COMMANDER 
   D. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF C4I STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT C2 ORGANIZATION 
   E. ASSIGN OPORDER DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
   F. COORDINATE HELO INTEROPERABILITY. ALL PARTICIPANTS OFFERING 
HELO CAPABLE SURFACE PLATFORMS SHOULD BRING APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL 
DATA FOR HELO FLIGHT DECK CAPABILITY AND VERIFY NATO HOSTAC 
COMPATIBILITY (IF APPLICABLE). 
7. IN PREPARATION FOR THE IPC REQUEST THAT EACH PARTICIPATING NATION 
PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING NLT 20 NOV: 
   A. AVAILABLE LAND RANGES TO CNE/C6F POC (PARA 10.H.). 
   B. INPUTS ON POSSIBLE PORTS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE PRE-SAIL 
AND POST SAIL EXERCISES TO CNE/C6F POC. 
   C. PARTICIPANTS TO HOST THE MPC CONTACT CNE/C6F POC. 
   D. PARTICIPANTS CONFIRM AVAILABILITY FOR LISTED WORKING GROUP AND 
COMMAND AND CONTROL ASSIGNMENT TO ESG-2 POC. 
   E. SPECIAL EVENTS.  AGREEMENT ON STRUCTURE OF THE SERIAL PHASE 
WILL BE ACHIEVED AT THE IPC. SPECIFIC TACTICAL OBJECTIVES, TACTICS 
VALIDATION OR SERIALS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SERIAL PHASE ARE TO BE 
PROVIDED AT THE IPC. 
   F. UPDATED FORCE PARTICIPATION. REQUEST EACH NATION PROVIDE ANY 
CHANGES TO FORCE OFFERINGS DISCUSSED AT CDC TO ESG-12 POC BY 20 NOV 
2004. 
8. WORKING GROUP LEADS.  TENTATIVE WORKING GROUP LEAD 
ASSIGNMENTS: 
   A. EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP/ROE: US - ESG-12 
   B. AIR: US, FRANCE AND GERMANY - CAOC-1 
   C. SURFACE:  US - ESG-12 
   D. SUBSURFACE:  GE - CINCGERFLEET 
   E.–LAND:  US - USMC 2-23 
   F. OPFOR: UK - HMS SUTHERLAND 
   G. LOGISTICS: US - ESG-2 
   H. COMMUNIICATIONS/OPSEC:  US AND GERMANY - ESG-2 AND 
CINCGERFLEET 
   I. MCM: UK - MCM HQ 
   J.AMPHIB:– US - LSD/LPD (TBD) 
WORKING GROUP LEAD WILL PROVIDE DIRECTION AND OVERSIGHT. 
9. SCHEDULE OF EVENTS FOR BALTOPS 2005 IPC FOLLOWS: 
6 DECEMBER (MONDAY) 
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TRAVEL DAY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS 
--------- 
7 DECEMBER (TUESDAY) 
0730-0815 CHECK-IN SHERATON CONFERENCE ROOM 
0815 OPENING REMARKS BY ESG-12 AND INTRODUCTION 
0830 CONFERENCE ADMIN/OVERVIEW 
0840 COUNTRY/FORCE REPRESENTATIVE INTRODUCTIONS 
0920 REVIEW CDC NOTES (C6F)/REVIEW IPC OBJECTIVES AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
1000 PRESENTATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, WORKING GROUP ASSIGNMENTS 
AND OPORDER RESPONSIBILITIES 
1030 TACTICAL PLANNING BRIEF 
1230 DRAFT INITIAL PLANNING ORDERS 
1300 SERIAL BRIEF 
1330 WORKING GROUP OBJECTIVES 
1345-1500 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
1500-1600 WORKING GROUP PROGRESS REPORTS 
1800-2000 RECEPTION HOSTED BY ESG-12 (SHERATON) (DRESS: 
CASUAL) 
--------- 
8 DECEMBER (WEDNESDAY) 
0800 DAY ONE REVIEW AND DAY TWO OBJECTIVES 
0830 ROE OVERVIEW 
0900 PROPOSED TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION 
0930 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
1500-1530 WORKING GROUP PROGRESS REPORTS 
--------- 
9 DECEMBER (THURSDAY) 
0800 DAY TWO REVIEW AND DAY THREE OBJECTIVES 
0815 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
1000 WORKING GROUP OUTBRIEFS 
1400 IPC OBJECTIVES STATUS REVIEW 
1430 ROADMAP, MPC AGENDA/LOGISTICS 
1500 IPC WRAP-UP 
--------- 
10 DECEMBER (FRIDAY) 
TRAVEL DAY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS 
10. ADMINISTRATION. 
   A. WEBSITE ACCESS: COMMANDS DESIGNATE 2-3 PERSONNEL TO OBTAIN 
ACCESS TO THE HOA IN THE PARTNERS FOR PEACE INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (PIMS) WEBSITE. THE FIRST STEP IS TO REGISTER AND 
OBTAIN AN ACCOUNT AND PASSWORD. TO REGISTER GO TO THE FOLLOWING 
SITE: HTTP: (DOUBLE 
IN THE REMARKS SECTION.  ONCE YOU HAVE OBTAINED AN ACCOUNT GO TO THE 
PIMS HOME PAGE AND SELECT BALTOPS UNDER THE ANNOUNCEMENT BANNER 
(PASSWORD PROTECTED).  THIS IS WHERE ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS 
RELATING TO HOA SOTHERN WATCH WILL BE POSTED. 
   B. CONFERENCE. ROOM WILL BE EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT MICROSOFT 
POWERPOINT BRIEFS WITH A PROJECTOR.  ESG-2 OPERATES POWERPOINT 
2003.  COMMANDS PROVIDING POWERPOINT BRIEFS, EMAIL BRIEFS TO ESG-2 
POC NLT 20 NOV.  MAX FILE ATTACHMENT SIZE IS 5MB.  FILE MAY BE 
MAILED TO POC AT: 
        CDR OMAR DENZEL 
        COMMANDER EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP TWO 
        UNIT 123456 
        FPO AE 09506-4704 
   C.  SHERATON WATERSIDE HOTEL 
      (1) SHERATON PHUKETPHUKET, THAILAND.  RESERVATIONS CAN BE  
MADE DIRECT TO THE HOTEL AT 011-757-622-6664. FAX NUMBER IS   
011-757-635-8271.  WEBSITE IS HTTP (SLASH 
SLASH)WWW.PHUKET.COM/SHERATON/.  FORTY (40) ROOMS ARE SET ASIDE 
FOR THE CONFERENCE.  ROOM CHARGE IS ONE HUNDRED AND TEN (110) US PER 
NIGHT PLUS APPLICABLE TAXES AND FEES. 
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      (2) REQUEST THAT “SOUTHERN WATCH” IS REFERENCED WHEN BOOKING 
RESERVATIONS.  TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AVAILABILITY, ATTENDEES ARE 
ENCOURAGED TO MAKE RESERVATIONS NO LATER THAN 12 NOV 2004. 
      (3) A CONFERENCE FEE OF TEN (10) US DOLLARS WILL BE COLLECTED 
DURING CHECK-IN TUESDAY MORNING 7 DEC TO COVER ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. 
   D. FOR TRANSPORTATION ISSUES PLEASE CONTACT THE ESG-2 STAFF 
DUTY OFFICER AT 757-642-6970. ADDITIONALLY, IF ANY ISSUES ARE 
ENCOUNTERED WITH THE HOTEL, PLEASE CONTACT THE ESG-2 LOGISTICS 
OFFICER AT 757-946-1234. 
   F. INFORMATION ON THE PHUKET, THAILAND AREA MAY BE FOUND 
ON THE WEB AT WWW.PHUKET.COM. 
   G. ATTIRE.  THE CONFERENCE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN WORKING UNIFORM. 
   H. POINTS OF CONTACT: 
      C6F-CNE: LT JOSE DELGADOE -N37, DSN: 314-235-4–22, COMM: 
0044-207-514-4022, CELL: 0044-773-986-2216, FAX: 0044-207-514-4637, 
EMAIL: JOSE.DELGADOE@NAVEUR.NAVY.MIL 
      ESG-2: CDR OMAR DENZEL - N34, DSN 312-445-9–95. COMM: 










    
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier
> 
    <originator>ESG2</originator> 
    <month_name>JUN</month_name> 
  </message_identification> 
  <subject> 
    <message_subject>NOTIFICATION OF ANTIPIRACY SOUTHERN WATCH INITIAL 
PLANNING</message_subject> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <message_subject_continued>CONFERENCE</message_subject_continued> 
    </group_of_fields> 
  </subject> 
  <point_of_contact_information> 
    <contact_name>CDR OMAR DENZEL</contact_name> 
    <rank_or_position>FPO</rank_or_position> 
    <unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
      <unit_identifier>ESG2</unit_identifier> 
    </unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
        <poc_location xsi:nil=”true”/> 
     
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        <nonsecure_telephone_number>001-757-445-
9595</nonsecure_telephone_number> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        <nonsecure_telephone_number>312-565-
8750</nonsecure_telephone_number> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        <nonsecure_telephone_number>001-757-621-
6352</nonsecure_telephone_number> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        
<electronic_mail_address>OMAR.DENZEL@NAVY.MIL</electronic_mail_address> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
  </point_of_contact_information> 
  <general_text_information> 
    <gentext_text_indicator>REMARKS</gentext_text_indicator> 
    <free_text xml:space =’preserve’>1. AUTHORIZATION GRANTED BY NAVEUR 
AND SIXTH FLEET FOR CTF151 TO SEND SUBJ MSG TO USDAOS. REQUEST USDAOS 
DISSEMINATE THIS MESSAGE TO APPROPRIATE HOST NATION COMMANDS AND STAFFS. 
2.COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS STRIKE GROUP TWO WILL HOST THE INITIAL 
PLANNING CONFERENCE (IPC) AT THE SHERATON WATERSIDE HOTEL 
3. MISSION OVERVIEW:   THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS CURRENTLY 
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UNDER ATTACK BY A NON-TRADITIONAL ADVERSARY.  THE ADVERSARY IS NOT A 
SOVERIEGN ENTITY BUT THIEVES AND MURDERERS THEY PREY ON DEFENSELESS 
MERCHANT AND PRIVATELY OWNED VESSELS.  THE ADVERSARY RESPECTS NO 
AUTHORITY. IT&apos;S MOTIVATION IS NEITHER POLITICAL NOR TERROR BUT IT 
IS 
GREED.  THE ADVERSARY IS EVERY NATION&apos;S ARCH ENEMY FROM TIMES 
ANCIENT TIMES.  IT IS THE MODERN DAY PIRATE.   
THE ASSEMBLED MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE IS A HQ USEUCOM DIRECTED, 
COMUSNAVEUR 
MARITIME AND LAND OPERATIONS WILL BE HELD IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AREA 
CONTINUOUSLY TILL THE THREAT IS ELIMINATED.  MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT 
IT WE ARE IN FOR THE LONG HALL.  COMMAND WILL ROTATE BETWEEN MEMBER 
NATIONS.  THE PRIMARY PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION 
COMMAND IS COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS STRIKE GROUP TWO. 
4. THE FOLLOWING NATIONS ARE INVITED TO SEND NAVY AND MARINE 
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE IPC: DENMARK, ESTONIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, 
GERMANY, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, NORWAY, POLAND, RUSSIA, SWEDEN, UNITED 
KINGDOM, CHINA, ISREAL, BAHRAIN, UAE, PAKISTAN, IRAN, SOMOLIA, 
SPAIN, SOUTH AFRICA, JAPAN, ITALY, UNITED STATES. 
   A. FURTHER, NATIONS ARE INVITED TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVES TO 
DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES AT WORKING GROUPS AS FOLLOWS: 
     EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP/ROE: ALL 
     COMMUNICATIONS: ALL 
     SURFACE: NATIONS OFFERING SURFACE FORCES 
     AIR: CAOC-1 AND NATIONS OFFERING AIR FORCES 
     SUBSURFACE: CINCGERFLEET AND NATIONS OFFERING SUBMARINE 
        ASSETS OR VARIABLE DEPTH SONAR SHIPS 
     LAND: USMC 2-23, MARFOREUR AND NATIONS OFFERING LAND FORCES 
     AMPHIB: USMC 2-23, MARFOREUR AND NATIONS OFFERING AMPHIBIOUS 
        SHIPPING 
     OPFOR: UK (HMS SUTHERLAND) 
     LOGISTICS: ALL 
     MCM: UK (MCM HQ) AND NATION OFFERING MCM FORCES 
ESG-2 RECOGNIZES THAT IT MAY NOT BE PRACTICAL FOR ALL NATIONS TO 
SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO ALL WORKING GROUPS LISTED ABOVE. HOWEVER, IT 
IS REQUESTED THAT THE DESIGNATED IPC REPRESENTATIVES BE SUFFICIENTLY 
KNOWLEDGEABLE TO PROVIDE INPUT TO THE ABOVE WORKING GROUPS. 
   B. ACTION OFFICER PARTICIPATION/KEY PLANNING DATES ARE 
7-9 DEC. 
   C. ACTION OFFICERS MUST BE PREPARED AND AUTHORIZED TO MAKE 
DECISIONS REGARDING COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND OTHER 
ISSUES LISTED AS IPC OBJECTIVES. 
5. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO FORWARD A LIST OF PARTICIPANTS TO 
ESG-2 POC (PARA 10.H.) BY 20 NOVEMBER, 2004 IN THE 
FOLLOWING FORMAT: 
       (1) NAME/RANK/SERVICE 
       (2) NATION/COMMAND REPRESENTED 
       (3) CONTACT PHONE NUMBER/EMAIL ADDRESS 
       (4) WORKING GROUP(S) TO ATTEND 
       (5) SPECIFIC TACTICAL OBJECTIVES 
REQUEST USDAO ADDRESSEES PROVIDE POC FOR BALTOPS ISSUES TO ESG-2 
POC TO FACILITATE FOLLOW ON COMMUNICATIONS. 
6. OBJECTIVES OF THE IPC ARE: 
   A. FINALIZE COMMAND AND CONTROL, WORKING GROUP ASSIGNMENTS 
AND TASK ORGANIZATION 
   B. PROPOSE AND APPROVE DRAFT INITIAL TASKING ORDERS 
   C. COMMENCE PLANNING AND FUNCTIONAL COMMANDER 
   D. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF C4I STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT C2 ORGANIZATION 
   E. ASSIGN OPORDER DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
   F. COORDINATE HELO INTEROPERABILITY. ALL PARTICIPANTS OFFERING 
HELO CAPABLE SURFACE PLATFORMS SHOULD BRING APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL 
DATA FOR HELO FLIGHT DECK CAPABILITY AND VERIFY NATO HOSTAC 
COMPATIBILITY (IF APPLICABLE). 
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7. IN PREPARATION FOR THE IPC REQUEST THAT EACH PARTICIPATING NATION 
PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING NLT 20 NOV: 
   A. AVAILABLE LAND RANGES TO CNE/C6F POC (PARA 10.H.). 
   B. INPUTS ON POSSIBLE PORTS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE PRE-SAIL 
AND POST SAIL EXERCISES TO CNE/C6F POC. 
   C. PARTICIPANTS TO HOST THE MPC CONTACT CNE/C6F POC. 
   D. PARTICIPANTS CONFIRM AVAILABILITY FOR LISTED WORKING GROUP AND 
COMMAND AND CONTROL ASSIGNMENT TO ESG-2 POC. 
   E. SPECIAL EVENTS.  AGREEMENT ON STRUCTURE OF THE SERIAL PHASE 
WILL BE ACHIEVED AT THE IPC. SPECIFIC TACTICAL OBJECTIVES, TACTICS 
VALIDATION OR SERIALS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SERIAL PHASE ARE TO BE 
PROVIDED AT THE IPC. 
   F. UPDATED FORCE PARTICIPATION. REQUEST EACH NATION PROVIDE ANY 
CHANGES TO FORCE OFFERINGS DISCUSSED AT CDC TO ESG-12 POC BY 20 NOV 
2004. 
8. WORKING GROUP LEADS.  TENTATIVE WORKING GROUP LEAD 
ASSIGNMENTS: 
   A. EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP/ROE: US – ESG-12 
   B. AIR:  US, FRANCE AND GERMANY – CAOC-1 
   C. SURFACE:  US – ESG-12 
   D. SUBSURFACE:  GE – CINCGERFLEET 
   E. LAND:  US – USMC 2-23 
   F. OPFOR: UK – HMS SUTHERLAND 
   G. LOGISTICS: US – ESG-2 
   H. COMMUNICATIONS/OPSEC:  US AND GERMANY – ESG-2 AND 
CINCGERFLEET 
   I. MCM: UK – MCM HQ 
   J. AMPHIB: US – LSD/LPD (TBD) 
WORKING GROUP LEAD WILL PROVIDE DIRECTION AND OVERSIGHT. 
9. SCHEDULE OF EVENTS FOR BALTOPS 2005 IPC FOLLOWS: 
6 DECEMBER (MONDAY) 
TRAVEL DAY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS 
--------- 
7 DECEMBER (TUESDAY) 
0730-0815 CHECK-IN SHERATON CONFERENCE ROOM 
0815 OPENING REMARKS BY ESG-12 AND INTRODUCTION 
0830 CONFERENCE ADMIN/OVERVIEW 
0840 COUNTRY/FORCE REPRESENTATIVE INTRODUCTIONS 
0920 REVIEW CDC NOTES (C6F)/REVIEW IPC OBJECTIVES AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
1000 PRESENTATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, WORKING GROUP ASSIGNMENTS 
AND OPORDER RESPONSIBILITIES 
1030 TACTICAL PLANNING BRIEF 
1230 DRAFT INITIAL PLANNING ORDERS 
1300 SERIAL BRIEF 
1330 WORKING GROUP OBJECTIVES 
1345-1500 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
1500-1600 WORKING GROUP PROGRESS REPORTS 
1800-2000 RECEPTION HOSTED BY ESG-12 (SHERATON) (DRESS: 
CASUAL) 
--------- 
8 DECEMBER (WEDNESDAY) 
0800 DAY ONE REVIEW AND DAY TWO OBJECTIVES 
0830 ROE OVERVIEW 
0900 PROPOSED TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION 
0930 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
1500-1530 WORKING GROUP PROGRESS REPORTS 
--------- 
9 DECEMBER (THURSDAY) 
0800 DAY TWO REVIEW AND DAY THREE OBJECTIVES 
0815 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
1000 WORKING GROUP OUTBRIEFS 
1400 IPC OBJECTIVES STATUS REVIEW 
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1430 ROADMAP, MPC AGENDA/LOGISTICS 
1500 IPC WRAP-UP 
--------- 
10 DECEMBER (FRIDAY) 
TRAVEL DAY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS 
10. ADMINISTRATION. 
   A. WEBSITE ACCESS: COMMANDS DESIGNATE 2-3 PERSONNEL TO OBTAIN 
ACCESS TO THE HOA IN THE PARTNERS FOR PEACE INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (PIMS) WEBSITE. THE FIRST STEP IS TO REGISTER AND 
OBTAIN AN ACCOUNT AND PASSWORD. TO REGISTER GO TO THE FOLLOWING 
SITE: HTTP: (DOUBLE SLASH) WWW.CONSORTIUM.PIMS.ORG 
IN THE REMARKS SECTION.  ONCE YOU HAVE OBTAINED AN ACCOUNT GO TO THE 
PIMS HOME PAGE AND SELECT BALTOPS UNDER THE ANNOUNCEMENT BANNER 
(PASSWORD PROTECTED).  THIS IS WHERE ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS 
RELATING TO HOA SOTHERN WATCH WILL BE POSTED. 
   B. CONFERENCE. ROOM WILL BE EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT MICROSOFT 
POWERPOINT BRIEFS WITH A PROJECTOR.  ESG-2 OPERATES POWERPOINT 
2003.  COMMANDS PROVIDING POWERPOINT BRIEFS, EMAIL BRIEFS TO ESG-2 
POC NLT 20 NOV.  MAX FILE ATTACHMENT SIZE IS 5MB.  FILE MAY BE 
MAILED TO POC AT: 
        CDR OMAR DENZEL 
        COMMANDER EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP TWO 
        UNIT 123456 
        FPO AE 09506-4704 
   C.  SHERATON WATERSIDE HOTEL 
      (1) SHERATON PHUKET HOTEL PHUKET, THAILAND.  RESERVATIONS CAN BE  
MADE DIRECT TO THE HOTEL AT 011-757-622-6664. FAX NUMBER IS   
011-757-635-8271.  WEBSITE IS WWW.PHUKET.COM/SHERATON/.   
FORTY (40) ROOMS ARE SET ASIDE FOR THE CONFERENCE.  ROOM CHARGE IS ONE  
HUNDRED AND TEN (110) US PER NIGHT PLUS APPLICABLE TAXES AND FEES. 
      (2) REQUEST THAT &quot;SOUTHERN WATCH PFP&quot; IS REFERENCED WHEN 
BOOKING 
RESERVATIONS.  TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AVAILABILITY, ATTENDEES ARE 
ENCOURAGED TO MAKE RESERVATIONS NO LATER THAN 12 NOV 2004. 
      (3) A CONFERENCE FEE OF TEN (10) US DOLLARS WILL BE COLLECTED 
DURING CHECK-IN TUESDAY MORNING 7 DEC TO COVER ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. 
   D. FOR TRANSPORTATION ISSUES PLEASE CONTACT THE ESG-2 STAFF 
DUTY OFFICER AT 757-642-6970. ADDITIONALLY, IF ANY ISSUES ARE 
ENCOUNTERED WITH THE HOTEL, PLEASE CONTACT THE ESG-2 LOGISTICS 
OFFICER AT 757-946-1234. 
   F. INFORMATION ON THE PHUKET, THAILAND AREA MAY BE FOUND 
ON THE WEB AT WWW.PHUKET.COM. 
   G. ATTIRE.  THE CONFERENCE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN WORKING UNIFORM. 
   H. POINTS OF CONTACT: 
      C6F-CNE: LT JOSE DELGADOE –N37, DSN: 314-235-4022, COMM: 
0044-207-514-4022, CELL: 0044-773-986-2216, FAX: 0044-207-514-4637, 
EMAIL: JOSE.DELGADOE@NAVEUR.NAVY.MIL 
      ESG-2: CDR OMAR DENZEL – N34, DSN 312-445-9595. COMM: 
001-757-445-9595, CELL: 001-757-621-6352, FAX: 001-757-445-8703, 
EMAIL:OMAR.DENZEL@NAVY.MIL</free_text> 




Whether an organization steams independently, as part of a strike action group, or 
convoy, there must be some pre-established means to maintain communications. This is 
performed via an Operational Tasking Communications message via a tool known as 
Afloat Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Program (AESOP).   










NARR/REF A IS CTF 151 OPTASK COMMS ISO ALLIED PROTECTOR. REF B IS 
CHG 1 
TO CTF 151 OPTASK COMMS OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD PART ONE. REF C IS 
CHG 1 TO 
// 
POC/RIVERA/ITCS/CTF 151/LOC:HMS EDINBURGH/TEL:011 885-1250 
/EMAIL:RIVERAS(AT)EDINBURGH.RNS.SMIL.MIL// 
POC/KRENSHAW/IT2/CTF 151/LOC:HMS EDINBURG/TEL:021-259-2468 
/EMAIL:KANESHIGEI(AT)EDINBURG.RNS.SMIL.MIL// 
AKNLDG/YES// 
GENTEXT/REMARKS/NOTE: THIS IS A NOTIONAL COMMS PLAN WITH FICTITIOUS 
DATA FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING PROOF OF CONCEPT FOR THE THESIS 
ENTITLED DOCUMENT AND MESSAGE CENTRIC SECURITY USING XML 
AUTHNTICATION AND ENCRYPTION FOR COALITION AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS 
// 
RMKS/NECOS: ANZ 
#CTF 151_MDU_COORD/PURPOSE: CMD AND CONTROL OF TLAM OPS AND 
EXERCISES. 
PARTICIPANTS: TLAM UNITS 
GUARD: AS REQUIRED 
NECOS: ANZ 
#CTF 151_COMM_COORD/PURPOSE: COORDINATION AND TROUBLESHOOTING FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL. 




CH101/SAMETIME/SIPR SERVER 205.0.XXX.XX 
ROOMS: 
#CTF 151_CMD/PURPOSE: COMMAND, CONTROL AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FOR 
PRIMARY WATCH OFFICERS. 
PARTICIPANTS: FLAG TAO AND TAO'S 
GUARD: CONTINUOUS 
NECOS: EDI 
#CTF 151_SCC_COORD/PURPOSE: COORD SURFACE SHIPS 
GUARD: CONTINUOUS 
NECOS: WSC 
#CTF 151_FOTC_COORD/PURPOSE: TRACK MANAGEMENT. 




#CTF 151_IWC_COORD/PURPOSE: COORD OF IWC. 
PARTICIPANTS: HQ, IWC, ALL SHIPS EW MODULES, AND OTHER IWC SOURCES. 
GUARD: AS REQUIRED 
NECOS: EDI 
#CTF 151_COMM_COORD/PURPOSE: COORDINATION AND TROUBLESHOOTING FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL. 




D1/BCST/IAW NATIONAL RQMTS. 
D2/SHIP-SHORE IAW NATIONAL RQMTS 
  /1/ALL UNITS SUBMIT COMM GUARD SHIFT AS REQUIRED.  IN THE EVENT OF 
     OUTAGE, NECOS/ALT NECOS WILL RELAY MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM 
     SERVICING COMMUNICATION CENTER. 
E1/COMM GUARD/CIRCUIT GUARD REQUIREMENTS ARE PROMULGATED BY 
   COMMANDERS IN THEIR DAILY INTENTIONS MESSAGES. 
  /1/ST800A/BALTOPS CMD NET/UFO-9 CH-22/412.245/344.105-5K0G7W/ 
     AMST 152/W ALL CAPABLE UNITS COMMANDERS GUARD. 
F1/EHF/SEE EHF SERVICE PLAN/PROMULGATED SEPCOR. 
G1/TFCOMMS/AS LISTED IN CTF 151 CIRCUITS AND COMMAND NETS SECTIONS 
   ABOVE. 
G2/TFBDCST/ALL SHIPS AT A MINIMUM GUARD MMCC/MOCC 
I1/1/CALLSIGN/COVERED CIRCUITS, USE SHIP NAMES (LESS U-S-S, U-S-N-S, 
     OR SIMILAR PREFIX). 
  /2/UNCOVERED CKTS: JANAP 119 CALLSIGNS. SHIPS WILL USE THEIR 
     ASSIGNED JANAP 119 CALLSIGN FOR ALL CLEAR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS. 
  /3/AIRCRAFT WILL USE JANAP 119 SQUADRON CALL SIGNS SUFFIXED BY 
     AIRCRAFT SIDE NUMBER. 
  /4/SECURE VOICE CALLSIGNS, COMMAND TITLES OR CWC WARFARE CALLSIGNS 
     WILL BE USED ON SECURE VOICE NETS.  ENCRYPTED CALL SIGN 
     USE IS PROHIBITED ON SECURE NETS. 
  /5/SHIPS WILL USE INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGNS ON ORDERWIRES, NETTED 
     DATA CIRCUITS AND SHIP/SHORE NETS. 
I2/CODING/REFER TO REF H DAILY COMM STATUS XX2301ZMONYR. 
I3/RECPOL 
  /1/AUTHENTICATION IS REQUIRED ON ALL NON-SECURE CIRCUITS WHEN 
     TRANSMITTING IN THE BLIND, ENTERING AND RE-ENTERING INTO THE 
     NET AND PASSING FREQUENCY SHIFTS.  ZULU TIME WILL BE USED FOR 
     IMPLEMENTING NEW TABLES FOR DETERMINING AUTHENTICATION. 
J1/VSPOL/ 
  /1/MAXIMUM USE OF VISUAL COMMS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE 
     COMMS DISCIPLINE CONCERNING REDUCTION OF RECORD TRAFFIC AND 
     GAIN MAXIMUM TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR QUARTERMASTERS.  USE 
     FILTERS AND CONICAL ADAPTERS ON SIGNAL SEARCH LIGHTS BETWEEN 
     SUNSET AND SUNRISE. 
K1/REPINST/ 
  /1/ENSURE CTG 151.O1 AND HMS EDINGURG ARE TO BE INCLUDED AS INFO 
     ADDEES ON ALL COMMUNICATIONS RELATED MESSAGES. 
  /2/CANVAS FLAGSHIPS/AND SHIPS IN COMPANY FOR MISSING NRS, CCS 
     (EDINBURG) WILL SUBMIT BSR TO NCTAMS EURCENT. 
  /3/FAST REACTION EXERCISES:  EDI WILL RESPOND FOR CTG 151.O1 ON ALL 
     EMERGENCY ACTION RESPONSE TESTS.  CTU WILL RESPOND 
     ACCORDINGLY FOR THEIR OWN EAMS; HOWEVER, ANZ MAY BE USED TO 
     RELAY WHEN NECESSARY. 
  /4/COMSPOT REPORTS SUBMITTED TO ANZ AND APPROPRIATE NCTAMS; INFO 
     CTF 151 AND CTG 151.O1 WITHIN THIRTY MINUTES OF OUTAGE. USS 
     BATTAAN WILL BE INFO ON ALL COMSPOTS AS ALT CCS. 
Y1/SPECINST/1/EHF CAPABLE UNITS: 
  /1/EHF TERMINAL ID NUMBER: 
     UNIT               TERMINAL ID     UNIT             TERMINAL ID 
     NCTAMS LANT         2222           NCTAMS EURCENT    2555, 2666 
     ANZIO               2333           NAKASAKI          2777 
 149
     TORTUGA             2444           PAULEEN           2888 
     BATTAAN             1589 
Y1/SPECINST/2/APPLICABLE TO ALL: 
   /1/CALL SIGNS WILL BE SET IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: 
     CTX           CALL SIGN    COLLECTIVE 
     CTF 151        VIPER        FLAMINGO 
     CTG 151.01     GRANT        KUMATE 
     CTG 151.02     JACKAL       JADE 
     CTG 151.04     FANNIE       SNAKE 
     CTG 151.07     MISMO        PIE 
     CTU 151.01.01  ASTRO        SNATCH 
     CTU 151.01.02  PIPER        BUSH 
     CTU 151.01.03  CUTIE        REAGAN 
     CTU 151.01.04  PUMA         ANKLE 
     CTU 151.01.05  TROJAN       KNEE 
     CTU 151.01.06  ROOK         LION 
     CTU 151.07.01  BISHOP       KNIGHT 
     CTU 151.07.02  AXEMAN       QUEEN 
  /2/TRIGRAPH INFORMATION FOR ALL UNITS: 
     UNIT                              TRIGRAPH 
     ANZIO                             ANZ 
     PAULEEN                           PAL 
     TORTUGA                           TOR 
     MCFAUL                            MCF 
     HMS EDINBURG                      EDI 
     HDMS PETER TORDENSKIOLD           PTO 
     RFS NASTOYCHIVIY                  NAS 
     HDMS NIELS JUEL                   NIJ 
     HSWMS NORRKOPING                  NOR 
     HSWMS SPEJAREN                    SPJ 
     FGS HAMBURG                       HAM 
     FNS KOTKA                         KOT 
     HSWMS KAPAREN                     KAP 
     LVNS LODE                         LOD 
     HMS LEEDS CASTLE                  LEE 
     HMS BANGOR                        BAN 
     HMS CATTISTOCK                    CAT 
     FGS DATTELN                       DAT 
     ORP GOPLO                         GOP 
     HMS GRIMSBY                       GRI 
     HMS LEDBURY                       LED 
     ORP SNIARDWY                      SNI 
     HDMS STOEREN                      STO 
     ENS VAINDLO                       VAI 
     FGS U-24                          U24 
     ORP SOKOL                         SOK 
     ORP POZNAN                        POZ 
     RFS KALINIGRAD                    KAL 
     USNS BIGHORN                      BHN 
     SS PFC EUGENE A OBREGON           EAO 
     MV PFC DEWAYNE T WILLIAMS         DTW 
     HSWMS VISBORG                     VIS 
     HMS SUTHERLAND                    SUT 
     ORP KASZUB                        KAS 
     FGS HABICHT                       HAB 
     HSWMS TIRFING                     TIR 
     HSWMS YSTAD                       YST 
     LNS ZEMAITIS                      ZEM 
  /3/EACH CTU WILL CREATE THEIR OWN SUPPLEMENTAL OPTASK COMMS AS 
     NECESSARY. INFO CTF 151 ON ALL MESSAGES. 
  /4/ALL SHIPS MONITOR CHANNEL 16 FOR SAFETY. 
  /5/IAW REF O, HMS EDINBURG MAINTAINS THE SATHICOM GUARD FOR ALL 
     UNITS IN COMPANY. 
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  /6/COMMUNICATORS AND WATCHSTANDERS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CHECK 
     SATELLITE EQUIPMENT ONCE ANY ANOMALY IS DETECTED/SUSPECTED/ 
     REPORTED.  ENSURE ADHERENCE TO SATCOM POWER REGULATIONS 
     COMMENSURATE WITH RELIABLE COMMS.  REVIEW QUALITY MONITORING 
     POLICIES. 
  /7/OPERATE WSC-3 SATCOM DAMA RADIOS IN FDX MODE. I.E., TWO WSC-3 
     TCVRS PER TD-1271, ONE AS A TRANSMIT AND ONE AS A RCV. 
     CONFIGURE XMT WSC IN OFFSET 6 FOR ALL AND APPROPRIATE 
     OFFSET FOR RCV WSC. 
  /8/ALL UNITS REVIEW REF H, DAILY COMM STATUS, FOR ANY CHANGES 
     IN BCST OR MED SATELLITE CONFIGURATIONS. 
  /9/ALL UNITS USE MINIMUM POWER COMMENSURATE WITH RELIABLE 
     COMMS. 
 /10/CUDIXS, FSM, AND SHF-PCMT TERMINATION ASSIGNMENTS IAW REF N. 
     UNITS SUBMIT COMSHIFTS FOR DURATION OF TERM.  IMMEDIATE 
     RESTORAL WILL BE MMCC. 
 /11/ALL ATOS DURING BALTOPS 2005 WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED ONLY.  ATO 
     DISTRO PRIORITIES ARE: 
     A. PC NET 
     B. PIMS 
 /12/COALITION CIRCUITS WILL ALWAYS BE RESTORED FIRST. NOT ALL UNITS 
     GUARD/PARTICIPATE IN ALL NETS. INDIVIDUAL UNIT COMMANDERS WILL 
     DEVELOP RESTORATION PRIORITIES FOR THEIR UNIQUE CIRCUITS. 
 /13/MAXIMUM USE OF ZEN WILL REDUCE MESSAGE BACKLOGS. ENSURE THAT 
     MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO CTF 151 UNITS AND COMMANDS ASHORE USE 
     OPERATING SIGNAL "ZEN" AS APPROPRIATE IN FORMAT LINES 7 AND 8, 
     AND ARE PASSED TO GROUP SAIL UNITS VIA SIPRNET EMAIL USING 
     RADIO(AT)SHIP.DOMAIN.NAVY.SMIL.MIL ACCOUNTS OR THE APPROPRIATE 
     SHIP'S NATO INITIAL DATA TRANSFER SYSTEM (NIDTS) EMAIL ACCOUNT. 
 /14/MONITORING: NAVY TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS ARE SUBJECT 
     TO COMSEC MONITORING AND THE USE OF THESE CIRCUITS CONSTITUTES 
     CONSENT TO MONITORING. 
 /15/GINGERBREAD PROCEDURES WILL BE REVIEWED AND EXECUTED WHEN 
     EXPERIENCING INTRUSION ON CKTS. 
 /16/COMSEC AWARENESS IS A MUST IN DEGRADED COMM ENVIRONMENT. 
     PROPER R/T PROCEDURES ARE ESSENTIAL.  REVIEW RUTH PROCEDURES. 
     TACTICAL COMM CKTS SUBJ TO COMSEC MONITORING UNDER C2 PROTECT 
     PROGRAM.  USE OF CKTS CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO MONITORING. 
 /17/CMD NETS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE DIRECTED. (CWC NECOS). 
     WARFARE CMDRS ARE FREE TO USE THESE CIRCUITS WHEN DEALING WITH 
     THE BWC AND OTHER WARFARE CDRS.  WARFARE COMMANDERS AND OTHER 
     UNITS USE DESIGNATED WARFARE NETS WHEN REQUESTING AND/OR 
     RECEIVING OPERATIONAL REPORTS FROM SHIPS/UNITS. 
 /18/ALL UNITS EQUIPPED WITH HAVEQUICK SHOULD USE IT TO THE MAXIMUM 
     EXTENT POSSIBLE FOR AIRCRAFT CONTROL. 
 /19/NIDTS CAN BE USED TO EXCHANGE EMAIL BETWEEN NIDTS CAPABLE 
     UNITS.  UNITS WITH NIDTS ARE REQUIRED TO POST THEIR NIDTS EMAIL 
     ADDRESSES TO THE COMMS POC SECTION OF PIMS SITE BY 25MAY05. 
     (SEND TO CTF 66 TO HAVE POSTED). 
 /20/CRYPTO REQUIRMENTS: 
 
**FOR SECURITY CONCERNS THIS SECTION INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ** 
 
 /21/ALL UNITS REPORT RFI PROBLEMS TO CTF 151INFO COMSIXTHFLT AND 
COMSECONDFLT.  CTF 151 WILL DETERMINE AND ASSIGN REPLACEMENT 
FREQUENCIES AS REQUIRED.// 
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    <operation_codeword>ALLIED PROTECTOR</operation_codeword> 
  </operation_identification_data> 
  <message_identification> 
    
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier
> 
    <originator>CTF 151</originator> 
    <month_name>MAY</month_name> 
  </message_identification> 
  <subject> 
    <message_subject>OPTASK COMMS FOR CTF 151 ISO ALLIED 
PROTECTOR</message_subject> 
  </subject> 
  <reference> 
    <serial_identifier>A</serial_identifier> 
    <type_of_reference> 
      
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier
> 
    </type_of_reference> 
    <originator>CTF 151</originator> 
    <date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
      <reference_date_time_group> 
        <day>23</day> 
        <hour_time>16</hour_time> 
        <minute_time>45</minute_time> 
        <time_zone>Z</time_zone> 
        <month_name>JAN</month_name> 
        <year>2004</year> 
      </reference_date_time_group> 
    </date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
  </reference> 
  <reference> 
    <serial_identifier>B</serial_identifier> 
    <type_of_reference> 
      
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier
> 
    </type_of_reference> 
    <originator>CTF 151</originator> 
    <date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
      <reference_date_time_group> 
        <day>18</day> 
        <hour_time>19</hour_time> 
        <minute_time>45</minute_time> 
        <time_zone>Z</time_zone> 
        <month_name>FEB</month_name> 
        <year>2005</year> 
      </reference_date_time_group> 
    </date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
  </reference> 
  <reference> 
    <serial_identifier>C</serial_identifier> 
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    <type_of_reference> 
      
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier
> 
    </type_of_reference> 
    <originator>CTF 151</originator> 
    <date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
      <reference_date_time_group> 
        <day>25</day> 
        <hour_time>12</hour_time> 
        <minute_time>46</minute_time> 
        <time_zone>Z</time_zone> 
        <month_name>MAR</month_name> 
        <year>2005</year> 
      </reference_date_time_group> 
    </date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
  </reference> 
  <reference> 
    <narrative_information> 
      <free_text xml:space = 'preserve'>REF A IS CTF 151 OPTASK COMMS 
ISO ALLIED PROTECTOR. REF B IS 
CHG 1 
TO CTF 151 OPTASK COMMS OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD PART ONE. REF C IS 
CHG 1 TO 
</free_text> 
    </narrative_information> 
    <serial_identifier>D</serial_identifier> 
    <type_of_reference> 
      
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier
> 
    </type_of_reference> 
    <originator>CTF 151</originator> 
    <date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
      <reference_date_time_group> 
        <day>27</day> 
        <hour_time>16</hour_time> 
        <minute_time>46</minute_time> 
        <time_zone>Z</time_zone> 
        <month_name>APR</month_name> 
        <year>2005</year> 
      </reference_date_time_group> 
    </date_and_or_time_of_reference> 
  </reference> 
  <point_of_contact_information> 
    <contact_name>RIVERA</contact_name> 
    <rank_or_position>ITCS</rank_or_position> 
    <unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
      <unit_identifier>CTF 151</unit_identifier> 
    </unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
    <poc_location> 
      <location_name>HMS EDINBURGH</location_name> 
    </poc_location> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        <nonsecure_telephone_number>011 885-
1250</nonsecure_telephone_number> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 




      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
  </point_of_contact_information> 
  <point_of_contact_information> 
    <contact_name>KRENSHAW</contact_name> 
    <rank_or_position>IT2</rank_or_position> 
    <unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
      <unit_identifier>CTF 151</unit_identifier> 
    </unit_identifier_or_call_sign> 
    <poc_location> 
      <location_name>HMS EDINBURG</location_name> 
    </poc_location> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        <nonsecure_telephone_number>021-259-
2468</nonsecure_telephone_number> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
    <group_of_fields> 
      <telephone_number_or_frequency> 
        
<electronic_mail_address>KANESHIGEI(AT)EDINBURG.RNS.SMIL.MIL</electronic
_mail_address> 
      </telephone_number_or_frequency> 
    </group_of_fields> 
  </point_of_contact_information> 
  <acknowledgement_requirement> 
    
<acknowledgement_requirement_indicator>YES</acknowledgement_requirement_
indicator> 
  </acknowledgement_requirement> 
  <general_text_information> 
    <gentext_text_indicator>REMARKS</gentext_text_indicator> 
    <free_text xml:space ='preserve'>NOTE: THIS IS A NOTIONAL COMMS PLAN 
WITH FICTITIOUS 
DATA FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING PROOF OF CONCEPT FOR THE THESIS 
ENTITLED DOCUMENT AND MESSAGE CENTRIC SECURITY USING XML 
AUTHNTICATION AND ENCRYPTION FOR COALITION AND INTERAGENCY 
OPERATIONS</free_text> 
  </general_text_information> 
  <remarks> 
    <free_text xml:space = 'preserve'>NECOS: ANZ 
#CTF 151_MDU_COORD/PURPOSE: CMD AND CONTROL OF TLAM OPS AND 
EXERCISES. 
PARTICIPANTS: TLAM UNITS 
GUARD: AS REQUIRED 
NECOS: ANZ 
#CTF 151_COMM_COORD/PURPOSE: COORDINATION AND TROUBLESHOOTING FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL. 




CH101/SAMETIME/SIPR SERVER 205.0.XXX.XX 
ROOMS: 
#CTF 151_CMD/PURPOSE: COMMAND, CONTROL AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FOR 
PRIMARY WATCH OFFICERS. 
PARTICIPANTS: FLAG TAO AND TAO&apos;S 
GUARD: CONTINUOUS 
NECOS: EDI 




#CTF 151_FOTC_COORD/PURPOSE: TRACK MANAGEMENT. 
PARTICIPANTS: ALL FOTC DATA BASE MANAGERS 
GUARD: CONTINUOUS 
NECOS: EDI 
#CTF 151_IWC_COORD/PURPOSE: COORD OF IWC. 
PARTICIPANTS: HQ, IWC, ALL SHIPS EW MODULES, AND OTHER IWC SOURCES. 
GUARD: AS REQUIRED 
NECOS: EDI 
#CTF 151_COMM_COORD/PURPOSE: COORDINATION AND TROUBLESHOOTING FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL. 




D1/BCST/IAW NATIONAL RQMTS. 
D2/SHIP-SHORE IAW NATIONAL RQMTS 
  /1/ALL UNITS SUBMIT COMM GUARD SHIFT AS REQUIRED.  IN THE EVENT OF 
     OUTAGE, NECOS/ALT NECOS WILL RELAY MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM 
     SERVICING COMMUNICATION CENTER. 
E1/COMM GUARD/CIRCUIT GUARD REQUIREMENTS ARE PROMULGATED BY 
   COMMANDERS IN THEIR DAILY INTENTIONS MESSAGES. 
  /1/ST800A/BALTOPS CMD NET/UFO-9 CH-22/412.245/344.105-5K0G7W/ 
     AMST 152/W ALL CAPABLE UNITS COMMANDERS GUARD. 
F1/EHF/SEE EHF SERVICE PLAN/PROMULGATED SEPCOR. 
G1/TFCOMMS/AS LISTED IN CTF 151 CIRCUITS AND COMMAND NETS SECTIONS 
   ABOVE. 
G2/TFBDCST/ALL SHIPS AT A MINIMUM GUARD MMCC/MOCC 
I1/1/CALLSIGN/COVERED CIRCUITS, USE SHIP NAMES (LESS U-S-S, U-S-N-S, 
     OR SIMILAR PREFIX). 
  /2/UNCOVERED CKTS: JANAP 119 CALLSIGNS. SHIPS WILL USE THEIR 
     ASSIGNED JANAP 119 CALLSIGN FOR ALL CLEAR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS. 
  /3/AIRCRAFT WILL USE JANAP 119 SQUADRON CALL SIGNS SUFFIXED BY 
     AIRCRAFT SIDE NUMBER. 
  /4/SECURE VOICE CALLSIGNS, COMMAND TITLES OR CWC WARFARE CALLSIGNS 
     WILL BE USED ON SECURE VOICE NETS.  ENCRYPTED CALL SIGN 
     USE IS PROHIBITED ON SECURE NETS. 
  /5/SHIPS WILL USE INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGNS ON ORDERWIRES, NETTED 
     DATA CIRCUITS AND SHIP/SHORE NETS. 
I2/CODING/REFER TO REF H DAILY COMM STATUS XX2301ZMONYR. 
I3/RECPOL 
  /1/AUTHENTICATION IS REQUIRED ON ALL NON-SECURE CIRCUITS WHEN 
     TRANSMITTING IN THE BLIND, ENTERING AND RE-ENTERING INTO THE 
     NET AND PASSING FREQUENCY SHIFTS.  ZULU TIME WILL BE USED FOR 
     IMPLEMENTING NEW TABLES FOR DETERMINING AUTHENTICATION. 
J1/VSPOL/ 
  /1/MAXIMUM USE OF VISUAL COMMS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE 
     COMMS DISCIPLINE CONCERNING REDUCTION OF RECORD TRAFFIC AND 
     GAIN MAXIMUM TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR QUARTERMASTERS.  USE 
     FILTERS AND CONICAL ADAPTERS ON SIGNAL SEARCH LIGHTS BETWEEN 
     SUNSET AND SUNRISE. 
K1/REPINST/ 
  /1/ENSURE CTG 151.O1 AND HMS EDINGURG ARE TO BE INCLUDED AS INFO 
     ADDEES ON ALL COMMUNICATIONS RELATED MESSAGES. 
  /2/CANVAS FLAGSHIPS/AND SHIPS IN COMPANY FOR MISSING NRS, CCS 
     (EDINBURG) WILL SUBMIT BSR TO NCTAMS EURCENT. 
  /3/FAST REACTION EXERCISES:  EDI WILL RESPOND FOR CTG 151.O1 ON ALL 
     EMERGENCY ACTION RESPONSE TESTS.  CTU WILL RESPOND 
     ACCORDINGLY FOR THEIR OWN EAMS; HOWEVER, ANZ MAY BE USED TO 
     RELAY WHEN NECESSARY. 
  /4/COMSPOT REPORTS SUBMITTED TO ANZ AND APPROPRIATE NCTAMS; INFO 
     CTF 151 AND CTG 151.O1 WITHIN THIRTY MINUTES OF OUTAGE. USS 
     BATTAAN WILL BE INFO ON ALL COMSPOTS AS ALT CCS. 
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Y1/SPECINST/1/EHF CAPABLE UNITS: 
  /1/EHF TERMINAL ID NUMBER: 
     UNIT               TERMINAL ID     UNIT             TERMINAL ID 
     NCTAMS LANT         2222           NCTAMS EURCENT    2555, 2666 
     ANZIO               2333           NAKASAKI          2777 
     TORTUGA             2444           PAULEEN           2888 
     BATTAAN             1589 
Y1/SPECINST/2/APPLICABLE TO ALL: 
   /1/CALL SIGNS WILL BE SET IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: 
     CTX           CALL SIGN    COLLECTIVE 
     CTF 151        VIPER        FLAMINGO 
     CTG 151.01     GRANT        KUMATE 
     CTG 151.02     JACKAL       JADE 
     CTG 151.04     FANNIE       SNAKE 
     CTG 151.07     MISMO        PIE 
     CTU 151.01.01  ASTRO        SNATCH 
     CTU 151.01.02  PIPER        BUSH 
     CTU 151.01.03  CUTIE        REAGAN 
     CTU 151.01.04  PUMA         ANKLE 
     CTU 151.01.05  TROJAN       KNEE 
     CTU 151.01.06  ROOK         LION 
     CTU 151.07.01  BISHOP       KNIGHT 
     CTU 151.07.02  AXEMAN       QUEEN 
  /2/TRIGRAPH INFORMATION FOR ALL UNITS: 
     UNIT                              TRIGRAPH 
     ANZIO                             ANZ 
     PAULEEN                           PAL 
     TORTUGA                           TOR 
     MCFAUL                            MCF 
     HMS EDINBURG                      EDI 
     HDMS PETER TORDENSKIOLD           PTO 
     RFS NASTOYCHIVIY                  NAS 
     HDMS NIELS JUEL                   NIJ 
     HSWMS NORRKOPING                  NOR 
     HSWMS SPEJAREN                    SPJ 
     FGS HAMBURG                       HAM 
     FNS KOTKA                         KOT 
     HSWMS KAPAREN                     KAP 
     LVNS LODE                         LOD 
     HMS LEEDS CASTLE                  LEE 
     HMS BANGOR                        BAN 
     HMS CATTISTOCK                    CAT 
     FGS DATTELN                       DAT 
     ORP GOPLO                         GOP 
     HMS GRIMSBY                       GRI 
     HMS LEDBURY                       LED 
     ORP SNIARDWY                      SNI 
     HDMS STOEREN                      STO 
     ENS VAINDLO                       VAI 
     FGS U-24                          U24 
     ORP SOKOL                         SOK 
     ORP POZNAN                        POZ 
     RFS KALINIGRAD                    KAL 
     USNS BIGHORN                      BHN 
     SS PFC EUGENE A OBREGON           EAO 
     MV PFC DEWAYNE T WILLIAMS         DTW 
     HSWMS VISBORG                     VIS 
     HMS SUTHERLAND                    SUT 
     ORP KASZUB                        KAS 
     FGS HABICHT                       HAB 
     HSWMS TIRFING                     TIR 
     HSWMS YSTAD                       YST 
     LNS ZEMAITIS                      ZEM 
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  /3/EACH CTU WILL CREATE THEIR OWN SUPPLEMENTAL OPTASK COMMS AS 
     NECESSARY. INFO CTF 151 ON ALL MESSAGES. 
  /4/ALL SHIPS MONITOR CHANNEL 16 FOR SAFETY. 
  /5/IAW REF O, HMS EDINBURG MAINTAINS THE SATHICOM GUARD FOR ALL 
     UNITS IN COMPANY. 
  /6/COMMUNICATORS AND WATCHSTANDERS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CHECK 
     SATELLITE EQUIPMENT ONCE ANY ANOMALY IS DETECTED/SUSPECTED/ 
     REPORTED.  ENSURE ADHERENCE TO SATCOM POWER REGULATIONS 
     COMMENSURATE WITH RELIABLE COMMS.  REVIEW QUALITY MONITORING 
     POLICIES. 
  /7/OPERATE WSC-3 SATCOM DAMA RADIOS IN FDX MODE. I.E., TWO WSC-3 
     TCVRS PER TD-1271, ONE AS A TRANSMIT AND ONE AS A RCV. 
     CONFIGURE XMT WSC IN OFFSET 6 FOR ALL AND APPROPRIATE 
     OFFSET FOR RCV WSC. 
  /8/ALL UNITS REVIEW REF H, DAILY COMM STATUS, FOR ANY CHANGES 
     IN BCST OR MED SATELLITE CONFIGURATIONS. 
  /9/ALL UNITS USE MINIMUM POWER COMMENSURATE WITH RELIABLE 
     COMMS. 
 /10/CUDIXS, FSM, AND SHF-PCMT TERMINATION ASSIGNMENTS IAW REF N. 
     UNITS SUBMIT COMSHIFTS FOR DURATION OF TERM.  IMMEDIATE 
     RESTORAL WILL BE MMCC. 
 /11/ALL ATOS DURING BALTOPS 2005 WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED ONLY.  ATO 
     DISTRO PRIORITIES ARE: 
     A. PC NET 
     B. PIMS 
 /12/COALITION CIRCUITS WILL ALWAYS BE RESTORED FIRST. NOT ALL UNITS 
     GUARD/PARTICIPATE IN ALL NETS. INDIVIDUAL UNIT COMMANDERS WILL 
     DEVELOP RESTORATION PRIORITIES FOR THEIR UNIQUE CIRCUITS. 
 /13/MAXIMUM USE OF ZEN WILL REDUCE MESSAGE BACKLOGS. ENSURE THAT 
     MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO CTF 151 UNITS AND COMMANDS ASHORE USE 
     OPERATING SIGNAL &quot;ZEN&quot; AS APPROPRIATE IN FORMAT LINES 7 
AND 8, 
     AND ARE PASSED TO GROUP SAIL UNITS VIA SIPRNET EMAIL USING 
     RADIO(AT)SHIP.DOMAIN.NAVY.SMIL.MIL ACCOUNTS OR THE APPROPRIATE 
     SHIP&apos;S NATO INITIAL DATA TRANSFER SYSTEM (NIDTS) EMAIL 
ACCOUNT. 
 /14/MONITORING: NAVY TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS ARE SUBJECT 
     TO COMSEC MONITORING AND THE USE OF THESE CIRCUITS CONSTITUTES 
     CONSENT TO MONITORING. 
 /15/GINGERBREAD PROCEDURES WILL BE REVIEWED AND EXECUTED WHEN 
     EXPERIENCING INTRUSION ON CKTS. 
 /16/COMSEC AWARENESS IS A MUST IN DEGRADED COMM ENVIRONMENT. 
     PROPER R/T PROCEDURES ARE ESSENTIAL.  REVIEW RUTH PROCEDURES. 
     TACTICAL COMM CKTS SUBJ TO COMSEC MONITORING UNDER C2 PROTECT 
     PROGRAM.  USE OF CKTS CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO MONITORING. 
 /17/CMD NETS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE DIRECTED. (CWC NECOS). 
     WARFARE CMDRS ARE FREE TO USE THESE CIRCUITS WHEN DEALING WITH 
     THE BWC AND OTHER WARFARE CDRS.  WARFARE COMMANDERS AND OTHER 
     UNITS USE DESIGNATED WARFARE NETS WHEN REQUESTING AND/OR 
     RECEIVING OPERATIONAL REPORTS FROM SHIPS/UNITS. 
 /18/ALL UNITS EQUIPPED WITH HAVEQUICK SHOULD USE IT TO THE MAXIMUM 
     EXTENT POSSIBLE FOR AIRCRAFT CONTROL. 
 /19/NIDTS CAN BE USED TO EXCHANGE EMAIL BETWEEN NIDTS CAPABLE 
     UNITS.  UNITS WITH NIDTS ARE REQUIRED TO POST THEIR NIDTS EMAIL 
     ADDRESSES TO THE COMMS POC SECTION OF PIMS SITE BY 25MAY05. 
     (SEND TO CTF 66 TO HAVE POSTED). 
 /20/CRYPTO REQUIRMENTS: 
          




 /21/ALL UNITS REPORT RFI PROBLEMS TO CTF 151INFO COMSIXTHFLT AND 
COMSECONDFLT.  CTF 151 WILL DETERMINE AND ASSIGN REPLACEMENT 
FREQUENCIES AS REQUIRED.</free_text> 
  </remarks> 
</mtf:general_administration_message>
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All things have a beginning and an end.  As a participating organization’s role in a 
mission draws to an end, the task force commander may deem it appropriate to send a 
farewell message stating the organizations contribution in relation to success of the 
overall mission objective and wishing the organization a safe transit back to their 
respective destination. 




SUBJ/ COALITION ANTIPIRACY OPERATIONS 2005 FAREWELL // 
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. PLEASE PASS TO CAPT PATROSKY,COMMANDING OFFICER, 
ORP SIAPAN.  CAPTAIN PATROSKY, CONGRATULATIONS ON A MOST SUCCESSFUL 
MISSION. THE CREW OF ORP SIAPAN IS COMMENDED FOR THEIR SUPERB 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND PARTICIPATION DURING EACH PHASE OF THE PURSUIT. 
THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTION PROCESS, THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF SIAPAN 
HELPED DETENTION OF SEVERAL PIRATE SUSPECTS THEREBY KEEPING THE 
INTERNATIONAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FREE AND OPEN FOR WORLD 
TRADE.  
     OUR NATION LOOKS FORWARD TO CONTINUED COOPERATIONS BETWEEN OUR 
TWO COUNTRIES IN EFFORTS OF PROMOTING PEACE AND LONGEVITY. AS YOU 
DEPART KNOW THAT YOU DEMONSTRATED SUPERIOR EXPERTISE OPERATING 12 
NATIONS, ACCOMPLISHED YOUR OWN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND DEVELOPED A 
CAMARADERIE WITH NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES THAT ALSO ENJOY A RICH 
MARITIME HERITAGE. 
     HAVE A SAFE TRANSIT TO YOUR HOMEPORT FOR A WELL-DESERVED REUNION 




J. COMMON OPERATING ENVIRONMENT COMMON MESSAGE 






    xmlns:mtf="urn:mtf:mil:usmtf:2004" 
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<message_identification> 
        
<message_text_format_identifier>GENADMIN</message_text_format_identifier> 
        <originator>CCSG12</originator> 
        <month_name>JUN</month_name> 
    </message_identification> 
    <subject> 
        <message_subject>COALITION ANTIPIRACY OPERATIONS 2005 
FAREWELL</message_subject> 
    </subject> 
    <general_text_information> 
        <gentext_text_indicator>REMARKS</gentext_text_indicator> 
        <free_text xml:space ='preserve'>1. PLEASE PASS TO CAPT 
PATROSKY,COMMANDING OFFICER, 
            ORP SIAPAN.  CAPTAIN PATROSKY, CONGRATULATIONS ON A MOST SUCCESSFUL 
            MISSION. THE CREW OF ORP SIAPAN IS COMMENDED FOR THEIR SUPERB 
            CONTRIBUTIONS AND PARTICIPATION DURING EACH PHASE OF THE PURSUIT. 
            THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTION PROCESS, THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF SIAPAN 
            HELPED DETENTION OF SEVERAL PIRATE SUSPECTS THEREBY KEEPING THE 
            INTERNATIONAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FREE AND OPEN FOR WORLD 
            TRADE.  
            OUR NATION LOOKS FORWARD TO CONTINUED COOPERATIONS BETWEEN OUR 
            TWO COUNTRIES IN EFFORTS OF PROMOTING PEACE AND LONGEVITY. AS YOU 
            DEPART KNOW THAT YOU DEMONSTRATED SUPERIOR EXPERTISE OPERATING 12 
            NATIONS, ACCOMPLISHED YOUR OWN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND DEVELOPED A 
            CAMARADERIE WITH NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES THAT ALSO ENJOY A RICH 
            MARITIME HERITAGE. 
            HAVE A SAFE TRANSIT TO YOUR HOMEPORT FOR A WELL-DESERVED REUNION 
            WITH FAMILY AND FRIENDS. REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAMS SENDS.</free_text> 
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APPENDIX B.  TOP NATIONAL PRIORITIES OF 37 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LEADERS  
Proceedings magazine interviewed 37 maritime leaders and compiled their 
comments in respects to the critical issues that they saw in relations to their respective 
nations national interests (Proceedings 2009).  From this article, a chart was constructed 
that enabled a comparison of the major issues across the 37 nations.  Table 9 illustrates 
the key points that bind these nations together to form the basis of current and future 
cooperation against a common cause.  Maintaining the Sea Lines of Communications, 
Preventing Piracy, and Enforcing the Economic Exclusive Zones were among the top 
issues.  Other issues emphasized but were less common across the nation’s collective 
critical interests were Terrorism, Drug/Human Trafficking, Environmental Disasters and 
Education of the public to guard against sea blindness.     
 162
Name Title Country Sea 
Blindness/ 
Ignorance 
of the Sea 







ADM Jorge Omar 
Chief of Staff, 
Argentine Navy Argentinia    X   X 
VADM R. H. Crane 
Chief of Navy, 




Maritime Component Belgium  X X X    
ADM Julio Soares de 
Moura Neto 
Commandant, 
Brazilian Navy Brazil    X X X X 
VADM Drew W. 
Robertson 
Chief of Maritime 
Staff, Canadian Navy Canada    X    
ADM Rodolfo Codina 
Diaz 
Commander-in-Chief, 






Forces Columbia  X X    X   
RADM Ante Urlic 
Commander, 
Croatian Navy Croatia    X    
RADM Nils Christian 




Djibouti Navy Dijbouti  X X X  X X 






Republic  X     X X 
RADM Aland Molestina 
Malta 
Chief of Staff, 
Ecuadoran Navy Ecuador    X   X 
LCDR J. J. Fox 
Commander, Fiji 
Navy Fiji       X 
ADM Pierre-Francois 
Forissier 
Chief of Staff, French 
Navy France  X X X     
VADM Wolfgang E. 
Nolting 
Chief of the German 




Hellenic Navy Greece  X X      
          
ADM Tedjo Edhy 
Purdijatno 
Chief of Staff, 
Indonesian Navy Indonesia   X X X X X 
ADM Paolo La Rosa Chief of the Italian Italy   X X      
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Navy General Staff 
ADM Keiji Akahosi 
Chief of Staff, Japan 
Maritime Self 
Defense Force Japan  X X X X  X 








Latvian Naval Forces Latvia        
RADM Ali El Moallem 
Commander, 
Lebanese Navy Lebanon  X  X     
ADM Dato' Sri Abdul 
Aziz bib Hj Jaafar 
Royal Malaysian 
Navy Chief Malaysia     X   X 





d  X X X    
RADM David Ledson 
Chief of Navy, New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand X    X  X 
RADM Juan Estrada 
Garcia 
Chief Admiral, 
Nicaraguan Navy Nicaragua      X X 
RADM Haakon Bruun-
Hanssen 
Chief of Staff, Royal 
Norwegian Navy Norway    X   X 
ADM Noman Bashir 
Chief of the Naval 
Staff, Pakistan Navy Pakistan   X X X X X 
ADM Rolando Antonio 
Navarrete Salomon 
Commander, 
Peruvian Navy Peru   X X  X X 
VADM Andrzej Karweta  
Commander-in-Chief, 
Polish Navy Poland  X   X     
ADM Fernando Jose 
Ribeiro de Melo Gomes 
Chief of Naval Staff, 
Portuguese Navy Portugal X X X   X X 
VADM J. Mudimu 
Chief, South African 
Navy 
South 
Africa X  X  X X X 
ADM Manuel Rebollo 
Chief of Staff, 
Spanish Navy Spain   X X     
RADM Anders 
Grenstad 
Chief of Staff, Royal 




Royal Thai Navy Thialand  X X   X X X 
RADM Ahmed M. Al 
Sabab Al Tenaiji 
Commander United 




Emirates   X X X X X X 
Admiral Sir Jonathon 
Band 
First Sea Lord and 
Chief of Navy Staff, 
United 
Kingdom X       
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Royal Navy 
   4 16 19 26 10 14 19 
   10.81% 43.24% 
51.35
% 70.27% 27.03% 37.84% 
51.35
% 
Sea lines of communication (abbreviated as SLOC) is a 
term describing the primary maritime routes between ports, 
used for trade, logistics and naval forces.        
An environmental disaster is a disaster that is due to human 
activity and should not be confused with natural disasters.        
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a 
state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine 
resources. It stretches from the edge of the state's territorial 
sea out to 200 nautical miles from its coast.        
Terrorism is the intentional use or threat to use violence 
against civilians and non-combatants "in order to achieve 
political goals"        
Sea Blindness is ignorance of the importance of the sea to 
everyday life.        
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 
or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).        
 
Table 9.   This table illustrates the national concerns of international maritime leaders around the world.
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APPENDIX C.  AVCL TO KML XSLT 
Translations between XML-Based Languages are critical to establish an 
interoperable-networked operating environment in which the security is embedded 
directly into the document.  By performing the translation and embedding security at the 
document level, the feeds may be available to any participating multinational or 
multiagency partner that possesses the appropriate credentials without the requirement to 
exchange cryptographic technology because the process is be based solely on the open 
standard technology that strictly adheres to the W3C specifications for digital signature 
and encryption. 
The following XML is a XML Stylesheet that adapts XML written in autonomous 
Vehicle Command Languange (AVCL) to Keyhole Markup Language (KML) 
A. XML-BASED AVCL TO KML TRANSLATIONS  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 




<!-- TODO:  author(s), creation date --> 
 
        <xsl:output method="xml" indent="yes" exclude-result-prefixes="xsl fo xs fn"/> 
 <xsl:template match="/"> 
  <kml> 
   <Document> 
    <xsl:apply-templates 
select="AVCL/body/MissionResults/SampledResults"/> 
   </Document> 
  </kml> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <xsl:template match="SampledResults"> 
  <Placemark> 
   <name> 
    <xsl:text>Telemetry Point #</xsl:text> 
    <xsl:value-of select="position()"/> 
   </name> 
   <xsl:if test="position()=1"> 
    <LookAt> 
     <longitude> 
      <xsl:value-of select="substring-
after(UUVTelemetry/GeographicPosition/@description,',')"/> 
     </longitude> 
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     <latitude> 
      <xsl:value-of select="substring-
before(UUVTelemetry/GeographicPosition/@description,',')"/> 
     </latitude> 
     <altitude>1000</altitude> 
     <range>0</range> 
     <tilt>45</tilt> 
     <heading>0</heading> 
    </LookAt> 
   </xsl:if> 
 <!-- to-do: TimeStamp generation logic needs testing 
   <xsl:call-template name="generateTimeStamp"/> --> 
   <styleURL>#msn_ylw-pushpin</styleURL> 
   <Point> 
    <coordinates> 
     <xsl:value-of select="format-number(number(substring-
after(UUVTelemetry/GeographicPosition/@description,',')),'#0.#####')"/> 
     <xsl:text>,</xsl:text> 
     <xsl:value-of select="format-number(number(substring-
before(UUVTelemetry/GeographicPosition/@description,',')),'#0.#####')"/> 
    </coordinates> 
   </Point> 
  </Placemark> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <xsl:template name="generateTimeStamp"> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <when> 
    <xsl:value-of select="../MissionStartTime/@year"/> 
    <xsl:text>-</xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="getMonthValue"> 
     <xsl:with-param name="month" 
select="../MissionStartTime/@month"/> 
    </xsl:call-template> 
    <xsl:text>-</xsl:text> 
    <xsl:if test="../MissionStartTime/@day&lt;10"> 
     <xsl:text>0</xsl:text> 
    </xsl:if> 
    <xsl:value-of select="../MissionStartTime/@day"/> 
    <xsl:text>T</xsl:text> 
    <xsl:variable name="seconds" select="UUVTelemetry/@timeStamp"/> 
    <!-- compute the number of hours in the timestamp --> 
    <xsl:variable name="hours" select="floor($seconds div 3600)"/> 
    <!-- compute the number of seconds left over after computing the 
number of hours in the timestamp --> 
    <xsl:variable name="leftover" select="$seconds mod 3600"/> 
    <xsl:if test="$hours &lt; 10"> 
     <xsl:text>0</xsl:text> 
    </xsl:if> 
    <xsl:value-of select="number(../MissionStartTime/@hour)+$hours"/> 
    <xsl:text>:</xsl:text> 
    <xsl:variable name="minutes" select="floor($leftover div 60)"/> 
    <xsl:if test="$minutes &lt; 10"> 
     <xsl:text>0</xsl:text> 
    </xsl:if> 
    <xsl:value-of 
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select="number(../MissionStartTime/@minute)+$minutes"/> 
    <xsl:text>:</xsl:text> 
    <!-- compute the number of seconds left over after computing the 
number of minutes left in the timestamp --> 
    <xsl:variable name="leftoverSeconds" select="$leftover mod 60"/> 
    <xsl:if test="$leftoverSeconds &lt; 10"> 
     <xsl:text>0</xsl:text> 
    </xsl:if> 
    <xsl:value-of 
select="number(../MissionStartTime/@second)+$leftoverSeconds"/> 
    <xsl:text>Z</xsl:text> 
   </when> 
  </TimeStamp> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <xsl:template name="getMonthValue"> 
  <xsl:param name="month"/> 
  <xsl:choose> 
   <xsl:when test="month='January'"> 
    <xsl:text>01</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='February'"> 
    <xsl:text>02</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='March'"> 
    <xsl:text>03</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='April'"> 
    <xsl:text>04</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='May'"> 
    <xsl:text>05</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='June'"> 
    <xsl:text>06</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='July'"> 
    <xsl:text>07</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='August'"> 
    <xsl:text>08</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='September'"> 
    <xsl:text>09</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='October'"> 
    <xsl:text>10</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:when test="month='November'"> 
    <xsl:text>11</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:when> 
   <xsl:otherwise> 
    <xsl:text>12</xsl:text> 
   </xsl:otherwise> 





B. XML-BASED DATA TO ADAPTED TO CUSTOMIZED OUTPUT     
XML-based data can be adapted from one XML data format to another XML data 
format for processing in different systems.  The XML data below was customized to suite 
the needs of KML.  Once data is adapted to the new data format, it can be represented in 
a textually or graphicly.   Figure 55 represents a graphical representation of the KML data 
as seen through GOOGLE Earth. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<kml xmlns="http://www.opengis.net/kml/2.2"> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T00:35:49.7147139999997Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75543,30.12944</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T00:35:50.6894590000002Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75543,30.12944</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T00:35:51.718871Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75543,30.12944</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T00:35:52.690979Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75543,30.12944</coordinates> 




  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T00:35:53.710955Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75543,30.12944</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T00:35:54.6767070000001Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75543,30.12944</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 
<!—Additional data omitted --> 
 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T01:07:30.711753Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75788,30.12671</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T01:07:31.6892710000002Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75788,30.12672</coordinates> 
  </Point> 
 </Placemark> 
 <Placemark> 
  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T01:07:32.7190879999998Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75788,30.12672</coordinates> 




  <TimeStamp> 
   <Time>1970-12-01T01:07:33.7055949999999Z</Time> 
  </TimeStamp> 
  <Point> 
   <coordinates>-85.75788,30.12673</coordinates> 




C. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF XML-BASED KML DATA 
There are various tools available that can represent XML-based data visually.  
Open source tools such as X3D-Earth and GOOGLE Earth are a few tools that can adapt 
data to visual formats.   Figure 55 illustrates KML data adapted to the GOOGLE Earth 
tool.  Note that this image is included for demonstration purposes only.  Google Earth 
licensing restricts the distribution of such imagery to personal use only unless otherwise 
licensed (http://www.google.com/intl/en-us/help/legalnotices_maps.html). 
 
Figure 55.   After the AVCL file is converted to KML it can be visualized in applications 
like Google Earth or other applications that accept KML output. 
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Web3D consortium members producing X3D-Earth implementations are 
currently planning to add support for KML on a royalty free basis.  X3D-Earth project is 
a presents a viable means for the creation of a standards-based 3D visualization 
infrastructure for visualizing real-world object and information constructs in a geospatial 
context utilizing Web architecture, XML languages, and open protocols.  Therefore, this 
is an appealing technology with much potential to support all personal and business-





APPENDIX  D.  SECURITY FEATURES OF X3D-EDIT 
 A robust toolset to generate graphics that can be digitally signed and encrypted 
with the most common methodologies has evolved significantly during the evolution of 
this thesis.  Of note is the Extensible Three Dimensional (X3D) Graphic tool.  It is an 
XML-based toolset for developing a vast array of 3D scenes and complex images, as can 
be scene throughout the Scenario Authoring and Visualization for Graphical 
Environments (SAVAGE) archive.   X3D-Edit includes features to support XML 
Canonicalization, XML Digital Signature, XML Encryption and lossless compression 
tools to include EXI compression. 
A. X3D-EDIT’S ROBUST ARRAY OF XML-BASED SECURITY FEATURES 
“X3D-Edit is an open-source extensible three-dimensional (X3D) XML-based 
graphics file editor that enables simple error-free editing, authoring and validation of 
X3D or VRML scene-graph files.  Context-sensitive tooltips provide concise summaries 
of each X3D node and attribute.  More generally, it is an XML editor, customized to edit 
X3D scene graphs.  It can be used to apply style sheet transformations to generate other 
file types, such as HTML and VRML97 (Web3D Consortium)”  It is written in the JAVA 
programming language and is equipped with several plugins that support activities from 
chat to encryption of visual scenes.  X3D-Edit is by design platform independent. 
NPS Professor, Don Brutzman and his team of elite Java programmers to include 
Mike Bailey, Terry Norbratten, and Don McGregor currently support x3D-Edit.  The 
project is based on open source standards-based XML technology as proposed by the 
World Wide Web Consortium Recommendations.  Code contributions from other sources 
are reviewed and plugins made accessible if within the guidelines of the project.  The 
SAVAGE team is currently working towards integrating an EXI implementation within 
the X3D-Edit code base.   
X3D-Edit is equipped with a full array of tools to support XML-Well formed 
verification, XML validation via various methods, XML Canonicalization, XML digital 
signature, and XML Encryption.  With the integration of Portecle, XML inate security 
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features are enhanced to cover a broader array of open source encryption methodologies 
available for X3D-Edit.  Portecle allows for the creation, managing, and examining of 
keystores, keys, certificates, certificate requests, certificate revocation lists and more.   
B. X3D-EDIT SECURITY FEATURES 
X3D-EDIT adheres to the base principles of XML  
 XML Documents must be well-formed 
 XML Documents must be valid 
 Though optional XML Documents may specify a canonicalization (C14N) 
methodology.  C14N is required for XML digital signature 
implementation.  
Well-formness and validity checks are seemless performed seamlessly by the X3D-Edit 
after the addition or removal of each component from the X3D scene.  Well-formedness 
and validity checks are must occur before any other operation in XML.  In regards to 
XML digital signature, they are required.  As seen in Figure 56 the flow of operations 
follows the XML digital signature specification. 
 
Figure 56.   X3D-Edit follows the digital signature specification by ensuring that well 
formedness checks and validity checks are performed before any other operation. 
X3D-Edit separates the operations under the X3D-Edit dropdown menu under the 
subtopic of “Quality Assurance.”  Under this topic the user can select to validate X3D- 
 
Edit using and X3D-Edit DTD, Schema, or Schematron, as well as a few others that are 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. Figure 57 illustrates the X3D Quality Assurance menu 
and options available. 
 
Figure 57.   X3D-Edit offers a array of validations available for an X3D scene as well as 
various other tools.  These features are essential to the proper validation of 
verifying that the document or scene generated is well formed and valid under the 
X3D schema. 
Well-formedness and validity checks are the first stages of X3D-Edit under the 
XML digitatal signature specification.  The XML Security menu illustrated in Figure 61 
offers the other features to support XML digital signature and encryption.  Of note are the 
Manage XML Security Keystore, which is a password protected site that maintains the 
digital certificates and for the user.   The Manage XML security keystore option offers 
two methods of managing digital keys, which are via the innate X3D-Edit keystore that 
was originally built into the X3D-Edit tool or the Portecle, which is a third-party tool that 
was integrated within the X3D-Edit toolset.   Portecle is discussed in further detail later in 
this section.    
When the Manage XML Security Keystore option is selected, the user is 




Manage X3D-Edit keystore option dialog appears.  This option allows the user to browse, 
create, delete, import, and export keys.  The X3D-Edit keystore dialogue is illustrated in 
Figure 58. 
 
Figure 58.   X3D-Edit allows the user to browse, create, delete, import, and export keys.  
These keys serve the basis of creating a digitally signed document in addition to 
encrpypting the document. 
When a create key is selected, the user is given the opportunity to create either a Secret 
key for encrypting the document or a Public/Private key pair for signing the document.  
Using symmetric key encryption the entity receiving an encrypted document can open the 
decrypt the document.  The key distribution problem is left up to each organizations 
security practicioners for implementation.  The public/private key pair is for signing the 
document.  The private key is neither shared nor made available to the general public.  
However, the public keys are distributed to those entities that the user seeks to converse 
securely.  The create public/private key pair option is critical to assuring message 
integrity and sender authenticity. 
 When the manage keystore using Portecle option is selected another Portecle 
dialog box appears which allows the user list all keys in the user’s keychain.  
Furthermore, Portecle provides a full suite of tools that allow greater functionality and a 
more diverse selection in the type of keys that the user can generate.  Figure 59 illustrates 
all possible types of keystores that Portecle can generate.  Portecle offers several types of 
keystores  
 Java Key Store (JKS) which is Sun’s Microsystems Keystore format 
 Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKSC #12) which RSA’s Personal 
Information Exchange Syntax Standard 
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 Java Cryptography Extension Keystore (JCEKS) whick is a more secure form of 
JKS 
 Bouncy Castle Keystore (BKS) which is Bouncy Castles version of JKS  
 Bouncy Castle Uber Keystore (BKS) which is a more secure version of BKS   
 GNU Keyring Keystore that requires a GNU Classpath version 9 or later installed. 
 
Figure 59.   Portecle offers a variety of keystore types, which enhances capability across a 
variety of potential security soultions. 
As with the default built in application, keys can either be created, deleted, 
imported, or exported.   Keystore types can also be changed via the tools menu.  Figure 
59 illustrates an example of the Portecle tools that facilitates key generation, certificate 
and key pair import, as well as various administrative tasks such as keystore password 
and changing keystore type and also a report feature.  The examine feature gives the user 
the ability to inspect the Certificate, the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), the actual 
transport layer security or security socket layer connection and the certificate requests 
itselft.  Finally the the Help menu option provides both online and embedded 






Figure 60.   Portecle tools grants a variety of selections inclusive of an option, which 
allows the user to select a certification authority (CA) certicificate keystore.  
Canonicalization (C14N) is optional for most applications but a required feature 
for using the XML security.  Within X3D-Edit it is accessed through the XML Security 
option of the X3D taskbar.  There are two different types of X3D C14N, the XML 
Canonicalization which adheres strictly to the specification such as ensuring opening and 
closing tags exists for every element and the X3D C14N method that ensures operates in 
a more efficient manner to minimize file size and still comply within the guidelines of 
XML.  Once such difference is for empty tags, such as <book> the X3D method places a 
slash at the end before the closing bracket such that it would appear like <book/>.  The 
XML specification on the other hand would have the example displayed as 
<book></book> thereby having a closing tag for every open tag.  In accordance with the 
W3C specification, the canonicalization method employed during digital signature is 
contained within the X3D/XML code.    
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Figure 61.   X3D-Edit offers two methods of C14N, X3D and XML Canonicalization.  
Although the X3D C14N is based on the W3C specification there are areas where 
it may deviate.  As a result it is highly recommended that the implementation used 
is negotiated with partners prior to deviating from the XML specification.  
The remaining features of the security suite contained within X3D-Edit are self-
explanatory.  For example, for every signed document received there is a method of 
verifying the signature against trusted certificates and checking the signed document.  
There are also options for removing a signature.  It is noted that once a document is 
signed, that any changes to the document invalidates the signature.    Encryption and 
decryption of the document is also a option.  Further information is available at the W3C 
Web site and also at https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit. 
Within the problem domain X3D-Edit effectively employs XML security to 
accomplish all of the prerequisite features of specificed in the XML security specification 
 
as illustrated in Figure 62. EXI compression is integrated into X3D-Edit. Through EXI 
compression implementation the best possible compression performance for XML-based 
data is achieved.   
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Figure 62.   X3D-Edit complies with the W3C recommendation for XML digital signature 
and XML encryption.  It signs and encrypts documents, as described within the 
W3C XML security specifications.  
The World Wide Web Conosortium has an example of the full implementation the 
security features used within X3D edit.  The URL to find the readme file is located at 
http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/x3dSecurityReadMe.html 
C. MODELING EXAMPLES BY X3D-EDIT 
X3D-Edit produces an array of graphical user scenes that are available to the 
general public via the SAVAGE archive, X3DforWebAuthors site, and the W3C.  A 
snapshot of a few of the examples that can be found at these sites are illustrated from 
Figure 63 through 65.  Unique realistic 3D graphics are possible using this X3D Edit that 
also enables imports from different formats and exports to traditional VRML. 
 




Figure 64.   X3D-Edit authored model of a Marine Corp AH1 Super Cobra in flight that is 
displayed using the Octaga viewer within a web browser. 
 
 
Figure 65.   X3D-Edit authored model of a Marine Corp AAAV1 Amphious Assault 
Vehicle within a web browser window. 
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There are several images and full scenes created with X3D-Edit tool suite.  The 
possibilities of the array of simulations that can be created using this tool are without 
bounds.  A key point to remember about X3D-Edit is that it is an open source solution 
that carries the GNU licence, which means that it can be fully integrated with any product 
or used as a stand-alone tool at no charge to the distributer.  However, any changes to the 
X3D-Edit code base must be freely available to the general public for review and 
integration into other products.  This does not mean that a private organization cannot 
maintain proprietary technology.  It simple means that they must ensure that their 
organizational secrets are not so integrated within the X3D code base that they cannot 
share the their changes to the X3D-Edit codebase (not integration technique) with the 
general public. 
B. SUMMARY 
X3D-Edit is a powerful graphics and scene visualization tool with several impressive 
security features that are in compliance with the W3C XML Canonicalization, XML 
Digital Signature, and XML Encryption recommendations.   It checks for well 
formedness, validates against an array of X3D Schemas and DTDs, and facilitates not 
only signing but key generation and storage of an array of certificates via the keystore.  
With the integration of Portecle, the cryptographic feature set available in X3D-Edit are 
greatly enhanced.  It is a definite contender for an all-in-one secure solution for authoring 
X3D graphics and scene graphs.  
 183
APPENDIX  E.  X3D SECURITY EXAMPLES 
The SAVAGE Team implemented the World Wide Web Consortium 
specification for  XML Canonicalization, XML Encryption and XML Digital Signature.  
Figures 66 and 67 illustrate webpages that support XML Security examples.  The are 
located at the following sites:    
http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/X3dSecurityReadMe.html  
http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security 
Figures 68 through 71 illustrate XML that are undergoing the respective XML 
Security operations.  Note, that all of these files underwent the C14N process prior to 
XML digital signature and XML Encryption. These figures represent the HelloWorld 
globe that was illustrated in Figure 16.  It is significant to recognize that each both XML 
Encryption and XML Digital Signature increases the size of the original input file.  























A. X3D SECURITY EXAMPLES HTML PAGE 
 
Figure 66.   The W3C X3D Security examples site is helpful to authors to gain and 
understanding of the implementation of XML Security. 
X3D Security Examples 
 
These examples show how to use the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Security Recommendations for XML Signature and XML 
Encryption with X3D. 
 
Example X3D scenes using XML Security 
 
1. HelloWorldSigned.x3d (.html) is digitally signed for authentication purposes. Digital signature elements appear at the end of 
the X3D scene. 
2. HelloWorldEncryptionInput.x3d (.html) is the example X3D scene that gets encrypted. 
3. HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml is the resulting XML document after applying XML encryption. 
4. HelloWorldDecrypted.x3d (.html) is the round-trip version that shows successful decryption. 
5. HelloWorldSignedEncryptionResult.xml is the resulting XML document after applying XML encryption to the signed version. 
6. HelloWorldSignedDecrypted.x3d (.html) is the round-trip version that shows successful decryption, and subsequent 
verification, of the signed version. 
 
X3D Canonicalization (C14N) was also performed on each of the unsigned .x3d scenes. 
 
These examples are distributed in the Security section of the X3D Basic Examples Archive under an open-source license. 
 
Keystore and keys for testing 
 
An example copy of the X3D-EditKeystore.ks containing encryption and authentication keys is provided in the keystore subdirectory. 
The Portecle tool produced reports about the keystore contents: X3D-EditKeystoreReport.txt and X3D-EditKeystoreReport.xml. 
 
X3D-Edit places keystore files in the %HOMEPATH%/X3D-Edit/security subdirectory. The password for this keystore is test. 
 
XML Signature (digital authentication) was applied using the example PublicPrivatePair key pair, available as 
PublicPrivatePair_certificateChain.cer. 
 
XML Encryption and decryption was applied using a single example SecretKey, available as SecretKey_key.b64. 
 
Warning: these keys are only provided for repeatability testing of the example results. Do not use them for your own work since they are 




These examples were produced using X3D-Edit 3.2. XML Security functions are provided via a right-click context menu for X3D scenes. 
A simple keystore management panel is also provided for creating, deleting, importing and exporting various public/private key pairs and 
secret keys. 
 
Unresolved problems and deficiencies are tracked using the X3D Security Issues using XML Signature and Encryption bug entry. 
 
Supplementary tool: Portecle is a user-friendly GUI application for creating, managing and examining keystores, keys, certificates, 
certificate requests, certificate revocation lists and more. 
 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for this page is  
http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/X3dSecurityReadMe.html  
Revised 7 July 2008. 
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B. SECURITY DIRECTORY CATALOG PAGE 
 
Figure 67.   An XML-based resource catalogue of results from various security operations 
is also available on the web3d.org site. 
XML-based X3D data is reprepresented in Figures 68 through 71.  
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Figure 68.   HelloworldDecrypted illustrates the XML-based X3D data that is illustrated 
visually as a globe, which is seen in Figure 16 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2//EN" "http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.dtd"> 
<X3D profile='Immersive' version='3.2' xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' 
xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation='http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.xsd'> 
  <head> 
    <meta content='HelloWorldDecrypted.x3d' name='title'/> 
    <meta content='Simple X3D example for XML encryption for security; actual encrypted result is in XML file 
HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml' name='description'/> 
    <meta content='HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='2 July 2008' name='created'/> 
    <meta content='6 July 2008' name='modified'/> 
    <meta content='Don Brutzman, Mike Bailey' name='creator'/> 
    <meta content='X3dSecurityReadMe.html' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='keystore/SelectSigningSecretKey.png' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='keystore/SecretKey_key.b64' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorld.x3d' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldEncryptionInput.x3d' 
name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml' 
name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldDecrypted.x3d' 
name='identifier'/> 
    <meta content='X3D-Edit 3.2, https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit' name='generator'/> 
    <meta content='X3D security, XML encryption, secret key' name='subject'/> 
    <meta content='../license.html' name='license'/> 
  </head> 
  <Scene> 
    <!-- Example scene to illustrate X3D tags and attributes. --> 
    <Group bboxCenter='0 0 0' bboxSize='-1 -1 -1' containerField='children'> 
      <Viewpoint centerOfRotation='0 -1 0' containerField='children' description='Hello world!' fieldOfView='0.785398' 
jump='true' position='0 -1 7'/> 
      <Transform bboxCenter='0 0 0' bboxSize='-1 -1 -1' center='0 0 0' containerField='children' rotation='0 1 0 3' scale='1 1 1' 
scaleOrientation='0 0 1 0' translation='0 0 0'> 
        <Shape bboxCenter='0 0 0' bboxSize='-1 -1 -1' containerField='children'> 
          <Sphere containerField='geometry' radius='1' solid='true'/> 
          <Appearance containerField='appearance'> 
            <Material ambientIntensity='0.2' containerField='material' diffuseColor='0 0.5 1' emissiveColor='0 0 0' shininess='0.2' 
specularColor='0 0 0' transparency='0'/> 




          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
      <Transform bboxCenter='0 0 0' bboxSize='-1 -1 -1' center='0 0 0' containerField='children' scale='1 1 1' 
scaleOrientation='0 0 1 0' translation='0 -2 0'> 
        <Shape bboxCenter='0 0 0' bboxSize='-1 -1 -1' containerField='children'> 
          <Text containerField='geometry' maxExtent='0.0' solid='false' string='"Hello" "world!"'> 
            <FontStyle containerField='fontStyle' family='"SERIF"' horizontal='true' justify='"MIDDLE" "MIDDLE"' 
leftToRight='true' size='1.0' spacing='1.0' style='PLAIN' topToBottom='true'/> 
          </Text> 
          <Appearance containerField='appearance'> 
            <Material ambientIntensity='0.2' containerField='material' diffuseColor='0.1 0.5 1' emissiveColor='0 0 0' 
shininess='0.2' specularColor='0 0 0' transparency='0'/> 
          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
    </Group> 





Figure 69.   HelloWorldEncryptionInput illustrates the XML-based X3D data used prior to 
undergoing an XML Encryption operation. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2//EN" "http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.dtd"> 
<X3D profile='Immersive' version='3.2' xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' 
xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation='http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.xsd'> 
  <head> 
    <meta content='HelloWorldEncryptionInput.x3d' name='title'/> 
    <meta content='Simple X3D example for XML encryption for security; actual encrypted result is in XML file 
HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml' name='description'/> 
    <meta content='HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='2 July 2008' name='created'/> 
    <meta content='6 July 2008' name='modified'/> 
    <meta content='Don Brutzman, Mike Bailey' name='creator'/> 
    <meta content='X3dSecurityReadMe.html' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='keystore/SelectSigningSecretKey.png' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='keystore/SecretKey_key.b64' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorld.x3d' name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldDecrypted.x3d' 
name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldEncryptionResult.xml' 
name='reference'/> 
    <meta content='http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldEncryptionInput.x3d' 
name='identifier'/> 
    <meta content='X3D-Edit 3.2, https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit' name='generator'/> 
    <meta content='X3D security, XML encryption, secret key' name='subject'/> 
    <meta content='../license.html' name='license'/> 
  </head> 
  <Scene> 
    <!-- Example scene to illustrate X3D tags and attributes. --> 
    <Group> 
      <Viewpoint centerOfRotation='0 -1 0' description='Hello world!' position='0 -1 7'/> 
      <Transform rotation='0 1 0 3'> 
        <Shape> 
          <Sphere/> 
          <Appearance> 
            <Material diffuseColor='0 0.5 1'/> 




          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
      <Transform translation='0 -2 0'> 
        <Shape> 
          <Text solid='false' string='"Hello" "world!"'> 
            <FontStyle justify='"MIDDLE" "MIDDLE"'/> 
          </Text> 
          <Appearance> 
            <Material diffuseColor='0.1 0.5 1'/> 
          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
    </Group> 





<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2//EN" "http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.dtd"> 
<X3D xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
profile="Immersive" version="3.2" xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.xsd"> 
  <head> 
    <meta content="HelloWorldSigned.x3d" name="title" /> 
    <meta content="Simple X3D example with XML digital signature for author authentication, also used for example combined 
with encryption" name="description" /> 
    <meta content="2 July 2008" name="created" /> 
    <meta content="6 July 2008" name="modified" /> 
    <meta content="Don Brutzman, Mike Bailey" name="creator" /> 
    <meta content="X3dSecurityReadMe.html" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="keystore/SelectSigningKeyPair.png" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="keystore/PublicPrivatePair_certificateChain.cer" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorld.x3d" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldSignedEncryptedResult.xml" 
name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldSignedDecrypted.x3d" 
name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldSigned.x3d" name="identifier" /> 
    <meta content="X3D-Edit 3.2, https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit" name="generator" /> 
    <meta content="../license.html" name="license" /> 
    <meta content="X3D security, XML signature authentication, public private key pair, XML encryption, secret key" 
name="subject" /> 
  </head> 
  <Scene> 
    <!-- Example scene to illustrate X3D tags and attributes. --> 
    <Group bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" containerField="children"> 
      <Viewpoint centerOfRotation="0 -1 0" containerField="children" description="Hello world!" fieldOfView="0.785398" 
jump="true" orientation="0 0 1 0" position="0 -1 7" /> 
      <Transform bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" center="0 0 0" containerField="children" rotation="0 1 0 3" scale="1 1 
1" scaleOrientation="0 0 1 0" translation="0 0 0"> 
        <Shape bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" containerField="children"> 
          <Sphere containerField="geometry" radius="1" solid="true" /> 
          <Appearance containerField="appearance"> 
            <Material ambientIntensity="0.2" containerField="material" diffuseColor="0 0.5 1" emissiveColor="0 0 0" 
shininess="0.2" specularColor="0 0 0" transparency="0" /> 




          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
      <Transform bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" center="0 0 0" containerField="children" rotation="0 0 1 0" scale="1 1 
1" scaleOrientation="0 0 1 0" translation="0 -2 0"> 
        <Shape bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" containerField="children"> 
          <Text containerField="geometry" maxExtent="0.0" solid="false" string="&quot;Hello&quot; &quot;world!&quot;"> 
            <FontStyle containerField="fontStyle" family="&quot;SERIF&quot;" horizontal="true" justify="&quot;MIDDLE&quot; 
&quot;MIDDLE&quot;" leftToRight="true" size="1.0" spacing="1.0" style="PLAIN" topToBottom="true" /> 
          </Text> 
          <Appearance containerField="appearance"> 
            <Material ambientIntensity="0.2" containerField="material" diffuseColor="0.1 0.5 1" emissiveColor="0 0 0" 
shininess="0.2" specularColor="0 0 0" transparency="0" /> 
          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
    </Group> 
  </Scene> 
<ds:Signature> 
<ds:SignedInfo> 
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315" /> 





Figure 70.   HelloWorldSigned illustrates the XML-based X3D data used after an XML 
Digital Signature operation. 
 
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments" /> 
</ds:Transforms> 

















































<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE X3D PUBLIC "ISO//Web3D//DTD X3D 3.2//EN" "http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.dtd"> 
<X3D xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
profile="Immersive" version="3.2" xsd:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://www.web3d.org/specifications/x3d-3.2.xsd"> 
  <head> 
    <meta content="HelloWorldSignedDecrypted.x3d" name="title" /> 
    <meta content="Simple X3D example with XML digital signature for author authentication, also used for example 
combined with encryption" name="description" /> 
    <meta content="2 July 2008" name="created" /> 
    <meta content="6 July 2008" name="modified" /> 
    <meta content="Don Brutzman, Mike Bailey" name="creator" /> 
    <meta content="X3dSecurityReadMe.html" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="keystore/SelectSigningKeyPair.png" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="keystore/PublicPrivatePair_certificateChain.cer" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/HelloWorld.x3d" name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldSignedEncryptedResult.xml" 
name="reference" /> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldSigned.x3d" name="reference" 
/> 
    <meta content="http://www.web3d.org/x3d/content/examples/Basic/Security/HelloWorldSignedDecrypted.x3d" 
name="identifier" /> 
    <meta content="X3D-Edit 3.2, https://savage.nps.edu/X3D-Edit" name="generator" /> 
    <meta content="../license.html" name="license" /> 
    <meta content="X3D security, XML signature authentication, public private key pair, XML encryption, secret key" 
name="subject" /> 
  </head> 
  <Scene> 
    <!-- Example scene to illustrate X3D tags and attributes. --> 
    <Group bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" containerField="children"> 
      <Viewpoint centerOfRotation="0 -1 0" containerField="children" description="Hello world!" fieldOfView="0.785398" 
jump="true" orientation="0 0 1 0" position="0 -1 7" /> 
      <Transform bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" center="0 0 0" containerField="children" rotation="0 1 0 3" 
scale="1 1 1" scaleOrientation="0 0 1 0" translation="0 0 0"> 
        <Shape bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" containerField="children"> 
          <Sphere containerField="geometry" radius="1" solid="true" /> 
          <Appearance containerField="appearance"> 
            <Material ambientIntensity="0.2" containerField="material" diffuseColor="0 0.5 1" emissiveColor="0 0 0" 
shininess="0.2" specularColor="0 0 0" transparency="0" /> 





          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 
      <Transform bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" center="0 0 0" containerField="children" rotation="0 0 1 0" 
scale="1 1 1" scaleOrientation="0 0 1 0" translation="0 -2 0"> 
        <Shape bboxCenter="0 0 0" bboxSize="-1 -1 -1" containerField="children"> 
          <Text containerField="geometry" maxExtent="0.0" solid="false" string="&quot;Hello&quot; &quot;world!&quot;"> 
            <FontStyle containerField="fontStyle" family="&quot;SERIF&quot;" horizontal="true" 
justify="&quot;MIDDLE&quot; &quot;MIDDLE&quot;" leftToRight="true" size="1.0" spacing="1.0" style="PLAIN" 
topToBottom="true" /> 
          </Text> 
<Appearance containerField="appearance"> 
            <Material ambientIntensity="0.2" containerField="material" diffuseColor="0.1 0.5 1" emissiveColor="0 0 0" 
shininess="0.2" specularColor="0 0 0" transparency="0" /> 
          </Appearance> 
        </Shape> 
      </Transform> 





Figure 71.   HelloWorldSigned illustrates the XML-based X3D data used after an XML 
Digital Signature operation. 
<ds:Signature> 
<ds:SignedInfo> 
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315" /> 
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
<ds:Reference URI="#xpointer(/)"> 
<ds:Transforms> 
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments" /> 
</ds:Transforms> 
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